The German question and the international order (1943-8): an English school approach by Lewkowicz, Nicolas Abel
Lewkowicz, Nicolas Abel (2008) The German question 
and the international order (1943-8): an English school 
approach. PhD thesis, University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/11168/1/479269.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
The German Question and the International 
Order (1943-8): an English School approach 
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in History 
October 2007 
Nicolas Abel Lewkowicz LLB(Hons), BA (Hons), NIA (Birkbeck College, University of 
London) 
Pg 
iox ry 
1' 
lrs. ý++wwr. cmýrsesaý? 
ABSTRACT 
Using the interpretative framework of the English School of international relations, the 
thesis explores the extent to which the inter-Allied treatment of the German Question 
during the 1943-8 period influenced the making of the post-war international order. Linking 
international relations theory with historical research, the thesis reinstates the importance of 
the resolution of the German Question as the most influential issue in the development of 
the post-war international order. The thesis explores the institutionalisation of international 
relations and the dynamic interaction of the legal, consensual and conflictual elements 
involved in the treatment of the German Question, portraying them as the main informative 
aspects of the origins of the Cold War international order. 
Employing the `trilateral approach' espoused by Martin Wight, the thesis tackles the Realist 
aspects of the treatment of the German Question by analysing superpower interaction in 
relation to the enforcement of their structural interests and the socialisation of conflict at 
occupation and diplomatic level. The thesis evaluates the transformation which occurred in 
Germany and the post-war international order due to the inter-Allied work on 
denazification. The thesis also analyses the Rationalist aspects of superpower interaction, 
with particular emphasis on the legal and diplomatic framework which sustained not only the 
treatment of the German Question but also the general context of inter-Allied relations. The 
main conclusion of the thesis is that by restricting superpower intervention to specific 
spheres of influence, the treatment of the German Question contributed to the creation of a 
`pluralist plus' international order which inhibited a systemic disruption of the bipolar 
settlement imposed by the main Allies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The treatment of the German Question and the making of the post-war international 
order (1943-8) 
The discussion and implementation of policy regarding the future of Germany from the 
declaration of `unconditional surrender', made at the Casablanca Conference in January 
1943, until the partition into two states in 1949, constituted the most important factor in the 
configuration of the post-war international order. Germany was given the most 
comprehensive treatment ever dispensed to a vanquished nation in the modern history of 
the international political system. The fundamental premise of this treatment was the 
acknowledgment of Germany's central position in the European political and economic 
order and its implications for the post-war international order. Germany had challenged the 
international order during the 1930s by rearming and gearing herself towards a war 
economy. Since 1938, Germany had redrawn its borders with her advance into Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and much of Western and Eastern Europe until the turn of the tide 
in favour of the Allies in 1942-1943. Germany was the only member of the Axis against 
whom all the major Allies campaigned together. This meant that at the end of the war, the 
United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France would have troops stationed on German 
soil. The new balance of power system and the formation of the spheres of influence were 
created in Germany. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had significant vested 
interests in the political and economic reorganisation of Germany. The United States were 
fundamentally interested in fostering the political and economic conditions that would 
satisfy its `grand design' for the post-war international order: the preservation and expansion 
of the free market system of exchange. Moscow's primary objectives were to prevent a 
future German aggression and to extract reparations from Germany. These objectives were 
geared towards rebuilding its devastated economy and influencing the political process in 
post-war Germany. 
Applying the theoretical framework provided by the English School of international 
relations, this thesis explores two arguments. Firstly, that the treatment of the German 
Question from the period spanning from the Casablanca Declaration until the breakdown of 
four power control unfolded within the trilateral perspective espoused by Martin Wight. The 
trilateral context of the treatment of the German Question comprised Rationalist elements 
which stemmed from the practical association framework that originated during the war, 
such as international law, diplomacy and the formation of spheres of influence. The 
treatment of the German Question was also informed by the pursuit of the national interest 
by each of the Allies, which spawned the conflict that would ultimately cause the polarisation 
of Germany and Europe into two camps. It also included the Revolutionist elements which 
would overhaul the political, social and economic system of both Germanys and create a 
transformation in the `society of states'. 
Secondly, this thesis argues that the trilateral context not only influenced the outcome of the 
German Question but also the shape of the post-war international order. Developments 
regarding Germany would influence the order of things in Europe and the international 
political system as a whole for the duration of the Cold War. The treatment of the German 
Question would shape the post-war international order in a `pluralist plus' manner, for the 
2 
elements of intervention and coexistence interacted in order to prevent a systemic disruption 
of the bipolar settlement imposed by the superpowers and create a series of transformations 
in the composition of the `society of states'. 
Thus far, the historical debate on the treatment of the German Question by the Allies 
from the declaration of `unconditional surrender', agreed by Roosevelt and Churchill at 
the Casablanca Conference of January-February 1943, until the walkout of the Soviet 
representative from the ACC in March 1948, has been mainly tackled by isolating 
specific aspects. This study reinstates the importance of the German Question as the most 
important factor in the configuration of the post-war international system. Moreover, 
unlike works tackling the same subject, this thesis charts the influence of the German 
Question on the origins of the Cold War using international relations theory. The inter- 
disciplinary nature of this study brings to light the different theoretical perspectives on 
the treatment of the German Question and on the origins of the Cold War and contrasts 
them against the framework of the English School of international relations. Within this 
interpretative framework, I will analyse the treatment of the German Question by analysing 
the different theoretical possibilities of the `trilateral approach' outlined by Martin Wight as 
well as by exploring the various aspects involved in the `pluralist-solidarist' debate. 
Martin Wight suggests that the most distinguished theories of international politics can be 
divided into three basic categories: Realism, which emphasises the concept of `international 
anarchy'; Revolutionism, which concentrates on the aspect of the `moral unity' of the 
international society and Rationalism, which is based on the aspect of `international 
dialogue 
3 
and intercourse'. ' Wight argues that the three traditions influence and cross-fertilise each 
other, constantly evolving but without losing their inner identity. 2 By rejecting each 
extreme, the English School embodies the notion of a middle course between practical 
demands and moral claims. In contrast to the Realist approach, the English School maintains 
that states are not entangled in a permanent struggle for power and that they limit their 
conflicts through common rules, institutions and moral imperatives. Unlike the Kantian 
tradition, the English School accepts the Realist premise that the state is the primary reality 
of the international political system and maintain that these imperatives foreswear the 
replacement of the society of states by a universal community of mankind. 3 One of the basic 
assumptions of this approach is that although the three traditions overlap, Rationalism 
provides a via media between national interest pursuits and moral claims. 
Wight's categorisation of the different traditions of international relations theory was taken 
by Hedley Bull, C. W. Manning, H. Butterfield and John Vincent among others, and its 
subsequent development came to be known as the English School of international relations. 
The English School, which has its roots in the Grotian view of an international order based 
on the rule of law among nations, describes the international political system as a society of 
states or international society. An international society comes into existence when a group of 
states perceive themselves to be bound by rules in their relations with one another and share 
common institutions. 4 The goals of international society are the preservation of the system 
and the society of states itself, the maintenance of external sovereignty (subordinate to the 
1 Wight M., International Theory, (London: Leicester University Press, a division of Pinter Publishers) (1991), p. 7- 
8 
2 Wight M., International Theory, p. 260 
3 Bull H., The Anarchical Society, (Basingstoke: Macmillan) (1995), p. 26-7 
4 Bull H., The Anarchical Society, p. 13 
4 
preservation of the society of states itself, by way of balance of power) and the goal of peace, 
to be breached only on special occasions. 5 
Another way in which the English School engages in the discussion over the nature of 
`international society' is from the perspective of the `pluralist-solidarist' debate. The English 
School tradition differentiates between the pluralist and the solidarist conception of 
international society. For pluralists like Hedley Bull and Robert Jackson, international 
relations are constituted through rational fixed principles of interaction and coexistence, 
such as sovereignty, diplomacy and international law. Denying an analogy between national 
and international societies, the pluralists maintain a common identity or culture is not 
necessarily seen as a precondition of international society. Within this approach, states are 
the only members of international society. ' Solidarists like R. J. Vincent stress substantial 
values and a common tradition as the normative foundation of international society, which is 
based on the principle of solidarity. They uphold an ethical universalism that serves as a 
moral standard of conduct. Within this approach members of the international society are 
both states and human beings. Therefore, next to the regulative norms emphasised by 
pluralists, human rights norms (enforced through the element of intervention, if necessary) 
are stressed as essential constitutive elements of the international society. ' 
The Allies configured a `pluralist plus' post-war international order by restraining the 
typically solidarist element of intervention to the demarcation imposed by the pluralist- 
5 Bull H., The Anarchical Society, p. 17 
6 See Bull, The Anarchical Society. Also, Jackson, R., The Global Covenant-Human Conduct in a World of States, (OUP: 
Oxford and New York) (2000) 
5 
orientated spheres of influence system. This interaction, which informed the development of 
the Cold War international order, stemmed from the treatment of the German Question. 
Apart from the obvious implications that this interpretative approach has for the study of 
the international political system, it also has the potential to shed new light on the pluralist- 
solidarist debate. In the case of the treatment of the German Question, the unfolding of the 
`pluralist plus' formula can be analysed from the Rationalist, Realist and Revolutionist 
dimensions of the English School schema. 
From the Rationalist perspective, the plurality of interests involved in the treatment of the 
German Question and the difference of ideologies between the superpowers compelled the 
Allies to intervene in the establishment of an assiduous legal and diplomatic framework and 
the setting of spheres of influence in order to restrain the conflictual side of relations. The 
precedent created by the wartime practical association framework would enable the Allies to 
proceed with a non-disruptive settlement of the German Question and enforce an orderly 
transition to a bipolar international order. This interpretation constitutes a via media 
between the centrality given to intervention by the solidarists and its rejection by the pluralist 
camp. In effect, the interventionism exercised by the superpowers in the treatment of the 
German Question and the creation of the post-war international order constituted a `selfish 
solidarism': a kind of solidarism which responded to the pursuit of the national interest, but 
also to the need to achieve a significant modicum of coexistence. 
7 Vincent, R. J., Human Rights and International Relations: issues and responses, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) (1986) p. 126. See also Vincent, R. J., Nonintervention and international order (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press) (1974) 
6 
From the Realist standpoint, the `pluralist plus' dimension of the treatment of the German 
Question responded to the importance given by the superpowers to the role of intervention 
in the attainment of their long range structural interests. The `selfish solidarism' employed in 
the pursuit of their respective `grand designs' was demarcated by pluralist spheres of 
influence. The principle of intervention involved in the treatment of the German Question 
was socialised in order to enforce the superpowers' bottom line interests within the 
boundaries of coexistence. 
The Revolutionist aspects of the treatment of the German Question denote a `pluralist plus' 
interaction in the reordering of the post-war international order. Superpower intervention 
served to rid Germany of the ideology which could have posed a threat of disruption to the 
society of states. This aspect of intervention unfolded within the spirit of coexistence: the 
process of denazification provided the superpowers with the opportunity to reconcile the 
transformation of Germany with their own long-term political and economic interests. 
It is worth mentioning that from its very beginnings, the English School had an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of international relations. The British Committee for 
the theory of international politics, the gathering point for English School scholars in the late 
1950s, included people with different training such as historians, diplomats and public 
servants. 8 In this context, and using the interpretative methods of international society 
thinking described above, this work intends to chart the importance of the German 
Question as the most important system-defining issue in the reconfiguration of the 
international order after 1943. 
7 
Among the few scholars that have tackled the German Question from a systemic 
perspective, Eisenberg argues that the partition of Germany into two separate states after the 
war was fundamentally `an American decision'. 9 According to Eisenberg, the Truman 
administration chose to overlook what the Allies agreed on at Yalta and Potsdam in regards 
to reparations, the shape of the post-war German government and various other areas. 
Added to this, the American push for the rehabilitation of the Western zones along 
conservative, capitalist and anti-Communist lines minimised the impact of the denazification 
process, limited the decartelisation of German industry and prevented a substantial reform 
of organised labour. Eisenberg's thesis is that a more accommodating stance of the United 
States to the demands of the Soviet Union could have prevented the division of Germany, 
Berlin and Europe. 
Trachtenberg, who elaborates on the German Question from the perspective of the Truman, 
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, is of the view that Germany constituted the 
central element of the Cold War and that its resolution was the key to a stable international 
order. '0 Trachtenberg argues that in spite of the acquiescence of the United States to the 
hegemonic drive of the Soviet Union towards Eastern Europe and to a four-zones 
occupation structure in Germany, Stalin's desire to extend Soviet power beyond his 
European area of influence in Europe into Iran and Turkey prompted the policy of 
8 Adam Watson notes on the British Committee for the theory of international politics (November 1998). 
l From the English School site www. leeds. ac. uk/12ohs/englishschoo 
9 See Eisenberg, C., Drawing the line: the American decision to divide Germany, 1944-1949 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) 
10 Trachtenberg, M., A Constructed Peace, (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press) (1999) p. 7 
8 
containment. " McAllister tackles the American involvement in Germany from the 
perspective of the `distribution of power' that unfolded after the war and analyses how 
Washington's policies influenced the polarisation of the post-war international order. 12 
In contrast to these American-focused accounts, Deighton looks at the influence of Britain 
in the creation of a Western policy for Germany. 13 Hughes follows from Deighton in adding 
to the debate on Britain's role in the evolution of the German Question. By examining the 
British input on the treatment of the German Question, Hughes brings to light the changed 
role of Britain in the international political order after 1945 and enhances our perspective on 
the position of the less predominant actors in the unfolding of the Cold War. " However, 
even these systemic works are very partial in their coverage, tending to focus on the policies 
of one state. 
Within the historical debate on the origins of the Cold War there are three mainstream 
traditions. The orthodox or traditionalist view, which prevailed during the first two decades 
of the Cold War, pins the blame on the origins of the conflict on the Soviet Union, adducing 
that Moscow imposed its hegemony on Eastern Europe and that the United States only 
reacted in 1947, in the form of Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The orthodox view 
II Trachtenberg, M., A Constructed Peace, p. 13 and pp. 35-41 
12 See McAllister, J., No Exit., America and the German Problem, 1943-1954, (Cornell University Press) (2002), p. 12 
13 See Deighton, A., The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford: 
Clarendon) (1990) 
14 Hughes, R. G,. Britain, Germany and the Cold War-The Search for a European Detente 1949-1967, (Abingdon, 
Oxon: Routledge) (2007) 
9 
sees security concerns and the protection of capitalism and democracy as the principal 
motivations of US foreign policy in the aftermath of World War Two. 's 
The revisionist school maintains that Washington conducted an aggressive foreign policy 
sustained by massive economic and military power, which motivated the Soviet Union to 
defend herself against the Western expansionism led by the United States. The revisionists 
see the need of the United States to invest abroad, to export its surplus and to import certain 
goods needed by the US economy as the prime objectives of post-war American foreign 
policy. 16 
15 See, inter alia, Schlesinger, A., Origins of the Cold War, Foreign Affairs 46, no. 1 (October 1967) pp. 22-52; 
Fels, H., From Trust to Terror. The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-50 (New York, 1970); Ulam, A., The Rivals: America 
and Russia since World War II (New York, 1971); Ulam, A., Expansion and Coexistence, (New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston) (1973); Kennan, G., Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1954); Mosely, P., The Kremlin and World Politics (New York, 1960); Maddox, R., The New Left and the Origins of the 
Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press) (1973); Ferrell, R., Truman Foreign Policy: A Traditionalist View, 
in Kirkendall, R., (ed)., The Truman Period as a Research Field (Columbia, 1974); Taubman, W., Stalin's American 
Policy (New York: W. W. Norton) (1982); Kuniholm, B., The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1987); Thomas, H., Armed Truce (New York, 1987); Kissinger, H., Necessity for Choice 
(New York, 1961). While John Lewis Gaddis spent most of his career as a post-revisionist, he has recently 
switched to the traditionalist camp. See We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon) (1997)); 
see also MacDonald, D., Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War, International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 
1995-96): 152-88; Raack, R. C., Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). 
Traditionalists emphasising Stalin's pursuit of power and security over ideological ends are Woods R. and 
Jones, H., The Damning of the Cold War (Athens, GA.: University of Georgia Press, 1991); Mastny, V., Russia's 
Road to the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Mastny, \'., The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Halle, L., The Cold War As History (New York: Harper and Row) 
(1967) and Spanier, J., American Foreign Policy Since the World War II (New York: Praeger) (1973) 
16 See Kolko, G., Politics of War (New York: Pantheon) (1990); Kolko, G. and Kolko, J., The Limits of Power (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1972); Williams, W. A., The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, rev. ed. (New York, 1962); 
LeFeber, W., America, Russia, and the Cold War (New York, 1967); McCormick, T., America's Half Century 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); Fleming, D. F. The Cold War and its Origins, 1917 1960,2 
vols. (Garden City, NY.: 1961); Horowitz, D., (ed. ), Containment and Revolution (Boston, 1968); Gardner, L., 
Architects of Illusion (Chicago, (1970); Bernstein, B., American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War, in 
Bernstein, B., (ed. ) Politics and Policies of the Truman Administation (Chicago, 1970); Alperovitz, G., Atomic 
Diplomacy, rev. ed. (London: Pluto) (1994); Alperovitz, G., The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (New York: 
Vintage, 1995); Horowitz, D., The Free World Colossus, rev. ed. (New York, 1971). For early critiques, see 
Tucker, R., The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hokpins University Press) (1971); 
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In the latter years of the Cold War, there were attempts to forge a `post-revisionist' synthesis. 
Rather than attribute the beginning of the Cold War to the actions of either superpower, 
post-revisionist historians have focused on reciprocal misperception, mutual reactivity and 
shared responsibility between the superpowers. According to this synthesis, `Communist 
activity' was not the root of the difficulties of Europe, but rather a consequence of the 
disruptive effects of World War Two on its economic, political and social structure. 17 My 
work parries the views of the three main lines of interpretation of the origins of the Cold 
War against the English School framework by charting the Realist aspects of superpower 
interaction over the treatment of the German Question. In order to do that, it explores the 
implementation of structural interests on the part of the superpowers as well as the elements 
involved in the socialisation of conflict. 
This work analyses the German Question from a systemic standpoint. By examining the 
treatment of the German Question within the context of overlapping conflict, cooperation 
and legality, this work endorses a post-revisionist stance. The Allies pursued their objectives 
as dictated by their national interest. However, they also established in a highly complex 
17 See Gaddis, J. L., The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University 
Press) (1972); Gaddis, J. L., Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press) (1982): Gaddis, J. L., 
`The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War, Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983): pp. 
171-90; Gaddis, J. L., Long Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Lundestad, G., Empire by Invitation? 
The United States and Europe, 1945-1952', journal of Peace Research 23, no. 3 (1986): 263-77; Lundestad, G., The 
American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe, 1943-1947 (New York, 1978); Parrish, S., `USSR and the Security 
Dilemma' (Ph. D diss., Columbia University, 1993); McMahon, R., The Cold War on the Periphery (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994); Trachtenberg, M., History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 
(1991); Yergin, D., Shattered Peace, rev. ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990); Wolhforth, W., The Elusive Balance: 
Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) (1993); Wolhforth, W., New Evidence 
on Moscow's Cold War', Diplomatic History 21, no. 2 (Spring 1997) pp. 229-42; Paterson, T., Soviet-American 
Confrontation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press) (1973); Pollard, R., Economic Security and the Origins of 
the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press) (1985); For a recent discussion of post- 
revisionism, see The Origins of the Cold War" A Symposium', led off by Howard Jones and Randall Woods's 'Origins 
of the Cold War in Europe and the Near East: Recent Historiography and the National Security Imperative, with 
commentaries by Rosenberg, E., Stephanson, R. and Berstein, B., in Diplomatic History 17, no. 2 (Spring 
1993): pp. 251-310 
framework of law and diplomacy, and a spheres of influence system. At the same time, they 
attempted to transform the post-war international order by creating a discontinuity with the 
Nazi regime and enhancing the scope of international organisation and cooperation. The 
treatment of the German Question became the microcosm of the post-war international 
order and initiated the overlap of legality, conflict and cooperation that extended to the 
international political system as a whole. In the treatment of the German Question, the 
elements of legality, conflict and cooperation overlapped and influenced the ultimate 
outcome towards a bipolar system. In the making of bipolarity, the elements of intervention 
and coexistence interacted in a `pluralist plus' manner and prevented a systemic disruption of 
the settlement imposed by the superpowers. Germany, Europe and the international political 
system embarked on a process of polarisation as the result of superpower interaction. 
However, polarisation emerged within a legal and diplomatic framework which compelled 
the actors involved in the treatment of the German Question to achieve an effective and 
orderly transition from a quadripartite to a bipolar arrangement. This Rationalist framework 
tamed the effects derived from the state of tension produced by the clash of interests 
between the four occupying powers and enabled the transformation of Germany on the 
basis of the denazification of political life, the Europeanisation of its economic system 
(particularly in the Western zones) and the `sovietisation' of Länder east of the Elbe. 
An analysis of the treatment of the German Question cannot be divorced from the general 
context of inter-Allied relations. In the following chapters, I will tackle the general aspects of 
superpower interaction in regards to configuration of the post-war international order and 
examine to what extent these influenced the process of polarisation. 
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As well as referring to the abundant literature and published primary sources on the subject, 
including Soviet and French policy, this study has also exploited British government 
documents in the National Archives at Kew Gardens, London and US sources at the 
National Archives in College Park, Maryland. Time restrictions and the vast volume of 
potentially useful material available necessitated a selective process involving the examination 
of documents related to strategic policy and the diplomacy of the German Question. I have 
looked in great detail at the FO 371 and CAB 129 files at the National Archives in Kew 
Gardens and the Miscelaneous German Files 1943-5, the State Files (Lot), the 
Interdepartmental and intradepartmental Committee (State Department) SWNCC 1944-9, 
the Documents Series and the Interdepartmental & Intradepartmental Committee (State 
Department)-SWNCC-Decimal files 1944-49 in the National Archives in Washington, DC. 
It is worth mentioning that there is a considerable number of good primary material 
accessible online, which is especially useful when examining the legal and policy aspects of 
inter-Allied relations. 18 
Although I was able to come across some good secondary sources and published primary 
sources relating to the French and Soviet participation in the policy-making, diplomacy and 
occupation network, I did not use any sources from the Moscow and Paris Archives. The 
French Archives at Quai d'Orsay and the military archives at Colmar remain underworked. 
In the case of Soviet sources, there is a good number of published primary documents which 
18 This is particularly true of American documents. The Truman Presidential Library www. trumanlibrary. org 
and the Roosevelt Presidential Library (http: //www. fdrlibrary. marist. edu/) provide very useful documents 
related to US policy during the latter stages of the war and the early Cold War. The National Security Archive 
(http: //www. gwu. edu/-nsarchiv/) is a great source for primary documents related to US intelligence, 
particularly in regards to assessments of Soviet Union during the early period of the Cold War.. The Foreign 
Office has a collection of documents pertaining to the diplomatic relations between the main Allies in regards 
to Germany 
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reflect Moscow's thinking on inter-Allied relations in general and the treatment of the 
German Question in particular. These published sources are indicative of the mindset 
prevailing amongst the Soviet leaders and its influence on the treatment of the German 
Question and the configuration of the post-war international order. 
Turning to the structure of the thesis, chapter 1 exposes the practical association between 
the Allies during World War Two, emphasising the Rationalist aspects of inter-Allied 
relations regarding the German Question and the creation of the post-war international 
order. Chapter 1 focuses on the spectrum of military, legal and diplomatic cooperation as 
well as the issues of dismemberment, occupation and reparations. Following from the 
Rationalist perspective outlined in chapter 1, the treatment of the German Question in 
relation to the way it influenced the creation of the `primary institutions' of the post-war 
international society is charted in chapter 4. The application of diplomacy, international law 
and formation of the balance of power created an outcome for Germany and the post-war 
international order that was enforced through the instruments of intervention and 
coexistence. This overlap between intervention and co-existence explains the creation of a 
`pluralist plus' international society following the aftermath of World War Two. 
Chapters 2 and 3 tackle the Realist aspects of the treatment of the German Question 
parrying the theoretical debate on the origins of the Cold War against the interpretative 
framework of the English School. Chapter 2 examines how the conflictual elements involved 
in the treatment of the German Question influenced the bipolar outcome in the post-war 
(http: / /www. fco. gov. uk / servlet/Front? pagename=O12enMarket/Xcelerate / ShowPage&c =Page&cid=1007029 
395375) 
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international order, exposing Soviet security concerns as the most important element in her 
policy regarding Germany and the American willingness to rehabilitate the Western zones as 
the engine of a free trade orientated Western European bloc. Chapter 3 exposes the socially- 
constructed dimension of the competitive struggle over Germany and the post-war 
international order and analyses the different aspects of its unfolding, with particular 
attention to developments at zonal level and the issue of the economic principles guiding the 
occupation process. 
Chapters 5 and 6 bring to light the Revolutionist aspects of the German Question and its 
transformative influence on the post-war society of states. Chapter 5 focuses on the 
discontinuity with Nazism, achieved through the denazification of Germany. Chapter 5 
establishes how these Revolutionist elements affected Germany's position in the 
international political system and how the outcome of the German Question transformed 
the post-war international order. Chapter 6 deals with the treatment of the German 
Question and its influence on the configuration of `international society' in the aftermath of 
World War Two. The chapter highlights four transformations deriving from the treatment of 
the German Question: the political emasculation of Germany and Europe, the ideological 
divide as the driving force of the post-war international order and the expansion and 
institutionalisation of international society. 
The conclusion will show that the interpretation of the origins of the Cold War benefits 
from a more systemic approach, linking the different aspects involved in the treatment of the 
German Question to the making of the Cold War international order. It will also illustrate 
that using an interdisciplinary approach, combining historical analysis and international 
15 
relations theory, enables us not only to realign the interpretations of the origins of the Cold 
War but also to refine the conceptual aspects of English School thinking having to with the 
trilateral approach and the pluralist-solidarist debate. 
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Chapter 1 
The practical association framework between the Allies during World War Two 
1.1 The nature of the practical association framework 
The prosecution of the war and the treatment of the German Question motivated the 
configuration of a practical association framework shaped by a process of military, legal and 
diplomatic cooperation. This framework of cooperation extended to issues which although 
primarily concerned with Germany, also contributed to the formation of the post-war 
international order. Because of the eclectic nature of the Alliance and its interventionist 
approach, this associative framework operated under a `pluralist plus' vision, permitting the 
Allies to cooperate on the vital issues, whilst allowing them room for independent political 
manoeuvre over a wide area of interests. 
This practical association is best interpreted by using the normative approach 
characteristically associated with the English School. Oakeshott recognised two distinct 
modes of human association, universitas and societas. A universitas is an association of people 
united in the pursuit of a common objective. Its practices are `prudential' in nature, designed 
to realise an end. Conversely, a societas constitutes a `moral' relationship between free agents 
who jointly acknowledge only the authority of certain conditions that are necessary to association and action 
but otherwise leave those involved to pursue their own goals. ' Nardin replicates 
Oakeshott's model of human association on a global scale: international society is best seen 
I See Oakeshott, M., On Human Conduct (Clarendon Press: Oxford) (1991) 
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as a practical association made up of states, each devoted to its own conception of good. For 
Nardin, the common good `resides not in the ends that some, or at times even most of its 
members may wish collectively to pursue, but in the values of justice, peace, security and co- 
existence, which can only be enjoyed through participation in a common body of 
authoritative practices'. 2 
The English School explores the moral possibilities of international society via the pluralist- 
solidarist debate. 3 The normative approached espoused by Nardin is linked to the pluralist 
conception of international society. For pluralists like Bull, international relations are 
constituted through rational fixed principles of interaction and coexistence, such as 
sovereignty, diplomacy and international law, without the precondition of a common identity 
or culture. Jackson upholds the societal vision of international society, referring to the 
independence of states in order to endorse `jurisdictional pluralism' as the constitutional 
basis of world politics, permitting states to compose their own `domestic values and 
orchestrate them in their own way'. ` Solidarists like Vincent stress substantial values and a 
common tradition as the normative foundation of international society based on the 
principle of solidarity and ethical universalism, with a special emphasis on human rights 
norms. ' He also argues that if states systematically and massively violated human rights `then 
there might fall to the international community a duty of humanitarian intervention'. 6 This 
2 Nardin T., Law, Morality and the Relations of States., (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press) (1983) p. 19 
3 See Wheeler, N. J, Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of Humanitarian Intervention: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian 
Intervention', Millenium, Journal of International Studies, 21/2 (1992), Dunne, T., Inventing International Society, 
(New York : St. Martin's Press in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford) (1998) and Linklater, A., The 
Transformation of Political Community: ethical foundations of the Post-Westphalian era (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, (1998) 
4 Jackson, R., The Political Theory of International Society in Booth, K. and Smith S., International Relations Theory 
Today, (Polity Press: Cambridge) (1995), pp. 178-9 
5 Vincent, R. J., Human Rights and International Relations, p. 126. See also Vincent, R. J., Nonintervention and 
international order (1974) 
6 Vincent, R. J., Human Rights and International Relations, p. 127 
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view is also sustained by Walzer, who argues that humanitarian intervention is justified when 
it is a response to acts that `shock the moral conscience of mankind'. 
For the Allies, the procedural societas described by Nardin would be crucial for the purposes 
of achieving a solid working arrangement in their treatment of the German Question during 
the 1943-8 period. The practical association put in place by the Allies applied the principle 
of intervention in a very pragmatic manner. As such, it fell short of creating a solidarist 
framework because it respected the diversity of interests in regards to the treatment of the 
German Question, the conduct in the war against the Axis and the kind of intervention 
needed for the purposes of restoring stability to international society. 
At first glance, it could be said that the cultural affinity between Britain and America and the 
assiduous diplomatic intercourse and the law-making in which they were engaged, 
approximated that association to a purposive one. However, the United States expressed 
concerns about the Anglo-Soviet Treaty. 8 Roosevelt stated his desire to bring about the 
dismantling of the British Empire. America had assigned a number of essential constraints 
on its Lend Lease aid to London. The President's conciliatory attitude towards Stalin at 
Teheran along with the perception in Washington of a convergence of interests between the 
Soviet Union and the United States after the war puts this relationship in the pluralist camp. 
7 Walzer, M., Just and Unjust Wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations (London: Allen Lane) (1978) p. 107. 
A solidarist account of international society is also given by Wheeler, N., Saving Strangers Humanitarian Intervention 
in International Society, (Oxford : Oxford University Press) (2000) chapter 1. See also, Falk, R., `A New Paradigm 
for international Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals' in Falk, R., Kratochwil, F. and Mendlovitz S., (ed) International 
Low: A Contemporary Perspective (Boulder, CO and London: Westview Press) (1985), pp. 651-702. 
8 Telegram from the Foreign Office. FRUS, 1942, Europe, vol. III, 517-18 
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At the same time, the United States made a significant financial contribution to the Soviet 
war effort and the spirit of friendship between Washington and Moscow seemed to be at its 
highest during the Teheran Conference. At Teheran, Roosevelt entertained the idea of giving 
part of the American-British merchant fleet to the Soviet Union after the war and agreed 
with Stalin on a number of issues, including the demotion of France and decolonisation, 
particularly in relation to India. 9 The two leaders discussed post-war organisation, agreeing 
at the behest of Stalin on the control of certain strong physical points either within 
Germany along German borders. 
. . 
to ensure that Germany would not embark on another 
course of aggression'. 10 Furthermore, there seemed to be a convergence in regards to 
macroeconomics, which took root in America in the mid-1930s thanks to the introduction 
of the New Deal, the rise of Hitler and the increasingly conservative nature of the Stalinist 
regime. In a book published in 1946, Varga had suggested that the increased role played in 
the economy by the governments of the Western capitalist states might make possible the 
emergence of a limited form of economic planning in those economies after the war. With 
such planning, Varga contended, these economies might be able to avoid economic crises of 
the type that had caused the Great Depression in the 1930s. " 
Stalin was aware that after the war the Soviet Union would be in no condition for an early 
trial of strength with the Anglo-Americans, from whom, moreover, the Kremlin wanted 
9 Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, November 28,1943, Teheran. Bohlen minutes. FRUS 1943, Conferences at Cairo and 
Teheran 1943, pp. 482-6 
10 Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, November 29,1943, Teheran. Bohlen minutes. FRUS 1943, Conferences at Cairo and 
Teheran 1943, pp. 529-533 
1' See Varga, E., Ir, meneniya v ekonomike kapitalitima v itoge vtoroi mirovoi voiny (Changes in the Economy of 
Capitalism as a Result of the Second World War) (Moscow: Gospolitizdat) (1946) 
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various forms of economic aid. Other reasons were more subtle, but they too figured 
importantly in Soviet calculations. 12 
However, the divergent nature of the ideologies rendered impossible any purposive 
association between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. The Soviet system revolved 
around premises which were radically opposed to the worldview of the West. The Soviet 
Union curtailed freedom of expression, association and religion and its economy was 
planned at state level instead of relying on the market for the exchange of goods, capital and 
manpower. The convergence of interests was temporary, and the association, while solid for 
the duration of the war, was informed by the historical animosity between the two camps '3 
and the fact that America envisaged a free market reorganisation of the world economy. 
Tensions would arise towards the end of the war when the defeat of Germany appeared to 
be certain. 
Nevertheless, the practical association produced an implicit principle of recognition of the 
Soviet system and a tacit differentiation, accepted by the Western Allies, between Hitlerism 
and Stalinism. Overy argues that the fundamental difference between the two dictatorships 
resides in the fact that whilst Stalin, in spite of internal economic dislocation and political 
repression, was fighting for the worldwide triumph of the underprivileged, Hitler remained 
convinced until the very end of the war about the idea of a racial empire. 14 Stalin operated 
within a rational context. It could be argued that collectivisation and the purges of the 1930s 
12 See, for example, the long list of American `enemies' of the Soviet Union provided by Ambassador 
Konstantin Oumanskii in a cable of 22 June 1941: Sogetsko-amerikanskiye Otnosheniya vo Vremya Velikoi 
Otechestvennoi Voiniy, 1941-1945.1,1941-1943 (Moscow: Politizdat) (1984), p. 42-44. 
13 Ruotsila M., British and American anticommunism before the Cold War, (London and Portland, OR : Frank Cass) 
(2001), p. xiii 
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were carried out in order to protect the Soviet Union, encircled by the Western Powers. In 
contrast, and particularly after the German debacle in Stalingrad, Hider was determined on 
setting Germany on a course of self-destruction. The Führer favoured the complete demise 
of Germany to any sort of compromise with the Allies. On March 1945, as the end of the 
Nazi regime approached, he told Albert Speer, minister for armaments, that there was no 
need 
to consider the basis even of a most primitive existence [of Germany] any longer... it is better to 
destroy even that, and to destroy it ourselves. The nation had proved itself weak, and the future 
belongs solely to the stronger eastern nation. 15 
The practical association imposed on the main Allies the responsibility for creating a post- 
war international system diametrically opposed to the ideology of the Axis and one in which 
Communism and democracy would be allowed to co-exist. In spite of the systemic conflict 
which loomed when the defeat of Germany became certain, the view of Stalin as a leader 
who pursued the national interest of the Soviet Union by rational means would survive the 
war. There was no `cognitive closure' between the Allies 16 as they were fully aware of each 
other's intentions and interests; and most importantly the need to cooperate for achieving 
victory over the common enemy. Indeed, on August 15,1941 Churchill and Roosevelt 
recognised 
14 Overy, R., The Dictators-Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, (Pimlico: London) (1995), p. 636 
15 Bullock, A., Hitler-A Study in Tyranny, (Pelican Books Ltd.: Harmondsworth, Middx. ) (1965), p. 774-5 
16 See Lebow, R. N. 
, 
Between Peace and War-The Nature of International Crisis, (The John Hopkins University Press: 
Baltimore) (1981) 
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how vitally important to the defeat of Hitlerism is the brave and steadfast resistance of the Soviet 
Union. 
. 
we feel therefore that we must not in any circumstances fail to act quickly and immediately 
in this matter on planning the program for the future allocation of our joint resources. 17 
After the signing of the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1942, Stalin informed Molotov that he hoped 
the United States would adhere to the pact, though he did not want Molotov to hint at that 
lest the British interpret the cue as `disparagement of their role. ' 18 
Whilst at the core of the practical association framework there was a definite pluralist 
overtone, the creation of a post-war international society would have unprecedented 
solidarist elements attached to it, because it elevated the importance of intervention in the 
international political system through the military, legal and diplomatic cooperation and the 
comprehensive treatment of the German Question. This chapter will now proceed to 
describe the elements that defined the practical association and examine their influence on 
the making of the post-war international order. 
1.2 Military cooperation 
The framework of military cooperation forged between the Allies emerged as a result of the 
Axis' campaigns in Europe and East Asia. The Tripartite Pact of September 27,1940, which 
called for the political, economic and military co-operation between Germany, Japan and 
17 Joint declaration Churchill-Roosevelt, Department of State Bulletin, November 8,1941 (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office) (1941) 
18 Document 58, cable, Stalin to Molotov, 25 May 1942, in Rzheshevsky, 0. A. (Ed), Voina i Diplomatia p. 
141. 
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Italy, " prompted the unfolding of an extensive military collaboration network between 
Britain and the United States. The Soviet Union would join the framework of military 
cooperation upon the launching of the German invasion on June 1941. Overall strategy for 
the defeat of Germany evolved through a policy framework which had profound 
implications for the shaping of the post-war international political system. This included the 
policy of the unconditional surrender of Germany, the strategic bombing of the German 
homeland and the cross-channel invasion of Nazi-occupied Europe. Major tensions arose 
between the Allies from the pursuit of these policies. The unfolding of the war gave rise to 
the possibility of a separate peace with Germany, which had proven to be a resilient enemy. 
Moreover, the failure of the Western Allies to open a Second Front in the European 
continent until 1944 made the Soviets apprehensive about their association with the Western 
Allies. 
However, the ultimate success of the Allied effort in the war was based on a framework of 
action that was generally cohesive and extremely efficient. On the eve of the Casablanca 
Conference, and notwithstanding some apprehension by Churchill, Roosevelt was 
favourable to conferring with the Soviets on military matters. The President stated the need 
to sit down at the table with the Russians. My notion would be a conference in Cairo or Moscow: 
that each of us would be represented by a small group meeting very secretly [and] that the 
conclusions of the conference would of course be approved by the three of us. 20 
19 Tripartite Pact between Italy and Japan, September 27,1940, 
http: //www. yale. edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/triparti. htm 
20 Roosevelt to Churchill, November 25,1942, FRUS 1942, The Conference at Washington 1941-2 and 
Casablanca 
1943, p. 489 
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Roosevelt also suggested a tripartite meeting with Stalin in order to satisfactorily get to the 
vital strategic conclusions that the military situation required. 27 
Roosevelt entertained the idea of `Four Policemen' (the United States, Great Britain, the 
Soviet Union, and China) which virtually alone among the nations of the world should 
have significant military establishments in order to enforce the peace. Stalin appeared to 
be to enthusiastic about this idea 
Roosevelt's statements on preserving peace after the war are absolutely correct. One cannot doubt 
that without the creation of an association of the armed forces of England, the United States [and] 
the Soviet Union able to forestall aggression, it will not be possible to preserve peace in the future. 22 
Cooperation was consolidated at the Moscow Conference of October 30,1943 where the 
Allies issued the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security. 23 Roosevelt entertained 
the idea of Although the practical association lacked an overall military command involving 
the Soviet Union, at the Cairo Conference (SEXTANT) on November 1943, the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff (CCS) agreed that the Chinese and Soviet representatives be invited to attend 
meetings of the CCS in matters concerning the fronts in which they had a vested interested. 
Furthermore, it was also agreed that at the forthcoming Teheran Conference (EUREKA), 
24 the Soviet representative would attend all meetings. 
21 Roosevelt to Churchill, December 2,1942, The Conference at Washington 1941-2 and Casablanca 1943 FRUS 
1942 Casablanca, p. 494 
22 Document No. 84, Unsigned cable (but Stalin's) to Molotov, 1 June 1942 in Rzheshevsky, 0. A. (Ed), Voina 
i Diplomatia: Dokumentiy, Kommentarii (1941-1942) (Moscow: Nauka) (1997) p. 192 
23 Joint Four Power Declaration, Moscow Conference, October, 1943- 
http"//www ibiblio org/Tha/policy/1943/431000a. html- 
24 Meeting of the CCS, Cairo, November 22,1943. FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran 1943, p. 304-7 
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Of central significance to inter-allied cooperation was the policy of the unconditional 
surrender of Germany, which had its antecedent in the `Europe First' policy endorsed by the 
Roosevelt administration. The President was adamant in his determination to achieve an 
Allied victory in `Europe First' (as agreed in the Atlantic Conference of August 1941) and 
rejected calls for the `Pacific First' alternative, outlined by Admiral Ernest King and General 
George Marshall in July 1942, on the grounds that it would engage American troops on 
islands whose occupation would not change the war situation in favour of the Allies. 25 The 
`Europe First' policy had profound implications for the political repositioning of the post- 
war international order. Concentrating on the war effort in Europe ensured that Germany 
would be the main battleground for the realignment of the post-war international order. The 
`Europe First' policy consolidated the framework of practical association because it fulfilled 
the American commitment to assist her main European Allies. At this stage of the war, the 
Soviet Union (and Britain) were still bearing the brunt of the fighting and resistance to the 
Axis forces in Europe, and if Germany were to prevail in their quest to dominate Europe, its 
potential domination of the Continent would have rendered her capable of extending its 
sway to Asia and facilitate the collapse of the Allied war effort in the Pacific. 
The call for the `unconditional surrender' of Germany, made at the Casablanca Conference 
of January-February 1943, exercised a factor of unity amongst the Allies as it reassured the 
Soviet Union that ideological diversity with the Western Allies would not disrupt the 
associative framework put in place. 
On February 12 the participants stated that 
26 
all the United Nations say-that the only terms on which we shall deal with an Axis government or 
any Axis factions are the terms proclaimed at Casablanca: `Unconditional Surrender' In our 
uncompromising policy we mean no harm to the common people of the Axis nations. But we do 
mean to impose punishment and retribution in full upon their guilty, barbaric leaders... 26 
Whenever he was asked for clarification on what the doctrine meant in specific terms, 
Roosevelt usually responded with an analogy from the American Civil War: `Lee was made 
to surrender to Grant unconditionally, but he was then treated fairly and his men were 
allowed to keep their horses'. In other words, after they surrendered, the German people 
would receive fair treatment from the Allies. 27 
In spite of the initial reticence on the part of Stalin (he formally signed it in Yalta) and some 
doubts on the part of Churchill, 28 the call for the unconditional surrender of Germany 
(unprecedented in military terms) established a common goal between the Allies: the main 
Axis power in Europe, once rid of Nazism, would be the main pawn in the reshaping of the 
post-war international order and it would be the members of the Alliance which would 
decide what that political order would look like. 
By fighting for the unconditional surrender of Germany, the Allies sought to create a new 
international order, in which Prussian militarism and Nazism would have no place. It also 
implied the elimination of the Grossdeutschland geopolitical space won by the German forces 
25 Stoler M. and Gustafson M. (Ed. ), Major Problems in the History of World War Two, (Houghton Mifflin Co.: 
Boston and New York) (2003) p. 88-9 
26 Casablanca Declaration, February 12,1943- http: //www. yale. edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/casablan. htm 
27 As Casey points out, Roosevelt did make some efforts to reassure the German people that he would only 
hold Nazi leaders responsible for the war. See Casey, S. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ernest 'Put, -i' Hanfstaengl and the 'S- 
Project, June 1942 June 1944, journal of Contemporary History 35 (July 2000): 339-59. 
28 See Balfour, M., Another Look at `Unconditional Surrender", International Affairs, Vol 46, no. 4, October 1970, 
p. 728 
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on the battlefield, 29 and the organisation of Europe as a racially-based German-dominated 
political and economic conglomerate capable of being a permanent threat to the Soviet 
Union, the British Empire and the United States. The effect of the stringent terms of the 
German surrender was to destroy not just the philosophy which twice disrupted the stability 
of the international political system during the twentieth century but also to arrest the 
potential re-emergence of Germany as a centralising force which could propel Europe as a 
single unified power juxtaposed to the systemic interests of the main Allies. 30 
The possibility of a separate peace with Germany informed the spectrum of practical 
association. 31 A possible peace deal between Britain and Germany would have left Germany 
as the most powerful nation in Europe, something which would have been potentially 
detrimental for British interests. It would have also meant a reversal in the British policy of 
not allowing any dominant power to have control of mainland Europe. Although Britain 
would have probably remained independent from American influence, the hypothetical 
29 The July 1944 Plot against Hitler (Operation Valkyrie) is a significant milestone in the unfolding of the post- 
war international order. It is highly likely that the plotters would have been able to retain some of the territorial 
gains made in the East, and/or, that they would have played the Soviet Union and the Western Allies against 
each other, therefore retaining a degree of political independence. There was very little support from the 
United States or Britain for the German resistance due to, in no small degree, to the fact that by July 1944 the 
Big Three had already established the foundations of a post-war international order in which Germany would 
have a subordinate position. See Hoffman, P., Stauffenberg: A Family History, 1905-1944 (Cambridge University 
Press) (1995), Moorhouse R., Killing Hitler. the plots, the assassins, and the dictator who cheated death (New York: 
Bantam Books (2006), Wheeler-Bennett, J. and Overy, R.. The Nemesis of Power. German Army in Politics, 1918- 
1945 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Publishing Company) (1968). Hoffmann, P.,. Stauffenberg und der 20. Juli 
1944. (München: C. H. Beck) (1998). Burleigh, M., The Third Reich: A New History. (Macmillan: Basingstoke) 
(2000) and Baigent, M. and Leigh, R., Secret Germany-Stauffenberg and the mystical crusade against Hitler (Arrow 
Books: Random House) (2006) 
30 For more on `unconditional surrender' see Campbell, Franklin Roosevelt and Unconditional Surrender' in 
Langhorne, R., (ed. ), Dijýlomacy and intelligence during the Second World War.: essays in honour of F. H. Hinsky, 
Reynolds, D., Churchill the Appeaser? in Dockrill, M., and McKercher, B., (ed. ) Diplomacy and world power: studies in 
British foreign policy, 1890-1950 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press) (1996) and Murphy, 
R., Diplomat Among Warriors (London, 1964) 
31 An episode that has captivated the imagination of historians is the voyage of Rudolph Hess, the Führer's 
Deputy, to Britain for a possible armistice between Britain and Germany in 1941. This possible armistice would 
have included a pledge by Hitler to allow Britain to keep its Empire See Picknett, L., Prince, C. and Prior, S., 
Brydon, R., Double Standards-The Rudooh Hess Cover Up (London: Paperback) (2001) 
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scenario of a less savagely managed but German-dominated Europe based on the Geopolitik 
concept of Haushoffer, 32 would have been largely adverse to British interests in the long 
run. Moreover, the wave of decolonisation had already swept through the main parts of the 
British Empire. 
Unconditional surrender also provided the Allies with the opportunity to reassure each other 
that there would not be a repeat of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. In September 1942 British 
intelligence intercepted telegrams containing references to `a separate peace between 
Germany and Russia'. 33 In November 1942 Peter Kleist, a personal friend of the German 
Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, had been sent to Stockholm to broach the 
possibility of a separate peace between Berlin and Moscow. In addition, the propaganda 
machinery of Dr Joseph Goebbels had started to refrain from making as many references to 
the `Jewish-Bolshevik menace'. As late as April 1943 `well-informed' sources in Sweden were 
predicting an imminent Russo-German peace. 34 
Stalin also believed that Britain and America could conclude a separate peace with Germany, 
a fear which towards the end of the war had inspired a change in Soviet strategy. The most 
eloquent manifestation of this fear was the Soviet determination to take Berlin first. On 
March 29,1945, Stalin showed Marshall Georgii Zhukov, in charge of the final assault into 
Berlin, a letter from an informant describing clandestine meetings between German agents 
and Western Allies representatives in Berne, where the Nazis offered a separate peace. The 
mistrust grew as the Red Army pushed deep into Germany. On April 16,1945 a captured 
32 See Dorpalen, A., World of General Haushofer. Geopolitics in Action, 1942 (Farrar & Rinehart: New York, 
Toronto) (1942) Also, Heske, H., Karl Haushofer hic role in German politics and in Nac politics, Political 
Geography 6 (1987), p. 135-144., Mattern, J., Geopolitik: Doctrine of National Self-Sufciency and Empire (The Johns 
Hopkins Press: Baltimore) (1942) and Beukema, Col. H. `Introduction' The World of General Haushofer (Farrar & 
Rinehart, Inc.: New York) (1984) 
33 Bassett, R., Hitler's Chief Spy-The Wilhelm Canaris Mystery, (Cassell: London) (2005) p. 251 
34 Bassett, R., Hitler's Chief Spy, p. 253-4 
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German soldier claimed that the remnant of the German forces had been instructed `to open 
the gates in the West and to stem the tide in the East'. 35 Stalin's fears were reinforced when 
he learned that Churchill had issued instructions to Eisenhower not to destroy captured Nazi 
weaponry as they would be needed in order to rearm Germany. Moreover, the Soviet Union 
began to build defensive installations in Austria, including anti-aircraft facilities, at the time 
when an operative German Air Force had ceased to exist. 36 
In the latter stages of the war, Allen Dulles, stationed in Berne at the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS), was approached by SS Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff about an armistice in 
Northern Italy. The Soviets were excluded from the meetings with Wolff, alluding to the fear 
that the Germans might want to withdraw any offer to surrender. Stalin clearly feared a 
separate peace between Germany and the Western Allies and a possible rearmament of the 
Wehrmacht. He was also worried about the large numbers of German troops surrendering 
along the Western front, thus giving rise to the possibility that the Western Allies might 
reach Berlin before the Red Army. 37 
The prospect of a separate peace between the Western Allies and Germany seemed illogical 
rather than impossible. A separate peace would have certainly meant a severe escalation of 
conflict between the Allies and the Soviet Union. It would have probably led to a fully- 
fledged alliance between Germany and the Western Allies on an equal status, which would 
have contradicted the purpose of the involvement of the United States in the European war, 
centered to a significant extent around its economic interests in the continent. 
`Unconditional surrender' had a dimension which extended beyond the military sphere as it 
35 Kennedy-Pipe, C., Stalin's cold war. Soviet strategies in Europe, 1943 to 1956 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press) (1995) p. 64-5 
3' Kennedy-Pipe, C., Stalin's Cold War, p. 65 
37 Beevor, A., Berlin-The Downfall 1945, (Penguin Books: London) (2004) p. 142 
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signified the surrender of the German state to the Allies. Because of the confluence of 
interests between the main Allies in the `total and unconditional surrender' by the 
Wehrmacht and the Third Reich, the chances of a separate peace seemed very improbable as 
the two emerging superpowers would benefit enormously from the political emasculation of 
Germany and Europe. 
Unity of purpose in the pursuit of the war was also achieved by the opening of the 
Mediterranean front and the bombing campaign against Germany, which acted as a `second 
front' in the fight against the Axis. The Italian Campaign, operationally responsible for all 
Allied land forces in the Mediterranean theatre, planned and commanded the invasion of 
Sicily and the campaign on the Italian mainland until the surrender of German forces in Italy 
in May 1945, diverting an important number of German forces away from the Eastern 
Front. 38 A pivotal role in the war against Germany was also assigned to the Anglo-American 
Strategic Air Force, which had the aim of destroying the German war machine and paving 
the way for a cross channel invasion. Sir Charles Portal, British Air Force Chief, was given 
the task of coordinating it. On January 21,1943 the CCS issued the Casablanca Directive 
which stated that the objective of the Combined Bombing Operations (CBO) was 
the destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the 
undermining of the morale of the German people to the point where their capacity for armed 
38 It is estimated that between September 1943 and April 1945 some 90,000 Allied and 110,000 German 
soldiers died in Italy. See Orgill, D., The Gothic Line, (The Autumn Campaign in Italy 1944) (London: 
Heinemann) p. 6. It should be noted that in Blaxland, G., Alexander's Generale (the Italian Campaign 1944-1945) 
(London: William Kimber & Co) (1979), p 11, Blaxland quotes 59,151 Allied deaths between 3 September 
1943 and 2 May 1945. For more on the Italian Campaign see Muhm, G., 'La Tattica tedesca nella 
Camßagna 
d'Italia' in Montemaggi, A., Linea Gotica avanposto dei Balcam' (Edizioni Civitas), Carver, The Imperial War Museum 
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resistance is fatally weakened. 39 
The Casablanca Directive earmarked for the destruction of German submarine construction 
yards, aircraft industry, transportation, oil plants and other targets in the German war 
industry. 4" The CBO was implemented by the Pointblank Directive, agreed between 
Roosevelt and Churchill during the Washington Conference of May 11,1943. The 
Pointblank Directive resulted in air offensives against Berlin, Hamburg and the Ruhr, and 
raids on Schweinfurt and Dresden. The strategic bombing of the German homeland dealt a 
severe blow to civil morale in Germany and the Reich's capacity to sustain the war effort. As 
Albert Speer, German Minister of Armaments, states in his memoirs, the attack of 935 
daylight bombers of the US Eight Air Force upon several fuel plants in central and eastern 
Germany in May 1944 indicated `the end of German armaments production'. 41 
Although some doubts have been cast on the real usefulness of the CBO, 42 the air front 
played a significant role in the defeat of Germany. Allied air attacks forced Germany to 
dedicate vast amounts of manpower and resources to continental air defense, reducing the 
Germans' ability to fully support land operations. By 1944 over 800,000 Germans were 
committed to air defense, including the crews of about 54,000 antiaircraft guns. `j In 1944 
more than half of Germany's industrial base was working to satisfy the Luftwaffe's needs. 
39 Neumann, W., Making The Peace 1941-5-The Ditlomacy of the Wartime Conferences, (Washington, D. C: Foundation 
for Foreign Affairs) (1950) p. 42-3 
40 Stoler M. and Gustafson M. (Ed. ), Major Problems in the History of World War Two, p. 115 
41 Speer, A., Inside the Third Reich, (Avid Books: New York) (1970) p. 445 
42 Hastings cites Sir Henry Tizard, chairman of the Aeronautical Research Committee, `The actual effort 
expended on bombing Germany, in manpower and resources, was greater than the value in manpower and 
resources of the damage caused'. Hastings himself is of the view that `the bomber offensive partly fulfilled 
`useful purposes for the Allied effort'. See Hastings, M., Bomber Command, (Pan Macmillan: London) (1999), p. 
349-352 
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Albert Speer estimated that 30 percent of artillery, 20 percent of heavy ammunition, and 
over 50 percent of electronics production were dedicated to air defense, depriving frontline 
ground forces of critical antitank munitions and communications equipment. -4When asked 
by Stalin on the destruction caused by the tactical air force, Marshall stated that German oil 
production had been reduced to approximately 20% of its capacity due to the Allied 
bombing. `'S The air bombing campaign had an important reassuring effect on inter-allied 
relations as it achieved the destruction of German cities and important distribution centres 
for the Eastern Front like Dresden. 
The creation of the Second Front was the most significant element in the spectrum of 
military cooperation amongst the Allies. Less than a month after Germany invaded the 
Soviet Union in 1941, Stalin informed Churchill that `the military position of the Soviet 
Union, and that of Great Britain, would be significantly improved if the Allies opened fronts 
against Hitler in the West and in the North'. 4' The issue of the Second Front had profound 
political implications for the configuration of the post-war international system as it raised 
the spectrum of a Soviet Europe as well as a possible permanent American presence in 
Europe. 47 
In August 1942, conversations between Churchill and Stalin were marked by Soviet 
bitterness when Churchill broke the news of the cancellation of the European invasion. 
Stalin insisted on a European invasion and spoke of the failure on the part of Britain and the 
44 Davis, R, Carl A. Spaatti and the Air War in Europe (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 
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United States to open a second front as detrimental for the Soviet Union. Also, the plans for 
an American-British air raid on the Caucasus (Operation VELVET), should Soviet resistance 
to the Germans in Southern Russia collapse, were slow in reaching the practical stage, and 
were permanently shelved after the Soviets breached the siege of Stalingrad. At the same 
time, Britain and the United States were haunted by the fear that the Soviet Union would 
desert the alliance and make peace with Germany. {' These concerns are indicative of the 
nature of the military alliance which the Allies put in place during the war. Whilst political 
manoeuvring and technical difficulties slowed the opening of the second front, the Allies 
were aware of the need to preserve the alliance and to forge ahead for the defeat of the 
common enemy. At the same time, the delay in the launching of the Second Front 
strengthened the Soviet position in regards to post-war territorial realignments. By early 1943 
the Soviets managed to repel the German attack on Stalingrad without the help of Allied air 
raid. This gave rise to the self-sufficient attitude of the Soviets and a growing political 
independence from the Western Allies. 
Nevertheless, the North African landings (Operation TORCH), mainly made up of British, 
American and Free French components, enhanced the unity of purpose amongst the Allies. 
The situation in North Africa had taken a decisive turn in favour of the Axis after Marshall 
Erwin Rommel's victories in Libya in April 1941. A North African full scale strategy on the 
part of Germany would have probably resulted in the Axis taking control of Egypt, the 
Caucasus, the route to India and the Bulge of Africa, thus destroying Lend Lease convoys 
and prompting the possibility of an invasion of the Western Hemisphere. This threat was 
48 Neumann, W., Making The Peace 1941-5-The Diplomacy of the Wartime Conferences, p. 39-40 
49 Armstrong, A., Unconditional Surrender-The Impact of the Casablanca Policy upon World War II, (New Brunswick: 
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acknowledged by Roosevelt in July 1942, when he approved the invasion of North Africa 50 
The opening of the North African front was supported by Stalin during his meeting 
Churchill in Moscow in 1942, adding that it would `hit Rommel in the back', `overawe Spain', 
`produce fighting between the Germans and Frenchmen in France' and `expose Italy to the 
whole brunt of the war'. 57 The invasion of North Africa established a military foothold 
within striking distance from the European continent and produced some significant 
political results. Free France was declared by America and Britain as the legitimate 
government of France. Hitler invaded Vichy France, which failed to protect such an 
important strategic theatre. Most importantly, it made the prospect of a second front in 
Europe more real to the Soviet Union and provided the American and British armies with 
the first important breakthrough of the conflagration. 
The cross channel landing in Normandy on June 6,1944 (Operation OVERLORD) 
consolidated the relationship between the Big Three. Long term plans for the cross-channel 
invasion of France had been drawn up by British Joint Planning staff as early as September 
1941 (Operation Roundup) but serious discussion started with the American entry into the 
war. A combined Anglo-American headquarters (COSSAC) was established in Britain in 
April 1943 under General Sir Frederick Morgan to co-ordinate planning and deception plans 
in order to monitor the German response to a cross channel invasion (Operation Jael and 
so Roosevelt's Memorandum for Harry Hopkins, General Marshall and Admiral King July 16,1942. Quoted in 
The Hinge of Fate, Churchill, W., The Second World War, p. 363-5. The failure of Germany to seize control of the 
Mediterranean theatre has been cited as a main cause for the loss of the war. See Alexander, B., How Hitler 
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later Bodyguard). 
At the Tehran Conference of 1943 the Big Three agreed to a cross-channel invasion of 
Western Europe by May 1,1944, as well as a simultaneous military operation in Southern 
France and a Soviet offensive to prevent the transfer of German troops from the Eastern to 
the Western front. 52 The priority of OVERLORD as the core strategy for winning the war 
was also reiterated at SEXTANT, prior to the meeting with the Soviets in Teheran. 53 The 
planning of OVERLORD was handed over to the newly appointed Supreme Allied 
Commander, US General Dwight Eisenhower at his headquarters in London. Operational 
command was given to General Sir Bernard Montgomery. The Allies committed massive 
strategic and tactical naval and air forces including a fleet of 5,000 ships under the command 
of Admiral Sir Bertrand Ramsay and 13,000 aircraft under the command of Air Chief 
Marshal Tedder. Although the political decision on the European Second Front had been 
taken at EUREKA, 54 the military execution of OVERLORD was the Alliance's finest hour. 
A week after the landing, Stalin would state in Pravda that `the history of wars does not 
know of an undertaking comparable to it for breadth of conception, grandeur of scale, and 
mastery of execution'. 55 Churchill would later comment that at that juncture of the war 
`harmony was complete'. 56 
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The issue of the `Second Front' in Europe provided the framework of practical association 
with a major source of tension. However, the failure to launch an attack on Northern 
Europe until the execution of OVERLORD in 1944 did not harm the unity of purpose of 
the Allies. The bombing campaign on Germany, the landings in North Africa and the Italian 
campaign had a significant role in achieving the ultimate defeat of Germany and providing 
the association framework with a spirit of cooperation that would contribute to a good 
working environment for the creation of a post-war international order. The Allies realised 
in spite of the conflictual aspects of the relationship that maintaining the practical 
association would be in the interest of all the parties concerned. This realisation enabled 
them to engage in a process of diplomatic, legal and financial cooperation which facilitated 
their victory against Axis forces and brought about the emergence of a post-war 
international order capable of catering to the interests of all its members. 
1.3 Legal and diplomatic cooperation 
The military alliance was galvanised by a concomitant process of intense inter-Allied 
diplomatic co-operation. The main medium for the diplomatic intercourse which occurred 
during this period were the several conferences organised and attended by the main 
members of the Allied coalition. This diplomatic engagement provided the Allies with the 
opportunity to develop a legal framework for the discussion of policy concerning the 
prosecution of the war against Germany and the realignment of the post-war international 
order. 
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During the Atlantic Conference of August 1941 the United States and Britain, both with 
considerable vested interests in the Pacific theatre, agreed on a common diplomatic and 
military stance in response to the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere declaration made by 
the Japanese Empire on July 1941.57 The Japanese declaration issued a statement of intent 
to Britain, America, France and the Netherlands as to Tokyo's geopolitical aspirations in 
East Asia and made imminent the possibility of military conflict in the Pacific Rim. 58 
The Atlantic Charter established the commitment of America and Britain to fight against the 
German quest for the domination of Europe and sketched the principles of a new 
international order which included the prohibition for countries to seek `aggrandizement, 
territorial or other', or `territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes 
of the peoples concerned'. Most notably, it indicated the right of all peoples to choose the 
form of government under which they will live', guaranteed access `to the trade and to the 
raw materials of the world' as well as the freedom to use the `high seas and oceans without 
hindrance'. 59 The principles established by the Atlantic Charter were favourably received by 
the member-states of the ever expanding alliance. At the Inter-Allied Meeting in London on 
September 24 1941, the governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, and representatives of 
57 The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (announced by Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke on August 
1,1940) was an attempt by Japan to create a self-sufficient bloc of Asian nations led by the Japanese Empire 
and free from the Western powers. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was to be established for the 
extension of Japanese economic power and the acquisition of an empire based on European models, though 
ostensibly free from Western imperialism. For more on the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere see Lebra, 
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Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941, (New York: Columbia University Press) (1980), McCoy, A. W., Southeast 
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General Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French, unanimously adhered to the common 
principles of policy set forth in the Atlantic Charter. 
The Conference of December 1941 (ARCADIA), solidified the Alliance by crafting the 
United Nations Declaration. It also created the CCS system and placed all Allied war 
production allocation under the control of the military, establishing the speedy flow of Lend 
Lease to the Soviet Union and China. Moreover, it propelled the expansion of the industrial 
and military growth of the United States, which would be crucial for the ultimate victory of 
the Alliance. G0 The Declaration of the United Nations of January 1,1942 was signed by the 
main Allies, including the United States, the United Kingdom and the Dominions, the Soviet 
Union and China. It subscribed to the aims of the Atlantic Charter while pledging to `employ 
its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its 
adherents with which such government is at war' and to `co-operate with the Governments 
signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies'. The 
Declaration was open to `other nations [... ] rendering material assistance and contributions 
in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism'. G' The Declaration is highly significant not only 
because of its content but also in regards to its timing. By 1942 the United States, Britain and 
the Soviet Union were at war against the Axis and the good run of the enemy's forces in all 
the theatres of the war prompted the Allies to provide the practical association framework 
with a well-defined legal structure. 
The Declaration also had the purpose of binding the different constituents of the Allies 
together in common purpose and to create the nucleus for a post-war international society 
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which would cater to the interests of the members of the Alliance, irrespective of their 
geographical location or their internal political system. The spirit of the Declaration was 
described by President Roosevelt, who addressed the US Congress on the following terms 
We are fighting on the same side with the British people, who fought alone for long, terrible months 
and withstood the enemy with fortitude and tenacity and skill 
... 
We are fighting on the same side 
with the Russian people who have seen the Nazi hordes swarm up to the very gates of Moscow and 
who, with almost superhuman will and courage, have forced the invaders back into retreat.. 
. 
We are 
fighting on the same side as the brave people of China... We are fighting on the same side as all the 
other governments in exile... But we of the United Nations are not making all of this sacrifice of 
human effort and human lives to return to the kind of world we had after the last world war. 62 
On September 24,1942, the Soviet government notified London and Washington that `a 
consistent application of those principles will secure the most energetic support on the part 
of the Government and People of the Soviet Union'. 63 
The war against the Axis was undoubtedly won with the support of the gigantic industrial 
and financial network set up by the United States upon the country's entry into the war. The 
main instrument of financial co-operation between the Allies was the Lend Lease Act. 64 
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Prior to its passage into law, Roosevelt traded fifty over-age destroyers in return for bases, 
diverted to England orders for arms placed for US forces and explored every possible device 
for circumventing the restrictive provisions of American neutrality legislation. 65 The US 
Congress passed the Lend Lease Act on March 11,1941 enabling Roosevelt access to $7 
billion to be designated to any of the 47 countries whose defence he deemed vital for the 
security of the United States. 66 
Though Lend Lease had been authorised primarily to aid Great Britain, it was extended to 
China in April 1941, to the Soviet Union in September 1941, and eventually to 35 different 
countries. Much of the aid, valued at about $49 billion by the time the program was 
terminated in August 1945, amounted to outright gifts, although some of the costs were 
offset by reverse Lend Lease, under which Allied nations gave US troops stationed abroad 
about $8 billion worth of aid. 
During World War Two Britain received $ 27 billion worth of Lend Lease aid from the 
United States (without cash payments), providing in return $6 billion worth of Reverse 
Lend-Lease. The extension of economic assistance to Britain was qualified by political 
concerns. The Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement of February 28,1942 67 was meant 
to restrain London's political and economic independence in the post-war international 
order. The Roosevelt administration was adamant in their determination to dismantle the 
imperial structures that hampered free trade and would have restricted American access to 
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new markets. Lend Lease to Britain was subject to not letting Britain trade articles obtained 
on aid for the recovery of her export trade. 61 
Conversely, American financial aid to the Soviet Union was extended on the knowledge that 
the Soviet war effort was pivotal to military success in the war and therefore less subject to 
political considerations. Prevailing uncertainties in Soviet-American relations and the need 
for Moscow's support in the defeat of the Axis made Roosevelt and his Soviet Protocol 
Committee determined to continue with its unconditional aid policy. G9 In July 1941, the US 
administration sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow to report on the Russian front and to discuss 
the supply of American aid to the Soviet Union. On September 28-30,1941, Averell 
Harriman, the American administrator of the Lend Lease to the Soviet Union, accompanied 
by a number of American officials, arrived in Moscow with a British delegation headed by 
Lord Beaverbrook and a confidential protocol was signed by Britain, the United States and 
the Soviet Union for the extension of military aid. A little more than a month later the Soviet 
Union was formally included in the Lend-Lease program. 70 
Hull and Roosevelt had been committed to the idea that prompt and generous lend-lease 
deliveries to Russia should be the `test' of American goodwill toward the Soviet Union. " 
The extent of Allied aid to the Soviet Union during the war was impressive. According to 
Major General John R. Deane, over 15 million tons were shipped to the Soviet Union 
between October 1941 and the end of the war, including over 2.6 million tons of petroleum 
products and over 4.4 million tons of food, which amounted to half a pound of 
68 Dobson, A. P., U. S. wartime aid to Britain 1940-1946, p. 203-5 
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concentrated food per day for each one of the 12 million servicemen of the Red Army. 72 
The ferocity of the war in the Eastern Front and the vast amount of losses suffered by the 
Red Army, coupled with the political implications of a hypotethical Soviet debacle, informed 
Washington's policy in regards to the financial aid granted to its largest ally in the continent 
of Europe. 
Amendments to the Lend Lease program to the Soviet Union were personally approved by 
Roosevelt. The United States required no justification for requests and made no attempt to 
find out how the Soviet Union used the Lend Lease funds. All this was carefully kept out of 
Congress. 73 When on January 16,1944 Averell Harriman and Major General Deane, in 
charge of the Lend Lease Aid to the Soviet Union in Moscow, proposed that the Soviets 
provide justification for items in short supply in the United States, the Soviet Protocol 
Committee (chaired by Harry Hopkins) rejected their arguments. 74 
The Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of the United Nations and the various treaties signed 
between the members of the Alliance for political and economic cooperation would provide 
not only with the legal framework for the defeat of Nazi Germany but also with the legal 
instruments that would shape the post-war society of states. These legal instruments, 
according to a rationalist interpretation, would identify the political organisation of the post- 
war society of states and proclaim its supremacy over all competitors (i. e., the Axis), laying 
down the rules of co-existence amongst the Allies. 75 The legal framework set out by the 
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Allies regulated their relationships with one another, created international behaviour and set 
a precedent for the reorganisation of the post-war international political system. 
The English school scholarship acknowledges that the setting of general standards in law can 
have a long lasting effect on behaviour. James explains it as follows: a set of exact rights and 
duties `will almost certainly represent a pre-existing intent or willingness on the part of all 
subject to them to act in the way they indicate'. 'G The framework of legal, diplomatic and 
financial cooperation between the Allies would consolidate the subordinate position of 
Germany during the Cold War and realign the international order according to the criteria 
set by the major members of the wartime Alliance. The treatment of the German Question 
during the war would have significant implications for the practical association. The issue of 
the occupation and possible dismemberment of Germany as well as the subject of economic 
reparations would have a significant political impact on inter-Allied relations as well as on 
Germany's position in the Cold War international order. 
1.4 The issue of dismemberment 
The issue of the possible dismemberment of Germany after the war created enormous 
political implications for the shape of the international order in the wake of the war. Any 
reshaping of Germany's role in Europe was directly linked to the geopolitical concerns of 
the major Allies and their position in the post-war international political system. 
Dismembering Germany created opportunities as well as risks. The extent of the 
involvement of the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, meant that the 
76 James, r1., Law and Order in International Society in James A., (ed. ), The Bases of International Order. Essays in Honour 
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possibility of dismemberment was more logical than the idea of keeping Germany united. 
Washington and Moscow seem to share a common interest in the possibility of 
dismemberment. The practical association framework legitimised the idea of pursuing 
geopolitical interests through the discussion of partition. 
The idea of dismembering Germany was favoured by Roosevelt since ARGENTIA. To that 
effect he instructed the Department of State to study the idea via the Four Committees of 
the `Advisory Committee on Post-War Policy' in January 1942. The Advisory Committee 
analysed the partition of Germany into three, five and seven separate states as well as the 
political, economic and demographic problems involved, but ultimately rejected the idea of 
dismemberment. Instead, they favoured the policy of preventing the rearmament of 
Germany, the promotion of democratic institutions and the reduction or control of German 
economic preponderance in Europe. " 
The State Department maintained an anti-dismemberment position throughout the war. 78 
The State Department, along with the War Department and the FEA were unfavourable to 
partition. This put them at odds with the pro-dismemberment views of the Treasury 
Department headed by Harry Morgenthau, Jr. On July 27,1943, the State Department 
prepared a policy summary of the deliberations of January 1943 labelled `H24 Germany: 
77 Mosely, P. E., The Dismemberment of Germany, Foreign Affairs (April, 1950) p. 488-9 
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Partition' which showed a definite bias in favour of unity. 7' During 1943-4 an inter- 
divisional committee of the State Department studied post-war policy towards Germany. 
The resulting basic memorandum, approved by Hull in July 1944, although welcoming 
federalism, expressed doubts about partition. The memorandum also warned against a de 
facto division of Germany through the creation of three zones of occupation. The 
memorandum predicted that in this manner the individual parts would fall under the control 
of the great powers, which would `find themselves bidding for German support by 
promising to work for the reunification of Germany'. 80 
The final memorandum that the State Department, issued to Roosevelt prior to his 
departure for the upcoming Quebec Conference (OCTAGON) in September 1944, 
endorsed the demilitarisation and denazification of German society, and recommended 
harsh treatment of war criminals. The memorandum also insisted that the `primary 
objectives' of Allied economic policy should be to hold down the German standard of living 
to `subsistence levels' and prevent any reconversion to war production. In addition, it 
refused to endorse Morgenthau's call for the destruction of heavy industry in the Ruhr and 
suggested that the issues of dismemberment, deindustrialisation and reparations should not 
81 be decided until the `internal situation' in Germany was clear. 
The most extreme pro-dismemberment view was the Morgenthau Plan, presented by the 
Secretary of the Treasury to the President in September 1944. Roosevelt engineered the 
creation of a special Cabinet Committee on Germany composed of himself, Morgenthau, 
Hull and Stimson and Hopkins, which was given the task of looking into the German 
79 Backer, J. H., The Decision to Divide Germany, (Duke University Press: Durham, NC) (1978) p. 20-1 
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problem in order to make recommendations to the President prior to his departure for the 
Quebec Conference. The Morgenthau Plan called for the demilitarisation of Germany and 
the establishment of new boundaries, with Poland and the Soviet Union annexing parts of 
East Prussia and Silesia and France the Saar. The Plan placed the Ruhr under international 
jurisdiction. It also called for the partition of Germany into two states: a Northern German 
state, made up of old Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia and several smaller states, and a Southern 
German state, including Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and some smaller areas. The 
internationalisation of the Ruhr was to be accomplished by dismantling its industrial plants 
and transporting its equipment to the United Nations as restitution. Military administration 
in Germany would be carried out toward the eventual partition of Germany. Political 
decentralisation and the dismissal of all policy making officials of the Reich should be 
encouraged. The Morgenthau Plan also suggested adequate controls over the German 
economy for at least twenty years. These included land reform and reparations. Reparations 
would be extracted by transferring of German territory and German private rights in 
industrial property, by using forced German labour and by confiscating German assets 
outside Germany. The plan also envisaged that the policing and civil administration of 
Germany was to be assumed by Germany's neighbours (including the Soviet Union) and the 
withdrawal of US troops in a relatively short period of time. 82 Proponents of the Plan 
stressed that the Morgenthau Plan would have removed the threat of a German-dominated 
Europe, capture German markets for the British and provide industrial plants for the victims 
of Nazi aggression. 83 
82 Morgenthau to Roosevelt, Suggested Post Surrender Program for Germany, September 5,1944, FRUS, 
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The Morgenthau Plan entailed the economic rehabilitation of the Soviet Union through 
reparations and the extension of massive economic aid, possibly in the hope that Stalin 
would not need to block off and exploit Eastern Europe in order to reconstruct the Soviet 
economy. Morgenthau acknowledged in an unsent memorandum prepared on January 10, 
1945, that those who opposed the Plan were moved `by fear of Russia and Communism' and 
argued that the idea of a bulwark against Bolshevism was one of the factors that brought the 
war. He also highlighted that the US position on the German problem could be a make or 
break factor in engendering trust or distrust between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
84 
The Treasury Department kept pressing for the idea of dismemberment right up until the 
end of the war. White's memorandum on a long range program for Germany suggested that 
(a) Germany should be kept weak for years to come and that (b) any program which has as 
its purpose the building up of Germany as a bulwark against Russia and Communism will 
inevitably lead to a third World War. The memorandum rejected `the fallacy that Europe 
needs a strong industrial Germany', `the contention that recurring reparations are necessary 
so that Germany may be made to pay for the destruction she has caused' and `the belief that 
the removal or destruction of all German war materials... would in itself prevent Germany 
from waging another war'. 85 
policy makers, and the State Department in particular, the rehabilitation of Germany would provide the basis 
for a European economic order conducive to a free market system of exchange that would benefit the US 
economy. This is one of the reasons why the State Department was weary about the idea of the Treasury 
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The view taken by the Treasury Department was at odds with the more comprehensive view 
endorsed by the State Department. Relations with the Soviet Union were to be decided by 
the position of Germany in the post-war international order. The degree of intervention of 
the United States in European affairs and the complex legal and diplomatic framework put 
in place by Washington for the making of an international order favourable to American 
interests necessitated a rehabilitative treatment of Germany after the war. 
Momentum in favour of partition seemed to wane after OCTAGON. The new political 
realities dictated by a retreating German Army and uncertainties as to future relations with 
the Soviet Union created a hiatus in discussions over the dismemberment of Germany. On 
September 29,1944 Hull suggested to the President that `no decision should be taken on the 
possible partition of Germany without examining what the internal situation is and what is 
the attitude of the principal Allies on this question'. 86 In a series of letters sent to Roosevelt 
before the Quebec Conference, Stimson sought to reverse the trend in favour of the 
Morgenthau Plan, calling it a `crime against civilisation itself and `an open confession of the 
bankruptcy of hope'. 87 Economic considerations seemed to prevail in Roosevelt's thinking. 
By the beginning of October 1944 it was clear that Roosevelt had decided to withdraw 
support for the Morgenthau Plan. The Cabinet Committee on Germany was abolished and 
Roosevelt made clear that the intention of the Quebec Memorandum was not to rid 
Germany of its industrial potential but to reduce her ability to compete with Britain 
in the 
world export markets. 88 
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Furthermore, the State Department recommended in their Briefing Book Paper on 
Germany, handed to Truman on June 29,1945, that Germany should not be dismembered, 
on the grounds that partition would be injurious to the economic rehabilitation of Europe 
and that it would be a source of disturbance to Europe. " This view was replicated by 
Henry Stimson, the US Secretary of War, who argued that a major destruction of Germany's 
industry and resources would not encourage democratic thinking in Europe. Moreover, 
Stimson argued that partition would not be conducive to the reestablishment of the German 
and European economy. He recommended the treatment of Germany as a single economic 
unit. 10 
With the end of the war in sight Roosevelt's view on dismemberment became more 
cautious, laying down that the American `attitude should be one of study and postponement 
of the final decision'. ý' 
Towards the end of the war the economic rationale of the State Department prevailed. As 
we will see in chapter 2, structural interests over Germany subjected the possibility of 
dismemberment to the `grand design' for the post-war international order, involving the 
continued expansion of the American economy by setting the conditions for a non-autarkic 
economic system in Europe. As the economic engine of Europe, Germany was pivotal 
in 
this `grand design'. Dismembering the country could only be done if the political conditions 
would allow such a move, and most importantly, from Washington's perspective, 
if it would 
serve the purpose of facilitating the set up of a free-market economic space in Europe. 
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Soviet policy on dismemberment was informed by the overriding concern of protecting the 
Soviet homeland against a resurgent Germany. The vacillation between dismemberment and 
unity was linked to security concerns. 91 Soviet policy towards Germany had two important 
milestones. The Maisky Memorandum of January 11,1944 defined the fundamental aim of 
the post-war period as the creation of `a situation which will guarantee for a long period the 
security of the Soviet Union and the maintenance of peace, at least in Europe and Asia'. 
Maisky proposed the `breaking up of Germany into a number of more or less independent 
state formations' as well as insisting on disarmament; reparations and the punishment of war 
criminals'. 93 The Litvinov Commission on Peace Treaties and Post-war Order studied the 
issue on March 14,1944, arguing that since disarmament and control presupposed Allied 
unity after the war, dismemberment was the natural alternative. 94 By January 1945 Litvinov 
was proposing to divide Germany into a maximum of seven states: Prussia, Hanover, 
Westphalia, Württemberg, Baden, Bavaria and Saxony. However, he stated that this could 
only be achieved in cooperation with Britain and America. 95 
The Soviet Union was concerned about the prospect of dismemberment since the German 
industrial potential lay in the West (which was to be occupied by the United States and the 
United Kingdom). German unity (at least for the time being) would be a less disconcerting 
option for the Soviet Union. Therefore, Stalin wanted to support joint work with his allies 
and urged German Communists not to confuse any anti-fascist reorganisation of Germany 
92 Soviet security concerns are referred to in depth in Chapter 2 
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with a socialist revolution. German Communists were instructed to work for the 
establishment of an anti-fascist, parliamentary democratic republic in Germany. " 
Filitov argues that the Soviet leadership proceeded with the treatment of the German 
Question on the basis of maintaining Germany as one state even if there is evidence 
suggesting the contrary, like Vishinsky's letter of January 1945 supporting Litvinov's 
argument for dismemberment and Gusev's letter of February 1945 asking for experts to be 
sent to EAC to work on plans for dismemberment. Filitov argues that these were zigzags 
which had no consequences on the basic orientation of the Soviet policy, which was to keep 
Germany as a single unitary state. 97 
Soviet thinking on dismemberment was inexorably linked to its own `grand design' for the 
post-war international order. Dismembering Germany could only be an option to be 
pursued if a united German entity was to prove hostile to Moscow's security interests. As we 
will see in chapters 2 and 3, the Soviet authorities embarked on the process of sovietisation 
in Germany right from the beginning of the occupation whilst still maintaining the facade of 
Allied unity. The idea of dismemberment was ultimately underpinned by the growing 
strength of the Red Army and the certainty of having secured a zone of occupation in 
Germany. For America and Britain, the opportunities which dismemberment could bring 
about were much more appealing than the idea of a united Germany gearing towards the 
Soviet orbit. 
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British wartime policy on dismemberment revolved around the concept of creating a 
controlled and solvent Germany. 98 Before leaving for Washington on March 8,1943, 
Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, circulated a paper to the War Cabinet on the 
future of Germany. The paper discussed the possibility of dismembering Germany into three 
independent, or quasi-independent German states: north Germany (the `new Prussia' with 
Saxony), Western Germany (the Rhine-Ruhr area) and South Germany (Baden, 
Württemberg and Bavaria). The paper also warned against more radical measures of 
dismemberment. 99 
The memorandum circulated to the War Cabinet by Lord Selborne, Minister of Economic 
Warfare, on April 8,1943 concluded that a lasting peace required a prosperous Germany. 
The memorandum suggested (1) the destruction of `Ersatz' war industries such as synthetic 
oil and rubber, (2) the destruction of key war industries such as the machine-tool making 
industry, (3) the transfer of whole sections of German industrial equipment to other 
European countries and (4) limiting German stocks of raw materials. Lord Selborne's view 
was that Britain should insist upon the dismemberment of Germany and try to make British- 
American opinion realise that such policy (accompanied by measures to secure German 
prosperity) was morally justifiable and the only means to securing a lasting peace. goo 
A second memorandum came from Clement Attlee, the Deputy Prime Minister, on July 19, 
1943. His main argument was that the real aggressive element in Germany was the Prussian 
Junker class, with its strong roots in the Reichswehr and the Civil Service. Attlee suggested 
that the Junker class had allied itself with the masters of heavy industry in Westphalia and 
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might now liquidate the Nazis and come forward as the only force capable of saving central 
Europe from anarchy. Attlee pressed for the eradication of the Prussian Junker class and the 
breaking of the big German economic interests in Central and Southeastern Europe. '0' 
For Britain, detached somewhat from the political realities of mainland Europe and already 
envisaging a demoted role in the post-war international order, the idea of dismemberment 
seemed to revolve around the idea of ridding Germany of its most dangerous political 
elements while endorsing the idea of a fairly prosperous German economy. The conservative 
elements in the British political establishment were aware of the dangers posed by a revived 
nationalistic Germany but were quick to defend the rehabilitation of the German economy. 
This thinking was influenced by the anti-Communist stance of Churchill. When discussing 
the Morgenthau Plan at Quebec he had called the idea `Unchristian'. The British were much 
quicker than the Americans in creating the notion of a threatening Russia. This shifted the 
consensus against dismemberment. Frank Roberts, the British Minister in Moscow, argued 
that any dismemberment could only be temporary, as splitting Germany `is a step that goes 
contrary to the development of history'. 1U2 This perspective would inform British policy 
during the occupation of Germany and influence the bipolar outcome after the end of the 
war. 
As a latecomer to the EAC setting, France would influence any policy on dismemberment 
only after the war. The aims of the Provisional Government on Germany included the 
abolition of a centralised Reich, `international control' of the Ruhr, the use of German 
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industrial resources to help rebuild France, a permanent occupation of the Rhineland and 
the furthering of economic ties with the Saar region. `Wholesale dismemberment' was not 
adopted as a general policy since the French thought that it would only revive German 
nationalism. 103 
During the early period of inter-Allied diplomatic negotiations there was a significant 
brainstorming in regards to the possibility of dismembering Germany. Anthony Eden, 
British Foreign Minister, and Stalin discussed partition during their meeting on December 
1941. Churchill may have suggested the possible dismemberment of Germany at the time of 
his first visit to Roosevelt in December 1941.104 When Eden visited Washington in March 
1943, the British Foreign Minister and Roosevelt agreed on the necessity of partition, and 
especially on the separation of Prussia. '0' Eden informed the President of Stalin's views on 
breaking up Germany into small states. Roosevelt agreed, but thought that the methods 
urged by Georges Clemanceau in 1919 should be avoided and that more encouragement 
should be given to separatist movements. If separatism would not flourish, Roosevelt 
believed that Germany should be arbitrarily divided into several states, one of which would 
be Prussia. Roosevelt felt that with Germany no longer existing as a nation, neither France 
nor Poland should have to be armed. 'o6 
At the Quebec Conference of 1943 (QUADRANT) Eden and Hull discussed the possibility 
of weakening German political and military power by way of decentralisation. Eden 
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advocated a plan to divide Germany into several small independent states. Hull agreed to a 
form of decentralisation but opposed forced separation, arguing that compulsory 
dismemberment would revive nationalist tendencies. Hull suggested an encouragement of 
voluntary federalism. '07 Eden was now more cautious about the idea of dismembering 
Germany. Hull stated that economic decentralisation could be accomplished through `natural 
forces'. He mentioned the possibility of providing Southern Germany with special access to 
the Mediterranean ports in order `to relieve it of dependence on the Northern German 
ports'. 108 
Inter-Allied enthusiasm towards dismemberment towards partition seemed to wane towards 
the end of 1943. The war had assumed a new political dimension with the breakthrough of 
the Red Army in the Eastern Front. At the Moscow Conference of October 1943 the 
preliminary discussion of post-war policy towards Germany was based upon two papers 
submitted by the United States delegation. Dismemberment was briefly discussed on the 
October 25 session. Hull noted that dismemberment found favour in `high quarters' in the 
United States government but that the experts on German matters were extremely sceptical 
about its long-range utility. Eden and Molotov expressed a similar view in regards to their 
own governments. 109 
The dismemberment of Germany was also discussed during the Teheran Conference. 
Having decided that Germany would lose Königsberg and its Eastern territories to Poland, 
the three leaders agreed tentatively that Germany be dismembered as it was before 1871. 
Churchill expressed a preference for a two-way division, joining Bavaria to Austria to form a 
South German state. According to Hopkins' notes, `Stalin was not enthusiastic about either 
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proposal... and saw little difference between the people of one part of Germany and 
another'. The question was then referred to the EAC (established at the Moscow 
Conference) which was about to begin its work in London. 10 
Churchill proposed a harsh treatment of Prussia and the creation of a Danubian 
confederation of states. Stalin stated that although he liked the idea, he needed to study it in 
detail before making concrete suggestions. "' During the tripartite political meeting of 
December 1,1943, which unfolded within the convivial atmosphere of the conference, Stalin 
argued the case for dismemberment and Roosevelt suggested a division of Germany into 
five parts. Stalin seemed more inclined to agree with Roosevelt on the partition of Germany 
into small pieces, juxtaposing their view to that of Churchill, perhaps more aware of the 
dangers involved in leaving a vacuum in the middle of Europe. 112 Britain suggested the 
establishment of a Dismemberment Committee in January 1944, to implement the plans 
discussed in the Teheran Conference. However, by then the Soviet Union started to express 
some reluctance on the subject and dismemberment plans were shelved. "3 
Agreeing on the possibility of keeping Germany united would have created unnecessary 
apprehension amongst the Allies. The idea of dismemberment allowed them to proceed on 
the safest option. Since the Moscow Conference of 1944, the policy machinery of each of 
the main Allies started to frown upon dismemberment, as this represented a threat to their 
interests. This might have responded to a certain apprehension on the part of the Allies 
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about the future of inter-Allied relations, a clear spin off from the aura of suspicion that 
clouded the general context of practical association, as well as to the uncertainty about the 
outcome of the German Question. 
At Moscow in 1944, Molotov indicated that talk of federations reminded him of the Western 
efforts to build a `cordon sanitaire' against the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution. 
Stalin viewed the possibility of a Balkan confederation as a potential threat to the Soviet 
Union. 114 During OCTAGON, Churchill finally opted to support the Morgenthau Plan as a 
quid pro quo for the continuation of the Lend Lease during the post-European phase of the 
war. "' The Quebec Memorandum was vague on the issue of dismemberment since it 
mentioned nothing on how Germany was to be permanently divided or what territory it was 
to lose. "' 
The crucial wartime inter-Allied discussions on Germany took place at the Yalta Conference. 
During the February 5,1945 meeting of the three foreign ministers, Eden stated that the 
British War Cabinet had not discussed partition, though studies had been made at an expert 
level. Molotov invited his partners to commit to partition while he withheld a Soviet decision 
for later. At the second plenary session, when asked by Stalin on his position on 
dismemberment, the Roosevelt replied that although the two were not directly connected, 
`the permanent treatment of Germany might grow out of the question of the zones of 
occupation'. Churchill insisted on the removal of Prussia and added that 
`the British 
government agreed in principle to dismemberment' but he felt that the actual method was 
`too complicated' to be undertaken in a short period of time. The Prime 
Minister also 
remarked that `all that was required was a final agreement on the zones of occupation and a 
114 Neumann, W., Making The Peace 1941-5, p. 67-8 
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zone for France'. 117 Stalin kept pressing the Allies for a decision on dismemberment, 
suggesting that it could be included in the instrument of surrender. Roosevelt added that `it 
would be a great mistake to have any public discussion on the dismemberment of Germany', 
opting like Churchill to delegate the issue to the EAC. "' 
During the February 6 meeting, the foreign ministers discussed the insertion of the word 
`dismemberment' in the instrument of surrender. The Soviet version committed the Big 
Three to dismemberment, while the American and British draft constituted a less binding 
approval of this policy. The three heads of government were now in agreement that the 
relevant article drafted by the EAC (article 12a) should state that, in the exercise of supreme 
authority with respect of Germany, the three governments `will take such steps, including the 
complete disarmament, demilitarisation and the dismemberment of Germany as they deem 
requisite for future peace and security'. "' During the February 7 meeting, the foreign 
ministers agreed to allocate a zone of occupation to France and added the word 
`dismemberment' to the instrument of surrender. They also delegated the study of the issue 
of dismemberment to a tripartite commission. Quite conveniently, the foreign ministers 
emphasised the need to study the `procedure' for a possible dismemberment of Germany 
rather than the dismemberment itself. 120 
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The Crimea Conference left the question of dismemberment in an ambiguous situation. 
With the end of the war beckoning, Churchill and Roosevelt were less sure about the 
benefits of a dismembered Germany, quite possibly at the mercy of the Red Army. Stalin 
now talked in public and private about a united Germany, although denazified, demilitarised 
and democratised. When addressing a Czechoslovak delegation in March 1945 he openly 
expressed his concerns about Western intentions in Germany. He harangued Slavic unity 
and indicated that 
[W]e must bear in mind that our allies will try to save the Germans and come to an agreement with 
them. We will be merciless towards the Germans but our allies will treat them with kid gloves. 121 
The discussions over the possible dismemberment of Germany responded to the logic of the 
practical association. It was easier to work on the alternative of dismemberment while the 
fighting went on. This is another indication of the `pluralist plus' nature of the practical 
association. The Allies worked earnestly on the option that would allow them to deal with 
the German Question without causing the breakdown of the practical association framework 
before finalising the task of winning the war. Dismemberment was closely link to the 
question of the political and economic stability of post-war Germany and Europe. The 
possible dismemberment of Germany was linked to the realignment of world politics after 
the war. A dismembered Germany would have been the source of a possibly wider 
confrontation between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. By shifting their position 
on dismemberment towards ambiguity, the Allies were able to keep the practical association 
intact and maintain the spirit of coexistence that would be pivotal for the relatively smooth 
passage to a bipolar solution in the wake of World War Two. 
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1.5 The issue of reparations 
The issue of reparations was one of the main informative aspects of the German Question. 
The exacting of reparations had political as well as economic considerations attached to it, as 
the countries occupied by Germany had suffered enormous economic devastation. 
The State Department began to deal with the subject of reparations in November 1943. The 
Council for Foreign Relations (CFR) study group reports stressed the imperative to prioritise 
the productivity of the German economy over punitive reparations. The final report of the 
Interdivisional Committee on Reparations, Restitution and Property Rights included a study 
conducted under the auspices of the Federal Reserves, which estimated that the total 
reparations bill would be in the region of 120 billion marks, collected during 12 years. 122 
A Federal Reserve document asserted that the final amount was `a realistic and not merely an 
ideal figure'. The Interdivisional Committee, however, refrained from committing itself to a 
definite sum. 123 A forty page document produced by the OSS was completed by its Research 
and Analysis Branch on the eve of the Yalta Conference and disseminated under the heading 
`Problems of German Reparations'. The OSS reached the conclusion that `contrary to 
general belief, experience does not indicate that the payment of large sums by Germany is 
impossible'. 124 
An earlier study conducted under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations and 
written by the economists Alvin H. Hansen, Jacob Viner, and William Diebold Jr., 
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recommended that reparations should be imposed only to the extent that they would 
contribute to strengthening the post-war economic and social order. Another study, 
conducted by the British Interdepartmental Committee on Reparations and Economic 
Security under the chairmanship of Sir William Malkin, opposed the complete 
deindustralisation of Germany and suggested an elastic formula to be automatically adjusted 
to the facts of the future. 125 In July 1944, the State Department presented new papers on 
German reparations and economic policy, seeking the approval of the Executive Committee 
of Foreign Economic Policy chaired by Dean Acheson. The papers focused on 
rehabilitation, stating that reparations should be extracted from production and in 
accordance with the German contribution to the reconstruction of Europe. 126 
After Yalta, the Informal Policy Committee on Germany went over the final drafts of JSC 
1067 and the `Instructions of the United States Representative on the Allied Commission on 
Reparations', otherwise known as the Pauley Report. The Pauley Report called for the 
avoidance of the mistakes made in the aftermath of World War One, in which reparations 
were paid with credits which the United States found difficult to collect because of import 
barriers. Pauley's instructions called for the elimination of war industries and a reparations 
plan which would not entail direct or indirect financing by the United States. 
127 
Reparations were therefore seen by US officials within the context of security against a 
revived nationalistic Germany, but most importantly, from the standpoint of 
hooking the 
German economy to a free market system of exchange. 
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Towards the end of the war, American planners began to examine the reparations problem 
within the context of US economic interests. The resulting staff papers of an Executive 
Committee on Foreign Economic Policy, chaired by Dean Acheson and composed of 
representatives of the Department of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce and Labour, of 
the US Tariff Commission and of the Foreign Economic Administration, concluded that 
Germany should contribute to the rehabilitation of other countries. Its economic machinery 
was therefore to be retained and placed under the control of the occupation authorities. The 
overriding principle was that reparation policies should conform to the American interests 
regarding the post-war international order. 128 
In a move to implement the Yalta decisions, on March 12,1945 Roosevelt had appointed 
Dr. Isador Lubin to head the US Delegation to the Moscow-based Allied Reparations 
Commission. Lubin's draft was submitted to the White House on March 22,1945. The draft 
stated that reparations should primarily consist of dismantled German plants and equipment, 
whereas deliveries from current production should include shipments of products such as 
coal, timber and potash, but should not be made in the form of manufactured goods. 129 
Most of the policy recommendations were based on the recognition that reparations should 
be paid from current production and that the Allies and neutrals should accept German 
products. These recommendations represented the majority view of the US administration, 
which towards the end of the war was openly calling for the rehabilitation of the German 
economy. 
The Soviet view on reparations was informed by the losses incurred in the pursuit of the 
Great Patriotic War. In November 1943, the Litvinov Commission, composed by academics 
128 Backer, J. H., The Decision to Divide Germany, p. 31 
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and officials from the Foreign Affairs Commissariat, produced a basic outline for action 
which revolved around the principle of taking `from Germany and its Allies everything that 
can be taken'. The maximum value of the equipment, goods and services to be secured was 
$75 billion, 80% of this to be extracted directly from Germany. In negotiations with the 
Allies, the Soviet Union insisted on a share of 50-80"'o taken in a one-off payment, 
procurements from current production over ten years and the rest by employing German 
labour. 130 
An article written in 1943 by the economist E. S. Varga entitled `Reparations by Hitler's 
Germany and its Accomplices' mentioned the sum of $ 100 billion as the total cost of the 
economic damage caused by Nazi Germany. Varga suggested that reparations should be 
distributed according to the damage done in proportion to the national wealth, a formula 
which would have entitled the Soviet Union to priority treatment. Varga's arguments were 
the Soviet position at Yalta and at the end of the war. 13' Loth argues that Stalin could not 
have a different program for Germany after the outcome of the war. Security against future 
German aggression was not to be gained without the control of the industrial heartland in 
Western Germany, a line of thinking influenced by Varga's article. Loth posits that this 
probably compelled Stalin to seek a common allied policy towards Germany, since it became 
clear to Moscow that America would not aid the reconstruction of the Soviet economy. 132 
Reparations from current production remained the formula under which the Soviets 
operated after the end of the war. The motivation to extract reparations from current 
130 Filitov, A., `Problems of Post-War Construction in Soviet Foreign Policy Conception during World liar II ` in Gori, F., 
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production had a political connotation which would be one of the main sources of 
disagreement for the Allies and a crucial factor in the partition of Germany. As we will see in 
chapters 2 and 3, by pressing for reparations from current production, Moscow made sure 
that they would have a significant say in the socio-economic system of the Eastern zone of 
occupation. This went hand in hand with their `grand design' for the post-war international 
order as reparations would be linked to the possibility of maintaining a political foothold in 
the Eastern zone and possibly extending it into the Western-occupied areas. For the Soviet 
Union, with its abundance of natural resources and manpower and under socialist economic 
planning, rehabilitation would come in the form of forced savings. Pursuing the issue of 
reparations would become a political tool to probe the intentions of the Western Allies and 
ultimately, to secure a political foothold in Germany. 
The Allies discussed the issue of reparations at inter-Allied level during the Yalta 
Conference. During the session of February 5, Ivan Maisky, Deputy Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs and former Ambassador to Britain, recommended the removal of heavy industry, 
including machine tools, plants and rolling stock over a period of two years and annual in- 
kind payments out of current production to last ten years. Maisky said that 80% of the iron 
and steel, electrical power and chemical industries would have to be withdrawn in order to 
restore the Soviet economy and provide for future European security. He recommended a 
100% removal of aviation factories, synthetic oil refineries and other specialised industry that 
the Germans could use for military purposes. Maisky also maintained that if roughly 20% of 
its industry remained, Germany could adequately meet its domestic needs and still fill their 
requirements of reparations deliveries in kind over the ten year period. With clear political 
13 ' Loth W., Stalin 'r Plans for Post-War Germany in Gori, F., and Pons S. (Ed. ), The Soviet Union and Eurvpe in the 
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intentions in mind, he stated that in order to execute the plan and maintain security, tripartite 
control over the German economy should last beyond the reparation period. He also 
recommended that the Allies seat on the boards of all industries that could be used for 
military purposes. The Soviet Union would expect to receive no less than $10 billion in 
withdrawals and yearly in kind payments. Churchill, while acknowledging that the Soviet 
Union suffered more than any country and deserved reparations from Germany, maintained 
that he did not believe it was possible to extract such large amounts as the Soviets wanted. 
The Prime Minister also pointed out the enormous reparation problems in the aftermath of 
World War One. 133 
Seeking to mediate between Britain and the Soviet Union, Roosevelt offered qualified 
support to the Soviet position. The President stressed that the United States would not 
repeat the mistakes of the 1920s, when it financed German reparations through loans. 
Roosevelt thought it appropriate that Germany should retain enough `industry and work' to 
keep it from starving, but that the Soviets should also get as much as they could in 
manpower and factories. An impasse was reached when the Allies agreed to delegate the 
matter to an inter-Allied commission for reparations to be set up in Moscow. 
134 
On February 9,1945, during the foreign ministers' session, Stettinius concurred in principle 
with the Soviet plan but suggested that the final sum should be decided by the reparations 
commission in Moscow. Molotov demanded that the sum of $20 billion should be referred 
to the commission as the basis for negotiations, adding that his figure was 
based on 1938 
prices and that the final amount might be 15-20% higher. Eden took a stand against a 
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definite reparations sum and suggested that reparations in the form of labour should be 
incorporated in the final protocol. He did not accept the Soviet idea that the purpose of 
reparations was the military and economic disarmament of Germany. 135 
The Yalta Protocol on reparations agreed upon by the Allies established that 
Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. 
Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main 
burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy. 136 
Reparations were to be exacted in the following manner 
(a)Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized 
resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well 
as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, 
shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc. ), these removals to be carried 
out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany. (b) Annual deliveries of 
goods from current production for a period to be fixed (c) Use of German labour. 137 
The proceedings at Yalta regarding the issue of reparations had been influenced by a shift in 
the long range objectives of the major Allies. With the war drawing to an end, the question 
of reparations would be linked to the long range objectives of the Allies in regards to the 
nature of the socio-economic system of any future German political entity. Although the 
Allies agreed on the principle of reparations, the divergence of interests in regards to the 
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manner in which these would be extracted marred the spectrum of practical association and 
would become one of the reasons for its breakdown after the war. Soviet participation in the 
extracting of reparations, particularly in a single German entity, would have given Moscow a 
political say in the German economy as a whole, therefore giving rise to the spectrum of a 
Soviet Germany. The Allies were cautious in not making reparations an issue that would 
have caused irreparable damage in the practical association framework while the fighting 
against the Axis and the process of territorial realignment went on. 
1.6 The post-war occupation of Germany 
Although the evolution of the demarcation of the zones of occupation would be informed 
by political concerns, as the war was drawing to an end the Allies succeeded, through the 
EAC, to agree on the zonal division of Germany for the purpose of its occupation. Sharp 
argues that these negotiations cannot be divorced from their military context as they were 
affected by the existing and future strategies of the Western and Soviet military forces. 
'38 
The War Department Occupational Directive JCS 1067, approved by President Harry 
Truman in May 1945, and heavily influenced by `Morgenthau Plan thinking', was to remain 
as the governing document for the US occupation of Germany during the 1945-7 period. 
JCS 1067 specified that Germany was `not to be occupied for the purposes of liberation 
but 
as a defeated enemy nation'. The country was to be disarmed, decentralised and 
denazified. 
Occupation administrators would be `just, but firm and aloof' nd fraternisation between 
occupiers and occupied would be `strongly discouraged'. Those who had held membership 
in any of the Nazi organizations were to be denied employment except as common 
labourers. Assistance to German political institutions would be limited to preventing civil 
138 Sharp, T., The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Diuision of Germany, (Clarendon Press: Oxford) (1975) p. 
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unrest and disease and to lay the foundation for eventual democratic rule. Administrators 
would do nothing to revive German economic or financial institutions. Key industries were 
to be strictly controlled or eliminated. German living standards would not be permitted to 
rise above those of neighbouring nations. It is worth mentioning that JCS 1067 remained 
secret until October 17,1945 when much of it had been incorporated into the Potsdam 
agreement. 139 It is partly due to bureaucratic infighting that the American occupation 
authorities would have JCS 1067 as their main instrument for action in Germany. It is also 
partly due to the Rationalist nature of the practical association framework and adherence to 
the rules stipulated at the Potsdam Conference that the military authorities would labour 
under an ambiguous occupational policy during 1945-7. Whilst the policy framework of the 
`grand design' had already been set up by the State Department, it would take until 1946-7 
for the Truman administration to adopt a more unilateral view on the German Question. 
At the Quebec Conference of September 1944, Roosevelt finally agreed to the American 
occupation of the southern zone. Mac Allister argues that since the President's primary 
reason for rejecting the southern zone had been his concern about becoming too involved in 
post-war European affairs, it is worth considering whether his shift in thinking reflected 
increasing doubts about post-war Soviet intentions and a corresponding acceptance of the 
need for a long-term presence of American forces in Europe. 140 
The Soviets on the other hand, appeared to have a more definite view of how the 
occupation should unfold at zonal level. By the time that Stalin issued the order to march on 
Berlin, Ulbricht and his associates had mapped out the Communist tasks in the Soviet zone 
"'' Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military 
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only, rather than in Germany as a whole. Three task forces of exiles were to act as arms of 
the occupation administration and establish a local administration supervised but not run, by 
Communists. These developments are indicative of Moscow's intention to make the Soviet 
zone into a separate political entity should four-power rule in Germany fail. "' Mastnv 
argues that the Soviets tackled the German Question according to the course of military 
events. The possibility of Britain and the United States entering Germany first prompted the 
Soviet Union to agree to the zonal division of Germany, the three-power status of Berlin and 
the tripartite control machinery at the EAC session of November 11,1944.142 This is 
suggestive of the new political reality imposed by the end of the war and demonstrative of 
the fact that Moscow was more prepared than the other Allies for the task of occupying 
Germany. 
As with the question of dismemberment and reparations, the Allies operated under the 
framework of legality and diplomacy. The creation of the EAC, the inter-Allied body in 
charge of making plans for the post-hostilities period, was decided at the Moscow 
Conference of 1943.143 At the Teheran Conference it was decided that Poland should be 
given a large portion of German territory, with the Oder-Neisse line as the eastern border of 
post-war Germany. The EAC worked out a number of recommendations during 1944 which 
included the splitting of Germany into three zones of occupation, each controlled by one 
power, the creation of the Allied Control Council for Germany (ACC), which could only act 
in consensus, and the partition of Berlin in three sectors. 
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The plan for the occupation of Germany devised by the EAC entailed that the Soviet Union 
would receive the eastern sector. Britain would occupy the northwest of Germany and 
United States the south-western part. The EAC made provisions for the disarming of 
Germany and the Allied imposition of firm controls in economic, political and military 
matters. 
144 
The question of allocating a zone of occupation for France was discussed at Yalta. Stalin was 
somewhat apprehensive about France's participation in the occupation machinery. 145 Up 
until OCTAGON France had played no direct part in the negotiations over the German 
Question. During his visit to Moscow in October 1944, Churchill, With Roosevelt's 
agreement, persuaded Stalin that France should be offered a place as the fourth member of 
the EAC. The inclusion of France as an occupation power had a political reason behind it: 
Churchill wanted to boost the membership of the Western camp, possibly as a bulwark 
against Soviet geopolitical intentions west of the Elbe. 
The establishment of occupation zones enabled the Allies to avoid a strict commitment to 
any plans for dismemberment. The commonly agreed policy of dividing Germany for the 
purpose of its occupation denotes a willingness to accomplish dismemberment by default. This is 
indicative of the Rationalist nature of the alliance. Whereas in Central and Eastern Europe 
territorial realignments would be susceptible to changes during the early Cold War period; in 
Germany, the Allies, through the work of the EAC, laid down the foundations of a spheres 
of influence settlement that would be consolidated with Bizonia, sovietisation and the 
144 Buhite, R., Decisions at Yalta: an appraisal of summit diplomacy, (Wilmington, DE.: Scholarly Resources) (1986) 
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partition into two states after the end of the war. The Allies would leave considerable space 
for the internal mechanism of the occupation process to the zonal commanders, as agreed at 
the Potsdam Conference. It is probably the 
-Allied intervention in the planning and 
implementation of the zones of occupation what set the background for the orderly partition 
of the country and the attainment of coexisting spheres of influence in Germany and 
Europe. 
1.7 Conclusion 
World War Two was one of the most disruptive wars in the history of the international 
political system. The devastation caused by the Nazi invasion of Western and Eastern 
Europe prompted the intervention of the United States and the Soviet Union in order to 
sustain the war effort financially, militarily and diplomatically. This intervention, on a scale 
unprecedented in the history of military alliances, created a situation of decisive action in 
Germany and a permanent involvement of the superpowers in European affairs. As we will 
see in chapters 4 and 5, the Allies set the foundations for a complete transformation of 
international society via the treatment of the German Question while at the same time 
respecting the diverse nature of the practical association framework. They managed to 
maintain an alliance which did not have the most homogenous background and found 
agreement in matters which led to the successful culmination of the war and the 
establishment of a workable post-war international order. The Allies engaged in the 
treatment of the most fundamental issues concerning the future of Germany in a Rationalist 
manner. They succeeded in setting a common framework for the study and implementation 
of policy pertaining to the occupation and possible dismemberment of Germany and to the 
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discussion of such difficult issues as the extracting of reparations from the main Axis power. 
The enormity of the task and the commitment to create a permanent engagement on 
Germany after the war created the conditions for a `pluralist-plus' international society. The 
very size of the task involved, the suspicion which informed inter-Allied relations and the 
prospect of occupying a defeated Germany made the Alliance reliant on the conservative 
elements outlined by the pluralists. The framework of practical association, the treatment of 
the German Question and the establishment of the post-war international order rested on a 
sound legal basis, indicative of the practical association outlined by Nardin, in which 
international law prevailed and the rules agreed upon rested on its own procedures rather 
than moralistic considerations. 146 While the post-war international society would not take a 
definite shape until after the end of the war, the Allies adhered to the legacy of cohabitation 
in order to manage of the transition into a new society of states. To paraphrase Nardin, `the 
precise constitutional shape of an [international] society', particularly during the war, was less 
important than the fact that it could `tolerate different beliefs, customs, and ways of life'. '" 
The interventionism displayed by the Allies in the shaping of the post-war international 
order had its origins in the treatment of the German Question. While the practical 
association operated under a framework which respected the plurality of interests, it would 
also give rise to substantial solidarist elements which would facilitate the setting of a post- 
war international order based on co-existence. Solidarism was enshrined in the legal 
instruments that the Allies established during the war and in the manner in which they 
bestowed upon themselves the task of radically transforming Germany and the post-war 
141 Nardin, T., Ethical Tradition in International Affairs in Mapel, D and Nardin T., (ed) Traditions of International 
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international order. This solidarist streak had its corollary in the creation of the UN Charter, 
which would provide the legal basis for intervention in the event of gross human rights 
abuses as well as action `necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security', '+8 
and the Convention on Genocide, which makes genocide a crime under international law 
and commits all members to `prevent and punish' it. "'' Solidarists, such as Vincent, Wheeler 
and Linklater, maintain that the emergence of limited, universal ethical consensus is possible, 
desirable and even present on some questions, such as moral outrage at genocide. 150 
Solidarism focuses on human rights as the quintessential reason for intervention. In spite of 
the pluralist defense of `sovereignty' as a central institution of international society, 151 the 
example of the wartime practical association shows that intervention can be carried out 
within the conservative boundaries demarcated by law, diplomacy and balance of power. 
This combination of pluralist and solidarist elements in the unfolding of the treatment of the 
German Question, make the practical association framework `pluralist plus' in nature. 
The elements of intervention and coexistence would remain the guiding lights in the 
treatment of the German Question after the war. It would be in the interest of the 
superpowers to take decisive action in Germany while at the same time adhering to a 
common legal and diplomatic framework during the transition to a bipolar outcome in 
Germany and Europe. The conduct of the Allies in matters regarding the pursuit of the war 
against Germany, marked by an assiduous legal, diplomatic, financial and military 
147 Nardin, T., Legal Positivism as a Theory of International Society in Mapel, D. and Nardin, T. (ed), International 
Society-Diverse Ethical Perspectives, p. 32 
148 UN Charter 
-http: //www. un. org/aboutun/charter/ 
149 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948- 
http. //www icrc org/ihl nsf/52d68d14de616OeOcl2563da005fdblb/a2ec826e5dO83098c125641e0040690d? Op 
enDocument 
Aso Williams, J., Pluralism, Solidarirm and the Emergence of li orld Society in English School Theory , International 
Relations, 19: 1, (2005) p. 22 
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cooperation, would extend to the negotiations regarding the principles that were to guide the 
occupation of the country after the war. These elements of Rationalist behaviour would 
inform the creation of the post-war international order. As we will see in chapter 4, 
superpower intervention and the principle of coexistence, generated by the treatment of the 
German Question, would become the `primary institutions' of the post-war international 
order. While conflictual elements would overlap with this overall Rationalist conduct 
between the superpowers, the precedent created by the wartime practical association 
framework would enable the Allies to reach a non-disruptive solution to the German 
Question and enforce an orderly transition to a bipolar international order. 
151 See Mayall, J., World Politics: Progress and its Limits, (Cambridge, Polity) (2000) 
75 
Chapter 2 
The German Question, American and Soviet structural interests, and the origins of 
the Cold War 
2.1 Introduction 
In spite of the Rationalist approach adopted by the Allies with regard to the treatment of the 
German Question and the making of the post-war international order, superpower 
interaction had conflictual elements that would have a significant impact on the political 
future of Germany and Europe. The divergence of interests over the German Question had 
structural aspects which stemmed from the pursuit of the national interest on the part of the 
superpowers and the ideologies that underwrote it. These were geared towards buttressing 
the economic, political and military position which the United States and the Soviet Union 
had attained during the war. From the American perspective, the perception was that Soviet 
interests and Soviet ideology were at odds with the American `grand design' for the post-war 
international order. Washington's main rationale in the pursuit of its national interest in 
Germany and Europe was of an economic nature. As such, her ideological and policy- 
making apparatus was intimately linked to the private interests of the American industrial 
and financial establishment; which perceived the need for a political and economic foothold 
in the vital strongholds of Germany and Western Europe. 
The Soviet `grand design' for the post-war international order involved the creation of a 
political and economic foothold in Germany and Eastern Europe. This `grand design' was 
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orientated towards preventing the resurgence of Germany as a challenging power, and being 
encircled by the West, as in the interwar period. Because of Germany's importance in the 
respective `grand design' ' projects of the superpowers, conflict appeared to have a structural 
connotation which would play a significant role in the creation of a bipolar Germany, and 
ultimately a bipolar Europe. 
The conflictual aspects of inter-Allied relations over the treatment of the German Question 
and the making of the post-war international order had attached to it the typical 
interpretative elements espoused by Realism. Realist scholars postulate that states act 
according to rational calculations when pursuing their interests. States seek power in order to 
preserve their security and enhance their standing in the international political system. Its 
focus on power is justified by human nature and based on the Hobbesian view of the 
insatiable desire of humans to dominate others. Realism sees state sovereignty and its 
survival as the supreme national interest in an international political system based on self- 
help. 2 Realists have borrowed methodology from economics in order to establish a 
distinctive political domain of theory, explicitly, as in Waltz's analogy between states and 
firms, or implicitly, as in Morgenthau's parallel between rational actors pursuing `interest 
defined as power' and `utility maximising individuals'. 3 
I The `grand design' mentality was first outlined and implemented through The Victory Plan of 1941, which 
became the blueprint for the general mobilisation of the US Army. The Victory Plan predicted the future 
organisation for an army that did not yet exist, outlined combat missions for a war not yet declared, and 
computed war production requirements for industries that were still committed to peacetime needs. See 
Kirkpatrick, C, An unknown future and a doubtful present. " writing the victory plan of 1941 (Washington, D. C.: Center of 
Military History, United States Army) (1990) 
2 Dunne T., Realism, in Baylis J. and Smith S. (Ed), The globalization of world politics : an introduction to international 
relations, (Oxford and New York : Oxford University Press) ( 1997) p. 118-9 
3 Buzan B., The Timeless Windom of Realism? in Smith S., Booth, K., Zalewski M. (Ed. ), International Theory: 
Positivism and Beyond, (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press) (1996) p. 51-2 
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The pursuit of the superpowers' structural interests was conducive to the creation of conflict 
and the ultimate breakdown of four-power control over Germany. Structural realism, also 
known as neorealism, provides with a sound theoretical framework for the analysis of the 
structural aspects of conflict involved in the treatment of the German Question. Neorealism 
sees not human nature but the anarchical international system as fostering fear and insecurity 
among states. 4 While classical realists argue that states rely on aggression, neorealists 
maintain that fear is the main informative element of inter-state relations. Both camps share 
the view that states rely on military force in order to pursue their objectives and put a special 
emphasis on the balance of military capabilities as one of the main ordering principles of 
inter-states relations. 5 
Waltz maintains that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar systems. In a bipolar 
world, great powers balance each other primarily by `internal' rather than `external' means: 
they rely on their own military capabilities rather than on alliances or the capabilities of allies. 
6 According to Waltz, internal balancing is a less uncertain and more efficient process than 
external balancing. Waltz posits that this reduction of uncertainty is a crucial element in 
explaining why bipolar systems are more stable and less war-prone than multipolar systems. 
Clearly, the military and economic capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union 
enabled them to intervene in the treatment of the German Question and the making of the 
post-war international order. The enhancement of their geopolitical and geo-econonuc 
standing in the aftermath of World War Two was responsible for ensuring that their 
4 Dunne T., Realism, p. 113. See Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics (McGraw Hill) (1979) 
S Brooks, S., Dueling Realisms, p. 455 
6 Waltz defines internal balancing efforts as `moves to increase economic capability, to 
increase military 
strength', and external balancing efforts as `moves to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to weaken 
and shrink an opposing one'. See Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, 118 
7 Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, 168-9 
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interventionist approach would not result in a less stable post-war international order. The 
smooth passage to a bipolar international order was executed in conditions that, although 
imbued with conflictual elements, were clearly influenced by the Rationalist principles of 
diplomacy, law-making and the idea of spheres of influence. In this context, Waltz's schema 
supplements a `pluralist plus' interpretation: the overwhelming capabilities of the 
superpowers would foster the conditions for a post-war international order based on 
coexistence. 
A neorealist interpretation is consistent with a `pluralist plus' interpretation inasmuch as 
structural constraints compelled the superpowers to intervene in what they saw as their 
spheres of influence. This intervention has nonetheless unfolded within Rationalist 
parameters. The demarcation established by Washington and Moscow had attached to it a 
strong element of coexistence. Ultimately, American and Soviet interests did not collide to 
the point of causing a systemic disruption. The legacy of the wartime practical association 
framework and the overwhelming power accrued by both superpowers during the 
conflagration established clear boundaries as to the scope of their structural interests. This 
would facilitate the orderly passage to a bipolar international order. 
The mainstream interpretations on the origins of the Cold War (particularly the orthodox 
and revisionist views) emphasise conflict as the main factor informing inter-Allies relations 
in the aftermath of World War Two. By doing so, they place themselves close to the Realist 
framework of interpretation. Critics of the English School argue that the tenets of 
79 
international society theory constitute a lighter version of Realism. After all, order and 
balance of power are concepts associated with the Realist discourse. 8 
However, in the case of the treatment of the German Question and the making of the post- 
war international order the elements of conflict, legality and transformation overlapped and 
complemented each other. World War Two had compelled the intervention of the United 
States and the Soviet Union on a scale unprecedented in the history of military conflict. 
American intervention was underpinned by structural interests mainly aimed at securing the 
continuation of the US economic expansion. Amongst the main theories on the origins of 
the Cold War, `revisionism' (which opposes the pro-containment stance of the `orthodox' 
camp) maintains that the United States and the Soviet Union were economic rivals, making 
them natural adversaries. LaFeber argues the United States and Imperial Russia were already 
rivals by 1900 over the development of Manchuria. Russia, unable to compete industrially 
with America, sought to close off parts of East Asia to trade with other colonial powers. 
Williams initiated the revisionist debate on the origins of the Cold War in the late 1950s. He 
underlined the `imperialistic' nature of the American political and economic system. Williams 
argues that particularly after the first successful detonation of the atomic bomb, the attitude 
of the United States left the Soviets with one real option: either acquiesce to American 
proposals or be confronted with power and hostility. 10 The binding element of the 
revisionist camp is what they perceive as the American responsibility for the breakdown of 
post-war peace. According to Williams and later revisionists, American policymakers shared 
8 Dunne T., Inventing international society: a history of the English school, (New York: St. Martin's Press in association 
with St. Antony's College, Oxford) (1998) p. 5. Bull argues that institutions like diplomacy, international law, 
war, the balance of power and great power intervention serve as the ordering principles of the society of states. 
See Bull, H., The Anarchical Society and Wight, M., Power Politics (New York: Leicester University Press) (1995) 
9 See Lafeber, W., America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1992 (New York and London : -McGraw-Hill, (1993) 
1" See Williams, W, The Tragedy ofAmerican Diplomacy (World Publishing Co.: Cleveland and New York) (1959) 
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an overriding concern with the health of capitalism at home. In order to achieve that 
objective, they pursued an `open door' policy abroad, aimed at increasing access to foreign 
markets for American business and agriculture. From this perspective, a growing economy 
went hand-in-hand with the consolidation of American power internationally. " 
Furthermore, starting with Alperovitz, revisionist scholars have focused on the American 
decision to use atomic weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the last days of 
World War Two as the starting point of the Cold War. According to Alperovitz, the bombs 
were not used to defeat Imperial Japan, who had been trying to surrender for several 
months, but to intimidate the Soviets; signaling that the United States would use nuclear 
weapons to preserve American interests in the post-war international order. 12 The Kolkos 
argue that US policy was both anticommunist and counterrevolutionary. The United States 
was not necessarily fighting Soviet influence, but any form of challenge to American 
economic and political interests. 13 
However, whilst Washington was pursuing its `grand design', the Soviet Union intervened in 
the Eastern zone of occupation in Germany as well as in Eastern Europe in order to carve a 
sphere of influence that would guarantee her security from a revived Germany and from 
encirclement by the West. Although the involvement of the Soviet Union in the reordering 
of the international political system created a divergence of interests vis-ä-vis the United 
" Nashel, J., `Cold War (1945-91) `Changing Interpretations' in Whiteclay Chambers II, J., (ed. ), The Oxford 
Companion to American Military History (Oxford University Press: Oxford and New York) (1999) 
12 See Alperovitz, G., Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (London : Pluto) (1994) 
13 See Kolko G. and J., The Limits of Power. The World and U. S. Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 )(New York: Harper and 
Row) (1972) 
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States, Moscow's intervention unfolded within clearly demarcated lines which seldom 
clashed with the US `grand design'. 
The `orthodox' school places the responsibility for the Cold War on the Soviet Union and its 
expansion into Eastern Europe. 14 The `orthodox' interpretation tends to be seen as the US 
official stance on the origins of the conflict. Bailey argues that the breakdown of inter-Allied 
relations following the aftermath of World War Two was the result of Soviet expansionism 
in the immediate post-war years. Stalin had violated the promises he had made at Yalta, 
imposing Soviet-dominated regimes on unwilling Eastern European populations, and 
conspired to spread communism throughout the world. The United States was forced to 
respond to Soviet aggression with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, in order to 
contain communist subversion around the world. 15 Schlesinger identifies Leninism and 
totalitarianism as the informing factors of a structure of thought and behaviour which made 
post-war collaboration between both superpowers inherently impossible. 16 
`Revisionist' scholars challenged the widely accepted notion that Soviet leaders were 
committed to postwar `expansionism'. They cited evidence that the Soviet Union's 
occupation of Eastern Europe had a defensive rationale, and that Soviet leaders saw 
themselves as attempting to avoid encirclement by the United States and its allies. According 
to this view, the Soviet Union was so weak and devastated after the end of the war as to be 
unable to pose any serious threat to the United States. Moreover, America maintained a 
nuclear monopoly until the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in August 1949. It has 
also been suggested that Stalin never fully understood the Western position. 
14 Calhoun, C., (ed. ), `Cold War', Dictionary of the Social Sciences (Oxford University Press: Oxford and New York) 
(2002) 
15 See Bailey, T., America Faces Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (1950) 
16 Schlesinger, A., Origins of the Cold War, Foreign Affairs 46, no. 1 (October 1967) pp. 22-52 
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An interpretation based on the English School schema downplays any explanation on the 
origins of conflict based on misunderstanding. Unlike the first Cold War, when US policy- 
making were informed with the `Riga axioms', \ti'orld War Two and superpower involvement 
in the treatment of the German Question on and off the battlefield forged an associative 
framework which created a cognitive opening. Both superpowers were aware of each other's 
intentions and structural interests. This generated clear boundaries as to the superpowers' 
scope of action, which would evolve into the creation of spheres of influence originating in 
Germany and creating the division of Europe into two blocs. 
As we will see in chapter 4, intervention, prompted by the American and Soviet involvement 
in the treatment of the German Question, would become one of the most significant factors 
in the creation of the Cold War international order. Although intervention would be 
undertaken within the framework of coexistence, which originated in the wartime practical 
association framework; American and Soviet involvement in the German Question and in 
the making of the post-war international order would be a source of conflict between the 
superpowers. Although the Rationalist framework sustained superpower interaction in the 
making of a post-war international order, the elements of conflict that were attached to it 
would be significant in the creation of a bipolar outcome in Germany and Europe. These 
elements of conflict would determine the demarcation lines of the polarisation process and 
create a specific identity for the United States and the Soviet Union as the two sole great 
powers in the post-war international order. 
2.2 US interests in Western Europe and the revival of Germany 
83 
The policies geared towards the accomplishment of long range structural interests on the 
part of the United States provided the post-war international order with one its main 
elements of conflict. American economic interests in Western Europe were inextricably 
linked to the revival of Germany. For the United States, the fate of Western Europe and its 
industrial resources were vital to its `grand design' for the post-war international order: the 
continuation of the wartime economic expansion. This `grand design' necessitated the 
opening of Europe to American goods and capital, as well as an international economy 
based on a free trade system of exchange. 
The Nazi New Order called for a German-led `autarkic, national-economic' system in 
Europe, " permanently secured by military means. 18 The opening of the world economy 
would prevent the emergence of warring blocs and propel the continual expansion of the US 
economy. American involvement in World War Two had brought with it a phenomenal 
economic expansion. The New Deal policies of the 1930s were not fully successful in 
absorbing the unemployed workforce. Unemployment in the United States in 1940 was at 
14.6% from the figure of 3.2% in 1929. The American economy had not fully recovered 
17 See Kenunler, H., Autarkie in der organischen Wirtschaft, Dresden, 1940 and Teichert, E., Autarkie und 
Grossraumwirtschaft in Deutschland, 1930-1939, Munich, 1940 (Quoted in Berghahn, V., The Americanisation of 11 est 
German Industry, 1945-1973, p. 27-8 
Is See Gauleiter Gustav Simon, regional chief of the Nazi regime in Luxembourg, September 28,1940 speech 
The reshaping of Europe' on the Nazi conception of a united Europe. Source `Neugestaltung Europa', in 
Luxemburger Wort. 30.09.1940, No 274; 93e annee, p. 1. Also, Funk, W., Verein Berliner Kaufleute und Industrieller 
und Wirtschafts-Hochschule Berlin (Ed. ). Europäische If-irischaftrgemeinrchaft (Berlin: Haude & Spenersche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung Max Paschke) 1943, pp. 17-42. 
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since the beginning of the Depression. In 1940 the gross national product per capita stood at 
$916, only a slight increase from the figure of $857 in 1929.19 
The war created a great expansion of the American industrial base and an inextricable link 
between government and the private sector. In the first six months of 1942, the US 
government gave out more than $100 billion in military contracts, more than the entire 
national product of 1940. The Ford Motor Company alone was producing more war material 
than the entire Italian economy. 20 The war also solidified the role of government in the 
overall running of the economy. The United States was able to pay about 45% of the war 
costs through taxation. By 1946 the national debt had soared to 130% of the GNP ($269.4 
billion). 2' The expansion of the American economy during the war was impressive. By 1945 
the United States produced half of the world's manufactured goods and held $ 23 billion in 
gold reserves. As the leading revisionist Kolko argues 
as a capitalist nation unable to expand its own internal market by redistributing its national income to 
absorb the surplus, the United States would soon plunge into the depression that only World War 
Two brought to an end. 22 
This view had been endorsed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who observed that 
`unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic 
19 Figures from the US Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States (Washington, DC) 
(US Government Printing Office) (1961) quoted in DiLorenzo T., How Capitalism saved America: the Untold 
History of Our Country-From the Pilgrims to the Present, (Three Rivers Press: New York) (2004), pp. 73 and pp. 139 
20 Gordon, J. S., The Empire of Wealth-The Epic History of the American Economic Power (Harper Perennial: New 
York, London, Toronto, Sydney) (2005), p. 353-4 
21 Gordon, J. S., The Empire of Wealth, p. 358 
22 See Kolko, G. and J, The limits ofpower the world and United Stater foreign poll , 1945-1954, (New York, Harper & 
Row) (1972) 
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competition with war'. 2 The American vision for the post-war international economy 
informed the financial aid scheme granted to Britain. Article VII of the Master Lend Lease 
Agreement between the United States and Britain of February 23,1942 called for 
the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the 
reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers. 24 
After the war, Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State, commented that `the only hope 
of maintaining world stability, social, political, and economic, was to adopt measures which 
will lead to an expansion of production, consumption and trade'. William Clayton, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, argued that `world peace will always be gravely 
jeopardised by the kind of international economic warfare which was so bitterly waged 
between the two world wars'. '5 
This `grand design' was informed by the experience of the economic depression in the 1930s 
and the American involvement in World War Two. The reorganisation of the world 
economy would be based on interventionist policies aimed at preventing a recurrence of the 
outstanding economic troubles of the interwar period and was in itself an extension of the 
New Deal. The model of government intervention in the economy at home would be 
exported to the international economy as a whole. The rationale behind the Bretton Woods 
agreements of July 1944 was to contain and transpose the threat of war into the realm of 
23 Cordell, H., The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Volume I (New York: Macmillan. ) (1948), p. 81 
24 Preliminary Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom, February 23,1942- 
http: //www. yale. edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade04. htm 
-' 
Kolko, G., The Politics of War-Allied Diplomacy of the 11"orld Criris of 1943-1945, (New York: Random House, 
1968) p. 485 
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international commerce. This liberal order would involve the lowering of tariffs, free 
convertibility of currencies and free trade that relied on fixed monetary exchange rates. An 
International Monetary Fund was to guard against a repetition of the exchange crisis in 1931- 
2 by providing funds to tie over temporary balance of payment difficulties. An International 
Bank of Settlements would be established to regulate international lending. An International 
Trade Organisation was to create a free trade environment. 26 
This vision of a free trade economic order was incompatible with Soviet ideology. Berghahn 
argues that the emergence of two blocs after the war has to be seen in the context of a 
simplification exercise. Instead of integrating the `planned' economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe, America sought to adapt the industrial centres of Western Europe and the Far East 
to the American model. 2' This `half world' compromise can also be interpreted as a 
willingness to co-exist with the Soviet Union. The structural interests of the United States in 
the post-war international order were of an economic nature. The Communist economic 
system of the Soviet Union ensured that Moscow, unlike an autarkic European bloc and the 
British Empire, mould not be in direct competition with American interests. Pursuing a liberal 
economic order in the vital strongholds of Germany and Western Europe would not put 
American interests irretrievably at odds with the Soviet Union. Superpower conflict would 
be restricted to specific boundaries, allowing Washington and Moscow to pursue their 
objectives within their respective spheres of influence. 
The `internationalist' camp in the United States wanted to bring Germany back into the 
community of nations through its integration into a free market economic system. In order 
26 Penrose, E. F., Economic Planning for the Peace, (Princeton, Princeton University Press) (1953) p. 351 
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to attain that, the German economy (whose industrial potential increased exponentially 
during the war) would have to retain a significant role in the rehabilitation of the European 
economy. The occupation of Germany would give the `internationalists' an opportunity to 
strengthen links with German industrialists. 28 The `grand design' had as its most pivotal 
element the reconstruction of Germany as the engine of a free market capitalist system in 
Western Europe. 
This thinking stemmed back to wartime policy. In the early months of 1942, a set of intra- 
divisional committees of the State Department concluded that German industry and markets 
were essential to the revival of Europe and the establishment of a free enterprise economy. 
Curtailing German economic power would deprive the Continent of an economic system of 
exchange and create pressure for socialist state planning. 29 A report by William Diebold Jr., 
of the Council on Foreign Relations, suggested that nothing should be done to damage the 
efficiency of Germany's productive plants, which should play an important role in West 
European prosperity'. Diebold had in mind the maintenance of the industrial network that 
could produce reparation goods for Europe. The State Department planners stressed the 
virtues of economic integration and the dependence of Germany upon the markets and 
resources of Western Europe. 30 
The state of war had not deterred the business community in the United States from 
continuing their trade with Nazi Germany. By late 1941, the size of American investments in 
Nazi Germany amounted to $475 million. Main American firms like Standard Oil, Ford and 
ITT as well as the banking community, continued to do business with Nazi Germany during 
27 Berghahn, V., TheAmericanisation of West German Industry, 1945-1973, (Leamington Spa : Berg) (1986) p. 72-3 
28 Berghahn, V., The Americanisation of Vest German Industry, 1945-1973, p. 36-7 
29 Eisenberg, C. W., Drawing the line: the American decision to divide Germany, 1944-1949, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press) (1996) p. 18 
30 Eisenberg, C. W., Drawing the line, p. 20 
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the war. 31 The contribution made by American capitalism before 1940 was crucial in the 
construction of the German war machine. For instance, in 1934 Germany produced 
domestically only 300,000 tons of natural petroleum products and less than 800,000 tons of 
synthetic gasoline. By 1944, after the transfer of Standard Oil of New Jersey hydrogenation 
patents and technology to I. G. Farben (used to produce synthetic gasoline from coal), 
Germany produced about 61 /2 million tons of oil, of which 85% was synthetic oil. 
Furthermore, the control of synthetic oil output in Germany was held by the I. G. Farben 
subsidiary, Braunkohle-Benzin A. G. The I. G. Farben cartel itself was created in 1926 with 
Wall Street financial assistance. 32 
In late 1946 the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) established a study group on Germany 
headed by Allan Dulles, which included John McCloy, John Galbraith, De Witt Poole and 
representatives of private companies who did business with Germany. Dulles emphasised 
the need to restore German industrial production. He also argued that `satisfying Soviet 
security needs and [integrating] the West German industry into Western Europe' would be a 
source of conflict between the superpowers. The idea of rehabilitating Germany was also 
endorsed by the American Association of the International Chamber of Commerce. Its study 
group recommended that the Soviet Union should be included in an all-German unit if it 
gave up demanding reparations from current production and agree to a free market 
economic system and free elections. It also emphasised the need to incorporate the Western 
31 See Higham, C, Trading with the Enemy-An Expose of the Nazi-American Money Plot, 1933-1949, (Robert Hale: 
London) (1983). Also, Wallace, M., American Axis: Henry Ford, Charles Lindbergh, and the rise of the Third Reich 
(New York: St. Martin's Press) (2003) 
32 Kilgore to Howard K. Ambruster, February 29,1944, Harley M. Kilgore Papers, West Virginia and Regional 
History Collection, West Virginia University, Morgantown 
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zones of occupation into the Western European economic system. The study group frowned 
upon the idea of excessive decartelisation and denazification. 33 
There was a close link between the American business community, General Lucius Clay's 
advisers, his successor John Mc Cloy and certain German industrialists. 34 During 1946-7 
American businessmen traveled throughout the Western zones of occupation. Berghahn 
maintains that it was due to the mediation of private Americans that directors of German 
firms were able to remain in their posts or reinstated. These included representatives of the 
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), which visited the American zone in June 
1946 and had been given a briefing by the OMGUS Economic Division on questions of 
reconstruction. James Martin, a member of the OMGUS Economic Division, surveyed the 
situation in Germany and published a report in 1947, calling for the reinstatement of board 
members of German companies. Martin also argued that German industry should be turned 
into a bulwark against Communism. 3s 
Fearing another economic depression, the American business community deemed the 
reconstruction of Germany and a prosperous Western Europe as essential for the US 
economy. Leading businessmen like Alfred P. Sloan, chairman of the board of General 
Motors Corporation, indicated the need for an industrial Germany. 36 The link between 
American private economic interests and the German cartels was exposed in a report by the 
Army Industrial College. The Report emphasised the significance of cartel activity for the 
33 Eisenberg, C. W., Drawing the line:, p. 282-4 
;4 Clay was the military governor of the US occupation zone. See Bird, K., The Chairman: John J. McCloy-The 
Making of the American Establishment, (New York: Simon & Schuster) (1992) 
;' Berghahn, V., The Americanisation of [E" est Getman Industry, 1945-1973, p. 82-4. 
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`defense and security of the United States', underlining the fact that several American firms 
were tied to the cartels in fields most important for the war effort. 37 Brigadier General 
William Draper, the head of the US Economic division at the ACC, was the vice president of 
Dillon, Read and Company, a company that had floated large amounts of German securities 
in the United States in the 1920s, including those from the Vereinigte Stahlwerke. A 
confidential report to the Special Senate Committee investigating the National Defense 
Program suggested that `individuals with Wall Street connections and philosophy would not 
naturally be inclined to advocate forcibly and effectively a program of decartelisation'. 38 
The US Congress earmarked the failure of the United States in enforcing the decartelisation 
of Germany. US Senator Harley M Kilgore, chair of the Subcommittee on War Mobilisation 
of the Military Affairs Committee and chairman of the Kilgore Committee, repeatedly 
warned during 1945 and 1946 that the German cartel apparatus, instead of being destroyed 
as required under the Quebec, Yalta and Potsdam agreements, was being deliberately 
protected. However, in spite of the dedicated efforts of Senator Kilgore, the connections 
between American, British and French capitalists and their German, Swedish, Swiss and 
other supposedly `neutral' counterparts would ensure that the search for Nazi assets and 
Nazi business interests would in the long term be largely unproductive. 
The Kilgore Committee heard detailed evidence from government officials, who revealed 
that when the Nazis came to power in 1933, they found that significant efforts had been 
36 LaFeber, W. (Ed. ), The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947, p. 38 
37 The Army Industrial College, Office of the Commandant, Washington DC, Report on Cartels, 
in 
Interdepartmental & Intradepartmental Committee (State Dept)-SWNCC-Decimal file 1944-49 Box 65 Entry 
504 
38 Confidential report to the Special Senate Committee investigating the National Defense Program on the 
preliminary investigation of military government in the occupied areas of Europe, November 22,1946. 
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made since 1918 in preparing the German industrial network for war. 39 The Committee 
devoted great attention to the impact of cartels in the development of the German military 
machine. "' A special West Virginia edition of Labor magazine highlighted that `Kilgore 
revealed that monopolies and cartels sabotaged Uncle Sam's preparations for war, and 
strengthened his enemies'. " 
The Ferguson Committee found that of the 500 enterprises that should have been 
investigated under the decartelisation law introduced in the US zone in February 1947, only 
sixty-one were ever checked. From these sixty-one, decartelisation proceedings had started 
in only a handful of cases. At the Henschel enterprise, the greatest armament factory in 
Germany, proceedings were stopped on the direct orders of Clay in March 1948.42 
The intricacies of the four-power occupation arrangement and the overall spectrum of inter- 
Allied relations prevented the implementation of economic recovery in Germany. As late as 
January 1946 the State Department was in favour of a balance of `punitive and constructive' 
policies in regards to the German level of industry. 43 However, by March 1946 the idea of a 
Western German entity was gaining ground, as the four-power setting was not permitting 
the enforcement of US structural interests. George Kennan (charge d'affairs in Moscow and 
soon to become head of the Policy Planning Staff at the US State Department) was hinting 
39 United States Congress. Senate. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs. 
Elimination of German Resources for War. Report pursuant to S. Res. 107 and 146, July 2,1945, Part 7, (78th 
Congress and 79th Congress), (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), hereafter cited as Elimination of 
German Resources. See Kolko, G., American Business and Germany, 1930-1941'1 The Western Political Quarterly, 
Volume XV, 1962. 
40 See Borkin, J., The Crime and Punishment of I. G. Farben (New York: The Free Press, 1978) and Maddox, Robert 
F. Maddox, The Senatorial Career of Harley Martin Kilgore (New York: Garland Publishing Company, 1981), 174-82 
41 Labor, October 12,1946 
42 Burchett, W., Cold War in Germany (World Unity Publications: Melbourne) (1950), p. 145-6 
43 Acheson to Murphy, January 23,1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, The British Commonwealth; U estern and Central 
Europe, p, 491 
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at walling the Western zones against Soviet penetration and integrating them into a Western 
European bloc. 44 Kennan perceived that the Soviet policy on Germany was to create `a 
`People's Republic' along the lines of Poland or Yugoslavia'. He advocated an American 
policy `independent from Potsdam' and pressed on the `organisation of Western Germany'. 
45 
The course of events in the occupation zones and the economic crisis of 1946 prompted the 
US policy-making machinery into action. Rostow refers to a meeting which probably took 
place on April 20,1946, shortly before Byrnes left for Paris to participate in treaty 
negotiations. The meeting was attended by Secretary of State James Byrnes, Dean Acheson 
and Will Clayton. Rostow surmises that Acheson and Clayton argued that a division of 
Europe was being configured along the Elbe. They maintained that potentially divisive 
forces operated in the ACC. Acheson and Clayton devised a plan which had as its basic 
rationale a permanent American concern in regards to Europe and a general European 
settlement. They thought that Soviet, British and French officials considered the American 
foothold in Europe to be permanent. This would entail the formation of a Soviet bloc and 
possibly a Western European bloc once the Americans left. 46 
Economic considerations were pivotal in the formulation of US policy. The revisionist 
school emphasise the importance of economic factors in American foreign policy during the 
Cold War. As Pollard argues, US policy makers had learned that American prosperity 
44 Kennan to Byrnes, March 6,1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, The British Commonwealth; [Festem and Central Eumpe, p, 
519 
45 Kennan to Carmel Offie, May 10,1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, The British Commonwealth; IIestern and Central 
Europe, p, 555-6 
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depended 
`upon a thriving international economy'. 4' The prevalent view of the American 
establishment was that United States, faced with a massive surplus of goods and capital, 
needed the reconstitution of Germany as a viable economic unit. 48 
According to Beschloss, President Truman, informed by the mistakes of World War One, 
perceived the need to reform Germany in order to avoid a drift towards Communism due to 
chaos and starvation. 41 As we will see in chapter 3, the failure of the Moscow CFM to 
keep Germany united gave George Marshall, Secretary of State after 1947, the impetus to 
launch the European Recovery Plan (ERP), also known as the Marshall Plan. 5( ' European 
reconstruction required products manufactured in the United States. In the immediate 
aftermath of World War Two, Europe did not have the dollars to buy these supplies. The 
United States had a sizeable trade surplus and its reserves were large and increasing. 
According to Hogan, the Marshall Plan was designed to promote Europe's financial, fiscal 
and political stability; to stimulate world trade and to forestall an economic depression 
through the expansion of markets for the US economy. The rationale behind the ERP was 
the creation of an integrated large internal European market with the ultimate result of 
creating a prosperous and stable European community, secure against the dangers of 
Communist subversion and able to join the United States in a multilateral system of trade. It 
also envisaged a sustained political and military involvement of the United States in 
+6 Rostow, W. W., The Division of Europe After World lG"ar Il: 1946, (Austin: University of Texas Press) (1981) p. 3- 
5 
47 Pollard, R., Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold U"ar, 1945-1950, p. 37-41 
48 See Wala, NI., The Council on the Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold Il"ar, (Berghahn 
Books: Providence) (1994) 
49 Beschloss, M., The Conquerors, Roosevelt, Truman, and the destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945 (New York and 
London : Simon & Schuster) (2003), p. 290 
50 Trachtenberg, M., Constructed Peace: the making of the European settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press) (1999) p. 56 
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European affairs since even an all-European union would be too vulnerable to Soviet attack. 
s' The economic revival of Germany was undertaken in accordance with the American 
`grand design' for the post-war international order. Seen from this perspective, the policy to 
revive the Western zones of occupation through the implementation of Bizonia and the 
ERP, constituted a demarcation line in the distribution of spheres of influence. Policy- 
makers in Washington acted according to a Rationalist pursuit of the American national 
interest. By pushing for the revival of Germany within specific boundaries, they minimised 
conflict and contributed to the formation of a workable balance of power for the post-war 
international order. 
The decision to revive Germany was taken in order to rectify the reparations problem and 
the shortage of German coal being supplied to Western Europe as well as to minimise the 
costs of the Anglo-American occupation. The State Department was aware of the fact that if 
Germany was to be revived, France and the neighbouring countries would demand 
compensation for the loss of reparations and cheap coal. 52 In the Netherlands, the Bakker- 
Schut Plan called for large sums of money to be paid in terms of compensation and even the 
annexation of a part of Germany which would have doubled the country's size. The Monnet 
Plan of 1946 proposed that France should be given control over the German coal areas of 
the Ruhr and Saar. The utilisation of these resources would bring France to 150% of prewar 
industrial production. The revival of Germany would therefore have to be undertaken within 
the context of an overall rehabilitation and integration of the Western European economies. 
51 Hogan M., The Marshall Plan- America, Britain, and the reconstruction of R Restern Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) (1987) p. 427-30 
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On May 8,1947, Dean Acheson made a speech in Cleveland, Mississippi in which he stated 
that `without outside aid, the process of recovery in many countries would take as long as to 
give rise to hopelessness and despair. ' Acheson highlighted the fact that while before the war 
US exports circulated at a rate of $4 billion, they now totaled $ 16 billion, with imports 
standing at $8 billion. Acheson concluded that the United States should `push ahead with 
the reconstruction of those two great workshops of Europe and Asia-Germany and Japan' 
and that `on the grounds of self interest and humanitarianism' the United States must take 
`as large a volume of imports as possible from abroad in order that the financial gap between 
what the world needs and it can borrowed can be narrowed. 53 As Acheson pointed out, the 
US State Department realised that a weak German economy was leading to `economic 
misery' in Western Europe, which resulted in strengthening Communism parties and 
movements in those countries. By punishing Germany economically, the United States was 
inadvertently helping in the rise of Communism in Europe. " 
The most important studies which gave shape to the ERP were made by the State War Navy 
Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) and the Policy Planning Staff (PPS). The SWNCC and 
PPS studies, Clayton's memoranda and Marshall's speech offered a set of principles and an 
invitation for Europeans to participate in a joint program. The SWNCC report supported 
increased foreign aid for the ailing European economies and listed among the countries in 
need of particular help as Austria, France and Italy. It also argued in favour of German 
recovery and a coordinated coal program. The PPS reports were written by Kennan, who 
52 Hogan M., The Marshall Plan, p. 87-8 
53 Speech by Under Secretary Dean Acheson at the Delta Council, Cleveland, Mississipi, May 18,1947- From 
www. truman library. org 
'4 Acheson, D., Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (NY: Norton) (1969) p. 241-4 
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argued that an aid program would have to be large enough and last long enough to convince 
the Europeans that it would work. The report also concluded that the program should be 
organised by the Europeans themselves, acting collectively and including Germany and 
Austria. Eastern Europe should be invited to join. The long term aim would be to make 
Europe prosperous so that communism would have no attraction. ss 
On June 5,1947 Marshall made his famous announcement at Harvard University, in which 
he stated that the preparation for war and the conflagration itself affected `the entire fabric 
of European economy'. He also stated that under the Nazis `[L]ong-standing commercial 
ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies, and shipping companies disappeared, 
through loss of capital, absorption through nationalisation, or by simple destruction'. He 
added that `Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other 
essential products (principally from America) are so much greater than her present ability to 
pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political 
deterioration of a very grave character'. The undertone was for bloc-formation, as Marshall 
stated that `it would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to 
draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. Marshall 
also stated that `any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full 
co-operation... on the part of the United States Government'. However, he warned that any 
government maneouvring to block the recovery of other countries could not expect help 
from the United States. 56 
55 Hogan M., The Marshall Plan, p. 81-2 
56 Extracts from Marshall Speech at Harvard University June 5,1947- 
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The Secretary of State's speech marked an important milestone along the road to a bipolar 
settlement. MacAllister argues that the early post-war international order should be viewed as 
a latent `tripolar system' He also maintains that the belief that Germany represented a 
potential third power whose defection or allegiance would determine the overall balance of 
power, as well as the closely related belief that a united Western Europe could eventually 
emerge as a third centre of power' exerted a dominant influence on American foreign policy 
after the failure to achieve a four-power solution at the Moscow CFM in 1947.57 Clearly, the 
ERP enforced a bipolar outcome by marrying the `grand design' thinking to the economic 
recovery of Western Europe. 
The reconstruction plan was developed at a meeting of the participating European states in 
Paris in July 1947. The Marshall Plan offered the same aid to the Soviet Union and its allies, 
if they would make political reforms and accept certain outside controls. The plan was to be 
operational for four fiscal years beginning in July 1947. The Europeans sent a reconstruction 
plan to Washington asking for $22 billion in aid. Truman cut this to $17 billion in the bill he 
put to Congress. The plan met sharp opposition in the US Congress, mostly from the 
portion of the Republican Party (led by Senator Robert Taft) that advocated a more 
isolationist policy and was weary of massive government spending. The plan also had 
opponents on the left. Henry Wallace, former US vice-president, saw the plan as a subsidy 
for American exporters and sure to polarise the world between East and West. Opposition 
to the ERP waned with the overthrow of the democratic government of Czechoslovakia by 
the Communists in February 1948. Soon after, a bill granting an initial $5 billion was passed 
57 MacAllister, J., No Exit, p. 11 
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into law by the US Congress, with strong bipartisan support. The US Congress would 
eventually donate $12.4 billion in aid over the four years of the plan. 58 
The political aspects of the ERP were intimately linked to the rehabilitation mindset. In the 
1980s, a new school was developed with some historians like Milward arguing that the 
Marshall Plan might not have played as decisive a role in Europe's recovery as was 
previously believed. " Such critics have pointed out that economic growth in many 
European countries revived before the large scale arrival of US aid, and was fastest amongst 
some of the lesser recipients. While aid from the Marshall Plan eased immediate difficulties 
and contributed to the recovery of some key sectors, growth from the post-war nadir was 
largely an independent process. Arkes reveals that the actual financial impact of the Marshall 
Plan aid was quite small, at no time exceeding 5% of the recipient nations GNP. G0 The 
genuine investment value of the Marshall Plan assistance was not remarkable either. The 
largest portion of ERP money was used to cover imports of agricultural products, raw 
58 Grogin R.,. Natural Enemies-the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold Ik"är, 1917-1991 (Lanham, Md.: 
Lexington Books) (2000), p. 118 
59 According to Milward, who argues that the recovery of the European economy originated in the post-war 
determination to succeed, it was the very strength of the recovery, sucking in huge volumes of American 
resources and causing severe balance of payment deficits, that created short term tensions. He also maintains 
that the ERP, although being responsible for the prevention of economic restrictions, did not make a 
substantial significance to the recovery except for maybe one or two years of economic growth. See Milward, 
AS., The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951 (Methuen: London) (1984), pp. 1-55,91-113 This view is 
supported by Eichengreen and DeLong who argue that the Marshall Plan significantly sped Western European 
growth by altering the environment in which economic policy was made. The Marshall Plan era saw a rapid 
dismantling of controls over product and factor markets in Western Europe and the restoration of price and 
exchange rate stability. This came about because to some degree the governments in power believed that the 
`mixed economies' they were building should have a strong pro-market orientation. The Marshall Plan 
`conditionality' pushed governments toward versions of the `mixed economy' that had more market orientation 
and less directive planning in the mix. The Marshall Plan should thus be thought of as a large and highly 
successful structural adjustment program. See De Long B. and J. and Eichengreen B., The Marshall Plan: 
History 'c Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program in Dornbusch R., Nulling W., and Layard R. (ed), Postwar 
Economic Reconstruction and Lessons for the East Today (Cambridge, vft1 and London: The MIT Press) (1993) 
60 Arkes, H., Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan, and the National Interest. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP 1972) p. 
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materials and semi-finished products. Used as credits for specific investment, mostly state 
projects, `these funds supplemented domestic sources of capital, made it easier for 
governments to direct resources into politically desired uses and thus... strengthened state 
control over Western Europe's economies'. 61 Distributed in such a way, the Marshall Plan 
aid did not serve as an incentive for European governments to change their economic 
policies in order to attract private capital inflows, but instead encouraged them to continue 
with their internal policies of `planification', demand expansion and premature 
redistribution'. 62 
The ERP would create a permanent involvement by the United States in the political and 
economic affairs of Western Europe. Leffler highlights the political nature of the ERP by 
claiming that the Marshall Plan was essentially designed to stabilise the socio-political 
situation in Western Europe, to speed the incorporation of western Germany into the 
Western bloc, and to reduce Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. 
63 The ERP was also 
designed to centre the European economic system around the revival of the western zones 
of occupation in Germany, a process which started with the creation of Bizonia. The 
creation and implementation of the ERP had profound implications for the post-war 
international order. The ERP finalised the process of bloc-formation. The French managed 
to clinch a deal with Britain and America during the Moscow CFM on April 19,1947 
for an 
61 Food, fertilizers, and feed constituted 32,1% of all ERP shipments, raw materials and semi-finished products 
48,3%; only 14,3% was used for machinery and vehicles. Cf. Kostrzewa, W., 
A Marshall Plan for Middle and 
Eastern Europe. In: World Economy 13 (Cowen, T., The Marshall Plan: Myths and Realities in Bandow, D. (Ed. ): U. S. 
Aid to the Developing World: A Free Market Agenda. (Washington: Heritage Found. 1985); pp. 61-74 at p. 63., Nlarch 
1990), pp. 27-49 at p. 31 
62 Kostrzewa, W., A Marshall Plan for Middle and Eastern Europe. In: World Economy 13 (March 1990), pp. 27-49 at 
p. 33 
63 See Leffler, -1., The Struggle for Germany and the Ongins of the Cold lJ ar, Occasional Paper 
No. 16, German 
Historical Institute (Washington, DC) 
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increased amount of coal to be exported to France, subject to revision by the end of 1947. 
The tripartite agreements signed in London on August 28,1947 and in Berlin on December 
1947 January 1948 ensured the integration of the coal production region of Saar to France 
and the supply of coke for the rehabilitation of the French steel industry. 64 Furthermore, 
the Accord of the Six in December 1948 created the International Authority of the Ruhr, in 
charge of the distribution of coal, coke and steel. 6s 
On June 28,1948, on the eve of the currency reform in the Western zones, Bevin 
announced that `the Six [Western European] Powers came to the conclusion that if this 
situation was to be remedied and conditions created in which Germany could profit from 
the ERP and reorganise her economy, it was necessary for a responsible German 
Government to be established as soon as possible'. In regards to the Ruhr, Bevin insisted on 
its potential `contribution to European rehabilitation as a whole'. " On July 14,1948 the 
United States of America and the US and British occupied areas in Germany signed an 
economic co-operation agreement, consistent with the Convention for European Economic 
Co-operation signed at Paris on April 16,1948. The aims of the agreement were to achieve a 
`joint recovery program. 
. . 
in Europe'. Under that principle, the military governors would 
ensure `the promotion of industrial and agricultural production on a sound economic basis 
along healthy non-aggressive lines' and `the stabilisation of currency, the establishment and 
maintenance of a valid rate of exchange, and the balancing of government budgets'. Most 
importantly, for the purposes of bloc-formation, the agreement envisaged `cooperation with 
64 Poidevin, R., La France et le Charbon allemande au lendemain de la deuxieme guerre mondiale, p. 371-2 Relations 
Internationales, no. 44, hiver 1985, pp. 365-77 
65 Poidevin, R., La France et le Charbon allemande au lendemain de la deuxieme guerre mondiale, p. 373-4 
GG From Bevin speech at the House of Common, June 30,1948-From von Oppen, B. R. (ed), Documents of 
Germany under Occupation 1945-1954. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(London, New York, Toronto: OUP) (1955), p. 308-14 
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other participating countries in facilitating and stimulating an increasing interchange of 
goods and services'. 67 
The presence of the Red Army in Central and Eastern Europe entailed the threat of a Soviet 
advance into Western Europe. This threat compelled the United States to push for the 
integration of the Western zones of occupation with the neighbouring countries. This 
intervention recreated the principle of a liberal economic order in the \X'estern half of 
Europe. The Western zones of occupation were by the end of 1946 on their way to greater 
economic and political interdependence with Western Europe. A politically emasculated 
Germany facilitated the possibility of true cooperation within the framework of European 
integration. In this context, the `revisionist' interpretation should be seen in conjunction with 
the transformative implications brought about by the integrationist process in Western 
Europe. As we will see in chapters 5 and 6, these transformative elements will play a 
significant part in ending the internal balance of power in Western Europe. 
American interests were implemented according to the demarcation lines imposed by the 
involvement of the Soviet Union in the war. Washington put into practice its containment 
policy in a `defensive' rather than `offensive' way. Cold War historians have argued that the 
`containment policy' of the Truman administration was basically an offensive threat to the 
expansion of the Soviet Union. It threatened to use force should Moscow attempt to expand 
its influence in areas that were not under Soviet control. Yet, it could also be considered 
defensive, because it let the Soviets know that the United States would protect its interests in 
67 Economic Co-Operation Agreement between the United States and the US and British Occupied Areas in 
Germany, July 14,1948-Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54, p. 318-22 
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Europe and Asia, but not make the first military move. 68 The notion of `vital strongholds' 
was not detached from the criteria imposed by the spheres of influence thinking, pervasive 
in the superpower interaction over the German Question. As we will see in chapter 3, this 
thinking would socialise conflict in a `pluralist plus' direction and therefore restrain it 
through the elements of diplomatic interaction and the formation of a balance of power in 
Germany and Europe. 
While the United States was prepared to let Eastern Europe join the Soviet bloc, the need to 
incorporate Western Europe into its sphere of influence necessitated an interventionist 
approach. This selfish interventionism did not provoke an offensive response by Moscow. 
The Soviet Union refrained from actively supporting left-wing insurgency in Western 
Europe or properly endorsing the local Communist parties, ever so eager to respond to 
Moscow's diktat, as they did during the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact impasse. The unfolding of 
the treatment of the German Question contributed to the creation the `West', as it was vital 
for the United States to protect its sphere of influence. The creation of a Western sphere of 
influence originated in the efforts to achieve a `peace of sorts' in Germany. A permanent 
involvement in continental affairs would be the natural implication of the economic rationale 
behind Bizonia and the ERP. '9 In the long run, any desire to pull out of the Continent could 
68 See Lucas, S., Freedom's War the US crusade against the Soviet Union, 1945-56 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press) (1999) and Deibel, T., and Gaddis, J. L., Containing the Soviet Union :a critique of U. S. policy 
Washington (D. C. and London : Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense) (1987) 
69 Ireland points out that `until the creation of the NATO structure and the assignment of US ground 
forces to 
that organisation, none of the American policies for Europe, as revolutionary as they were, implied permanent 
American involvement in continental affairs'. Ireland, T., Creating the Entangling Alliance (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press) (1981), p. 183. The idea of a `third independent centre of power' in order to correct the 
`geopolitical disbalance' was also mentioned by Kennan. See Kennan, G., Memoirs, 1925-50 (New York: 
Atlantic, Little, Brown, 1967), p. 463. 
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not be compatible with maintaining a sphere of influence in Western Europe. 70 Intervention 
in Western Germany and Europe adhered to the fundamental principles guiding US policy. 
As such, it became one of the two prongs of the demarcation line that created the spheres of 
influence. No other stronghold was more important than Germany in this demarcation 
process. The bipolar outcome in Germany created policy for the rest of Western Europe and 
conditioned the interaction with the Soviet bloc. 
2.3 Ideology and the enforcement of US structural interests 
As we will see in chapter 6, ideology was one of the main transformative elements of the 
post-war society of states. Ideological concerns had informed the Western response to the 
Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Western European and American forces aided the White side 
during the Russian Civil War (1917-20) and occupied parts of Russia. The Western 
European powers had turned a blind eye to Mussolini, Franco and the assortment of 
dictatorships that sprawled across Europe during the 1920s and 1930s. They had also built a 
cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union through a series of military treaties. 
The Soviet Union had a highly authoritarian political system under the leadership of a brutal 
dictator and an economic system that was diametrically opposed to that of the Western 
Allies. In the late 1920s, the Soviet Union embarked upon a process of war-orientated 
industrialisation. Stalin signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler in 1939, sharing the spoils of 
70 Leffler and Lundestad have argued that America was intent on preventing the emergence of a `third force' or 
an independent center of power on the continent. According to Leffler `neither an integrated Europe nor a 
united Germany nor an independent Japan must be permitted to emerge as a third force or a neutral bloc'. See 
Leffler, M., A Preponderance of Power, p. 17 and Lundestad, G., `Empire" by Integration: The United States and 
European Integration, 1945-1997 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 4,54-57. 
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Poland with the Führer and, to an extent, facilitating the Reich's march into Western Europe 
in 1940. This general context of suspicion clouded the spectrum of inter-Allied relations and 
spilled over to the issues pertaining to Germany where the Allies had diverging interests. 
Adding an alternative dimension to the view espoused by the orthodox and revisionist 
camps, one could argue that both superpowers had structural interests in regards to 
Germany and the post-war international order. Conflict unfolded because of the enormous 
amount of power which the United States and the Soviet Union accrued during the war. The 
American stance had from the very beginning an economic consideration. The ideology of 
the United States was in fact, the protection of its economic interests. Following from this 
principle, it is possible to conclude that ideology became a tool for the planning and 
execution of the split in Germany and Europe. 
America's most important ideological tool in regards to the German Question and the post- 
war international order was the policy of `containment'. The notion of containment 
stemmed from wartime policy and it was informed by the rationale behind Washington's 
involvement in World War Two: the expansion of American economic interests. 
Containment responded to the political situation that arose in Germany and Europe after 
the end of the war. In January 1946, the joint War Plans Committee projected that instead of 
seeking buffer zones along its borders, the Soviet Union would attempt to dominate `the 
Eurasian landmass' and all of its approaches. In February 1946, the War Department advised 
Truman that the United States should provide help to nations threatened by Soviet 
expansion. " Furthermore, James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, who commissioned a 
71 Gormly, J., From Potsdam to the Cold War. Big Three diplomacy, 1945-1947 (Wilmington, Del : SR Books)(1990), 
p. 115 
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private study of Soviet policy in late 1945, concluded that the Soviets were committed to 
`global, violent proletarian revolution' and posed a real threat to world peace. 72 
`Containment' thinking arose through the work carried out by the Policy Planning Staff of 
the US State Department, headed by George Kennan. The doctrine of `containment' 
systematically outlined Soviet foreign policy intentions as directed `to reduce strength and 
influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers' and `toward deepening and 
exploiting... conflicts between capitalist powers'. It also stated that if conflict would ensue, 
the Soviet Union would make sure that war turned into `revolutionary upheavals within the 
various capitalist countries'. 73 Kennan's strategy gyrated in its first stage around the 
principle of `containment'. At its core, containment had as its basic tenets the restoration of 
the balance of power, left unstable by the demise of Germany and Japan, and the Soviet 
encroachment on Eastern Europe. Kennan's `strongpoint defense' rationale entailed the 
strategic defense of five vital industrial and war-making capacity centres. Priority was to be 
given to the economic instruments of containment as opposed to military build-ups. The 
ERP is a perfect example of the implementation of this tactic. The strategy also entailed the 
configuration of independent and self-confident centres rather than spheres of influence 
subservient to Washington. 
The second stage of Kennan's strategy involved the fragmentation of the international 
Communist movement. The recognition of Tito's Yugoslavia is an eloquent example of this 
theory being put into practice. In addition to this, NSC 48/2 and NSC 58/2 were set up to 
encourage a rift between Mao's China and the Soviet Union and to encourage dissidence 
72 Forrestal, J., The Forrestal Diaries (ed. ) Walter Millis and Duffield E. S. (New York: 1951) , p. 127-32,137-140 
73 Kennan, G., Telegram to the Secretary of State, February 22,1946- 
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among Soviet satellite countries. A third stage of this strategy entailed the transformation of 
Soviet thinking by the acceptance on the part of Moscow of the diversity of the international 
political order. " 
Containment was aimed at advancing US interests rather than arresting an elusive Soviet 
advance into the West. By the time containment was formulated as doctrine, the vital points 
pinpointed by Kennan were secured from Soviet influence. The nature of the Soviet system 
made it incumbent upon Washington to formulate a policy which would demarcate the 
sphere of influence in which to operate. At the same time, Kennan's third stage of 
containment mentioned the `diversity of the international political order' as a transformative 
element in superpowers' relations. By the time containment thinking was operational, the 
Soviet Union had proved capable of respecting the boundaries imposed by the spheres of 
influence system. 
The policy of containment became the official US stance on inter-Allied relations in March 
12,1947, when the Truman Doctrine laid out the need to aid all countries threatened by 
Communism. The message of President Truman to the US Congress referred to the Greek 
government's inability to cope with the Communist insurgency and established that the 
United States would assist Greece as well as Turkey in their fight against Communism. But 
Truman went beyond, proclaiming that the world faced a choice between two different 
alternatives in the post-war era 
74 Gaddis Lewis, J., Strategies of ContainmentA CriticalAppraisal of PoshvarAmerican National Security Policy, p. 55-74 
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One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, 
representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and 
religion, and freedom from political oppression [and] the second way of life is based upon the will of 
a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled 
press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. 75 
These developments culminated in the establishment of the National Security Act 1947, 
which realigned and reorganised the US armed forces, foreign policy, and the intelligence 
community apparatus. The Act merged the Department of War and the Department of the 
Navy into the National Military Establishment (NME), headed by a Secretary of Defense, 
and created a separate Department of the Air Force from the existing US Army Air Force. It 
also established the National Security Council, a central place of coordination for national 
security policy in the Executive Branch, and the Central Intelligence Agency, the United 
States' first peacetime intelligence agency. 
The outcome of the Truman Doctrine and the ERP was the constitution of a Western bloc 
capable of arresting any possible Soviet expansionist aspirations east of the Elbe. Western 
cooperation amongst France, the United States, Britain and the Benelux countries was 
furthered by the conference held in London on February 23,1948. The London conference 
established a close cooperation framework in matters arising from the ERP and the 
economic rehabilitation of Western Germany. In March 1948, France, Britain and the 
Benelux countries established the Brussels Treaty Organisation in order to assist each other 
75 President Truman Address before the joint Session of the Senate and the House of Representatives- March 
12,1947 
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in the event of an attack towards any of them. On June 11,1948 the US Senate passed 
Resolution 239, which stated the idea of giving the Brussels Pact military support. 
The ideological underpinning of the US national interest contributed to the breakdown of 
inter-Allied relations over Germany and the post-war international order but not to the 
creation of disruptive conflict. The protection of the vital strongholds in Germany, Europe 
and Asia entailed the creation of a military and intelligence establishment which would 
ensure the enforcement of American economic interests. This would have an enormous 
significance for the post-war international order as intervention for the enforcement of 
American vital interests would be a feature of the Cold War international political system. 
This kind of selfish interventionism was manifested in the toppling of Mossadegh in Iran 
(1953), Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala (1954) and Salvador Allende in Chile (1973), all of them 
responsible for threatening US business interests in their respective countries. America's 
involvement in the German Question originated this line of thinking. At the same time, as 
we will see in the following chapters, the Soviet leadership was equally keen to enforce its 
own `grand design' on Germany and the international order as a whole. 
The ideological overtones of the United States revolved around considerations stemming 
from the pursuit of her national interest. However, these ideological considerations served to 
uphold the enforcement of structural interests within a clearly defined sphere of influence. 
The intervention of the Soviet Union in the treatment of the German Question served as a 
balancing element in the nascent international order and therefore restricted the scope of 
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conflict through the Rationalist boundaries imposed by continual diplomatic and legal 
interaction. 
2.4 Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe 
The second prong in the creation of conflict in inter-Allied relations was the pursuit of 
Soviet security interests in Germany and Eastern Europe. The orthodox perspective 
underlines Soviet expansionism as one of the main factors causing the breakdown of inter- 
Allied relations after the war. However, the Soviet Union enforced their security interests 
only in the areas where the Red Army had a significance presence. This indicates a 
Rationalist element in the structuralisation of conflict: Moscow did not attempt to discipline 
Tito's Yugoslavia with an outright invasion or to directly intervene in the Greek Civil War. 
In this security `grand design', securing a foothold in Germany was pivotal to holding on to 
Eastern Europe. Quadripartite agreement in Germany would have probably forced a retreat 
of the Red Army from Eastern Europe, as it occurred at the end of the Cold War. 
The region's emergent pattern was the setting of coalitions of national unity and the 
establishment of `people's democracies'. This pattern was guaranteed by the presence of the 
Red Army, which precluded Western scenarios of conservative restoration. On the other 
hand, Soviet security interests were narrow and indifferent to socialism per se. 
" The 
`national roads to socialism' strategy already characterised Communist policy in Western 
Europe in 1945, and from the summer of 1946 until late 1947 it also applied in the East. The 
76 For more on the National Front strategy see Mark, E., 'Revolution By Degrees: Stalin's National Front 
Strategy For 
Europe, 1941-1947 , The Cold I Eiar International History Project Working Paper no. 31 
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actual development of the `national roads' strategy varied. Elections ranged from thoroughly 
corrupt in Poland to genuinely free in Czechoslovakia. " 
There was no significant Red Army presence in either Albania or Yugoslavia when the 
communists took over. The process of sovietisation in these countries would therefore 
evolve with a degree of political independence amongst local Communists not seen 
anywhere else in Eastern Europe. When the Germans withdrew from Albania in the autumn 
of 1944, the Communists under Enver Hoxha were already well established as the dominant 
political force. In May 1944 the National Liberation Movement had transformed itself into 
the National Liberation Front and deposed King Zog. In October 1944 a congress at Berat 
established a provisional government, nine of whose eleven members were Communists. 
There were few obstacles to this rapid Communist takeover. The Allies had never recognised 
an Albanian government in exile so there was no one to intervene on behalf of former 
politicians. All other political factions in the country were disorganised and when opposition 
manifested itself later in the Catholic areas of the north, the well-armed Communist army 
and security forces had no difficulty in suppressing it. 78 
The communists in Yugoslavia were aided by the fact that Yugoslavia was considered a 
victor power and therefore had neither an occupation force nor an allied control 
commission. During the war Stalin had persistently advised the Yugoslav Communists to 
tread cautiously. Stalin joined with Churchill to urge Tito to come to an agreement in June 
1944 with Ivan Subasic, Prime Minister of the Royal Government, which provided for a 
77 See Coutouvidis, J. and Reynolds, J., Poland 9939-1947 (Leicester: Leicester University Press) (1986). Also 
Polonsky A. and Drukier, B (eds. ), The beginnings of communist rule in Poland (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul) 
(1980), pp. 1-139. 
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post-war coalition of royalist and partisan forces. On November 1944 a republic was 
proclaimed and the constituent assembly declared itself to be the people's assembly. The 
new constitution which was adopted on 31 January 1946 created the Federative People's 
Republic of Yugoslavia. The constitution provided for the socialisation of the economy and 
it enabled the Communist party to exercise a leading role in society. After the takeover the 
communists continued their campaign against their enemies. Draza Mihajlovic, the Cetnik 
leader, was executed in July 17,1946. In September 1946 leading members of the Croatian 
Ustasa were placed in the dock in a trial which also led to the imprisonment, albeit in relative 
comfort, of archbishop Stepinac. In 1947 the leader of the radical wing of the agrarians, 
Dragoljub Jovanovic, was arrested together with a number of other non-communist party 
leaders. " 
In spite of the existence of tripartite Allied Commissions, the situation in Central and 
Eastern Europe developed in the direction of sovietisation. Hitchins argues that the Soviet 
Union moved to secure its position in Romania sooner than elsewhere in Eastern Europe 
because Romania was the gateway to the Balkans and the Straits. 80 By February 1945 
Andrei Vishinskii, deputy Commisar for Foreign Affairs, demanded the resignation of the 
right-wing Prime Minister Nicolae Rädescu. The National Assembly opened on December 1, 
1946 with no members of the opposition in the Cabinet. $' In June 1947, the government 
secured the passage of a law giving the Minister of National Economy the power to control 
domestic and foreign industry. Currency reform was pursued and all foreign currency and 
78 Crampton, R. J., Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and after (Routledge: London) (1997), p. 215 
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80 Hitchins, K., Rumania, 1866-1947 (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1994), p. 515 
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most of the gold was declared government property. In October 1947 the Communist and 
Social Democratic Parties announced their merging in a `United `Workers' Party' and 
members of the Cabinet from other parties were dismissed and replaced by Communists. 82 
There was a similar pattern of Communist takeover in Bulgaria, where on October 27,1946 
a second election was held for a Constitutional Assembly. Both Britain and the United States 
decided that election conditions had not been satisfactory. Georg" Dimitrov, a Communist, 
became Prime Minister. His government consisted of nine Communists, five Agrarians, two 
Socialists and two Zveno Ministers. 83 The elimination of opposition leaders was completed 
by 1947. The Fatherland Front government consolidated its position throughout the country 
and passed a new constitution in December 1947, which protected private property but gave 
the state wide powers of public economic organisation. Industry was nationalised in 1947; 
private banks, foreign and domestic wholesale trade and large-scale real estate in the towns 
were nationalised in 1948.84 Bulgaria was `probably the only voluntary client state in Eastern 
Europe' and was typical of the Balkans in that, as Geoffrey and Nigel Swain put it, the 
Communists `could have won Western style elections in 1945 had they chosen to do so'. 85 
Poland remained the most important foothold in Eastern Europe for the Soviet Union. 
According to Raack, the `sovietisation' of Eastern Poland in 1943 can be seen as an attempt 
to coerce the Poles into agreeing to Soviet demands on other issues. Raack also maintains 
that Stalin attempted to distance himself from the London Poles at an early stage, planning a 
82 Betts R. R. (Ed), Central and South East Europe 1945-1948, p. 13-6 
83 duty, P, Bulgaria in Betts R. R. (Ed), Central and South East Europe 1945-1948, p. 37 
84 Betts R. R. (Ed), Central and South East Europe 1945-1948, p. 46-9 
113 
Polish `conquest' from 1943.86 The advancing Red Army had not intervened during the 
Warsaw Uprising of 1944 because of the Soviet interest in having a friendly government in 
Poland. Stalin had broken relations with the London Poles and recognised the Communist 
orientated leaders based in Lublin as the legitimate rulers of post-war Poland in January 
1945. Moscow pressed for the incorporation of Eastern Prussia and Silesia into Polish 
territory, which made Poland a de facto occupation power in Germany. 87 As such, it was 
paramount for the Soviet Union to ensure Warsaw's acquiescence to Moscow's diktat. By 
January 1946 Poland started to nationalise its economy. Meanwhile, on 10 May, 1946 the 
United States had suspended deliveries against credit of $40 million and $50 million granted 
a month earlier, on the grounds that the Polish Government was not keeping its election 
pledges, especially in regard to freedom of the press. A referendum was held on June 30 with 
an overwhelming victory in favour of the abolition of the Senate, the nationalisation of 
industry, land and economic reform and for the Western frontiers to become permanent. 
The Polish State took over the key sectors of industry and all enterprises, including former 
German and Danzig Free City firms which employed more than fifty workers a shift. Certain 
manufacturing industries, especially food industries, were turned into co-operatives. 88 By 
1948 the Soviet Union was Poland's biggest trading partner and, in the words of President 
Boleslaw Bierut, it was moving from a `people's democracy to Socialism'. Finance and 
transport were nationalised. Co-operative industries accounted for 85% of industrial output 
and employed three-quarters of the industrial labour force. 89 Biskupski argues that the 
Communist takeover can be explained by the combination of a powerful Soviet military 
85 Cited in Thody, P., Europe since 1945 (Routledge: London) (2000), p. 101 
86 Raack, R. C., Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press) (1995), p. 79-81 
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88 See Ireland, B., Poland in Central and South East Europe 1945-1948. 
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force menacingly stationed in the country (300,000 in late 1946) and the abandonment by the 
West of democratic elements in Poland. 90 
The takeover pattern appeared to be slower in Hungary and Czecholosvakia. In January 1946 
Hungary had been declared a Republic and a three-year plan was implemented in August 
1947. Although Socialist and Small Holder Party members remained in government, they 
carried little weight. The New Chamber, elected in August 1947, had 271 Government 
members and 140 opposition leaders. 9' Bohri argues that any `semblance of restraint' belied 
the fact that the Communists acted in the spirit of Stalin's exhortation. " According to 
Bohri, the evidence suggests that sovietisation had been intended from as early as 1945, 
and it proceeded more rapidly and effectively than previously imagined. 93 
In Czechoslovakia, on May 23,1946, in free elections, the Communists obtained 35% of the 
vote, which denoted a genuine pro-Soviet sentiment after the Red Army liberated the 
country. 94 By February 1948 the Communists, in view of the prospect of a defeat in the 
upcoming elections, staged an outright takeover. The Communists campaigned for the 
parliamentary elections to be based on a single ticket list, composed of National Front party 
members and then ratified by the electorate in a plebiscite. The Communist Minister of the 
Interior also purged the police of its few remaining non-Communist elements. The 
reluctance of the Minister to reverse the purges prompted a series of resignations by non- 
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Communist Ministers who left Klement Gottwald in virtual charge of the government. Anti- 
Communist purges ensued at universities, the press, professional bodies, the military and the 
civil services. 95 
The spectrum of Soviet economic domination in Eastern Europe was the subject of a 
Foreign Office memorandum, which stated that 
Russia's policy... [was] ruthlessly despoiling the countries occupied by the Red Army. Simultaneously, 
they are using their puppets to gear the economics of these countries to the Soviet machine... [T]hey 
are making exclusive commercial treaties and securing a predominant share in the control of basic 
industries from Germany and the Adriatic right across to Manchuria. 96 
Davies argues that Moscow ruthlessly enforced all the main features of Stalinism where they 
did not exist. Soviet `advisers' and specialists were incorporated into the local apparatus to 
ensure standardisation and obedience. " As to the question of whether the People's 
Democracies were formally integrated into the Soviet structures, Davies maintains that the 
main clues are to be found in the fact that the International Department of the Soviet 
Communist Party `could control the affairs of the fraternal parties, who in turn controlled 
the republics for which they were responsible'. " 
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Eley argues that post-war circumstances were favourable to a Communist takeover. The 
destructive force of Nazism and the mobility of massed populations created a vacuum that 
would be promptly filled by Communist forces. 9' Unlike the Eastern zone of occupation in 
Germany, which underwent a full-blown process of sovietisation since 1945; until 1947, the 
political future of Eastern Europe remained relatively open. In some cases, strategic security 
needs and weak local Communist Parties led to direct Soviet control, concentrating power 
quickly around the Communist Party, as in the case of Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. 
Elsewhere, like Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Communists took key ministries but proved 
more cautious on economic matters than their socialist rivals. Before the spring of 1947, the 
`national front' strategy (parliamentary democracy, national autonomy, and gradual 
transition) was still a viable option. However, a relentless sequence of events in 1947 (the 
Truman Doctrine, the expulsion of the French and Italian Communist Parties from the 
national government and the Marshall Plan) irretrievably changed the political situation in 
Eastern Europe towards sovietisation. 
As we will see in chapter 4, the process of balance of power making entailed that the spheres 
of influence would be carved according to the criteria imposed by the `grand design' 
thinking. Adhering to the `grand design' meant securing a foothold only in the geopolitical 
spaces deemed vital to the enforcement of structural interests. Lundestad argues that 
domestic economic radicalism (land reform, socialisation of the economy, etc) played little 
part in American attitudes towards Central and Eastern Europe. What counted primarily was 
Soviet economic domination, which came in the form of exclusive trade agreements between 
the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. joint Soviet-local companies 
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discriminated against other investors. In addition to this, heavy reparations to the Soviet 
Union, direct confiscations in the form of war booty and a general political climate of 
conflict and suspicion, strongly discouraged US investments. 100 
During the war, the Anglo-Americans appeared to be willing to allow the Soviet Union 
dominate Eastern Europe. From March 1942, when Roosevelt explained to the Soviet 
ambassador that he would not oppose the Soviet demands for the reestablishment of its 
western borders of June 1941 through Autumn of 1944, when the United States and Great 
Britain accepted Soviet draft armistice agreements for Germany's satellites, the Western 
Allies deferred to the Soviets in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. I'll Nevertheless, Stalin was 
keen to expand the Soviet area of influence in Eastern Europe at all costs. Just before the 
signing of the Anglo-Soviet treaty, which did not deal explicitly with territorial issues, he had 
told Molotov that on`[t]he question of borders 
... 
we will decide by force'. 102 
One of the salient features of the process of sovietisation in Eastern Europe was the lack of 
effective support for the opposition parties on the part of the Western Allies. This lack of 
support coincides with the overall structuralisation of conflict. Western support would have 
intensified conflict over parts of Europe which were not vital to the American `grand 
design'. This denotes a `selfish interventionist' policy on the part of the United States. While 
direct intervention was needed in the industrial core of Western Europe in order to prevent 
a left-wing takeover, Eastern Europe did not merit the same interventionist policy. At the 
same time, the Soviet Union was not willing to aid Communist and left-wing elements that 
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could have overtaken the political system in Italy and France. The Tito break probably 
reassured the Western Allies as to Soviet intentions in the post-war international order: 
although Moscow isolated Yugoslavia, it did not attempt to invade the country in order to 
enforce adherence to Soviet diktat. 
The Soviet Union was able to influence the political process in countries where the Red 
Army was stationed. However, Moscow did not show interest in supporting Communist and 
left-wing takeovers in Western Europe. Lack of support for these movements went back to 
the appeasing stance of the Soviet Union in regards to Hider's takeover in 1933 and the 
relatively weak support for Republican Spain during the Spanish Civil War. This modus 
operandi would ensure the basis of coexistence in the post-war international order. 
The sovietisation of the Eastern zone put the German lands east of the Elbe in direct 
contact with the Soviet experiment. The spectrum of Communism would have a bearing on 
the socio-economic system put in place in Eastern Germany and Europe, as it introduced 
Soviet planning and state intervention in the economy. This helped the process of bloc- 
formation, established according to a convivialist criterion. Bloc-formation would prevent 
the revival of Germany as a disruptive power. Both Germanys would be emasculated by the 
presence of Western and Soviet forces in their territories. 
The sovietisation of the Eastern zone went hand in hand with the `wait and see' policy of the 
Soviet Union in regards to German unity. But this `wait and see' policy did not preclude the 
Soviet Union from entrenching their interests in its zone of occupation in Germany and in 
Eastern Europe. Securing a foothold in Germany was the minimum aim of Soviet policy. 
The process of sovietisation in Germany was a test tube for the establishment of Moscow- 
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orientated regimes in Eastern Europe. The very notion of a political foothold in Eastern 
Europe depended on holding on to a piece of Germany. As we will see in chapter 3, the 
reconstruction of political life and the swift rehabilitation of the economy in the Eastern 
zone was vital for accomplishing this objective. 
Loth derives from Wilhelm Pieck's notes about his talks with Stalin and the heads of the 
Soviet military occupation in Germany, that the preservation of a united Germany was a 
declared aim of Soviet policy as Stalin wanted to avoid a division between East and West. 103 
Stalin thought that a united Germany would not be Communist or even Socialist (at least 
initially). At the same time, German Communist cadres were told in March-April 1945 that 
the objective was not to `realise Socialism in Germany but... a completion of the 1848 
bourgeois-democratic revolution'. The appeal of the German Communist Party (KPD) of 
June 11,1945 echoed Moscow's exhortation, as it called for the `setting up of an anti-Fascist 
... 
democratic parliamentary republic'. 1U4 
In June 1945, the KPD announced `that a policy which should force Germany into the 
Soviet system would be false, for such policy does not tie in with the conditions of 
development in Germany today'. Their aim was `to raise an anti-fascist democratic regime, a 
parliamentary democratic republic, with all rights and freedoms for the people'. 103 This 
gives the impression that ideological considerations gave way to the goal of safeguarding 
long range Soviet interests. A Red Army invasion of Western Germany would have probably 
been successful, as the battle-hardened Soviets were more motivated than the Anglo- 
Americans in exacting revenge on its former enemy. However, an outright invasion of the 
103 Loth, W., Stalin's Plan for Post-War Germany, in Gori, F., and Pons S. (Ed. ), The Soviet Union and Europe in the 
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Western zones would have not been conducive to the accomplishment of the Soviet aims 
for the post-war international order and would have created an unnecessary overstretching 
of resources. 
The Soviet refusal to accept ERP aid was another milestone in the path towards bipolarity in 
Germany and Europe. Stalin saw the Marshall Plan as a significant threat to Soviet control of 
Eastern Europe and believed that economic integration with the West would allow these 
countries to escape Soviet domination. The Czechoslovak and Polish delegations were 
prevented from attending the Paris meeting. Jan Masaryk, the Czechoslovak foreign minister, 
was summoned to Moscow and berated by Stalin for thinking of receiving ERP aid. The 
other Eastern European states immediately rejected the offer. Finland also declined to attend 
in order to avoid antagonising the Soviets. 106 
Moscow was aware of the political conditions attached to the ERP. In his memoirs, Molotov 
recalled 
At the beginning we in the foreign ministry wanted to propose that all socialist countries participate 
[in the Marshall Plan]. But we quickly realized that such a decision would be incorrect. They [the 
United States] hoped to attract us into their coalition, but it would have been a subordinated 
coalition. We would have become dependent on them, but we wouldn't really have received 
anything... This [dependence] would have been even more serious for the Czechs and Poles, who 
were in a very difficult position. 101 
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The Soviet delegation to the Paris talks was told by the Kremlin to `object to terms of 
assistance, which could entail any limitation on countries' sovereignty, or violation of their 
economic independence. ' Moscow was aware of the fact that American and British policy 
included the economic rehabilitation of Germany, a refusal to pay reparations from current 
production and most importantly, that the Marshall Plan would operate outside the UNRR\ 
framework. 108 
An analysis of the Soviet stance on the Marshall Plan allows us to conclude that Moscow 
prioritised the establishment and consolidation of Soviet control over Eastern Europe. Stalin 
considered the Soviet zone of influence to be the most important legacy of World War Two 
and was not going to make any concessions to the Western Allies in this area, for at that time 
the Soviet government regarded control over that sphere of influence as most essential for 
geopolitical and ideological considerations. The Soviet leadership saw the United States of 
America as its main rival in the international arena and was determined to prevent the 
United States from expanding its influence in Europe. Narinsky argues that `the unbending 
and unconstructive stand taken by the Soviet delegation in Paris was largely attributable to 
the desire to prevent the West from gaining a foothold in Eastern Europe, which Moscow 
regarded as its sphere of influence'. 109 
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The Soviet `grand design' for the post-war international order could only be accomplished by 
holding on to a part of Germany. The Soviet Union was eager to prevent the revival of an 
independent, militaristic Germany. The occupation of the Eastern zone provided the Soviets 
with a test tube for the sovietisation of the countries occupied by the Red Army. The 
occupation of a part of Germany gave the Soviet Union superpower status, as it gave 
Moscow the chance to make decisions on the fate of the most industrial country in the 
continent of Europe. 
2.5 Soviet ideology in the making of structural conflict 
The main long range aim of the Soviet Union in the treatment of the German Question and 
the making of the post-war international order would be to secure a political foothold in 
Germany and the areas occupied by the Red Army. The `percentages agreement' agreed by 
Stalin and Churchill in 1944 (with the tacit agreement of Roosevelt) corroborate the fact that 
the split in Europe would evolve according to the logical pursuit of the national interest and 
within the framework of cohabitation, "o instead of being the result to blind ideological 
calculations. 
Soviet thinking on Germany and the international order evolved with national interests 
concerns in mind and therefore unfolded in a cautious and highly rationalistic way. Ivan 
Maisky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in charge of the reparation 
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program, submitted a memorandum on January 11,1944. Maisky earmarked as the 
fundamental aim in the post-war period the creation of `a situation which will guarantee for a 
long period the security of the Soviet Union and the maintenance of peace, at least in 
Europe and Asia'. The concept of `a long period' was explained as meaning `a period long 
enough for (a) the Soviet Union to become sufficiently strong to fear no aggression in 
Europe and Asia, and so that no power or combination of powers in Europe and Asia could 
even think of such aggression, and for (b) Europe, or at least continental Europe, to become 
socialist, thereby excluding the possibility of wars occurring in this part of the world. ' The 
second section set out the primary conditions for realising this fundamental aim. Maisky 
stressed the need for the Soviet Union `to emerge from [the] war with favourable strategic 
frontiers'. "' 
In mid-December 1944 Maxim Litvinov, chairman of the Foreign Ministry's Commission 
for the preparation of peace treaties and on post-war order, advocated the creation of 
regional groupings within the framework of the United Nations but under the aegis of the 
great powers with interests in the respective regions. He took pains to emphasise that he was 
not calling for the establishment of spheres of influence. However, he did mention that the 
setting of `security zones' would only entail mutually beneficial military arrangements 
between the great and the small powers. 112 
Andrei Gromyko, Ambassador to Washington, led the Soviet team at the United Nations 
preparatory talks. He wrote a report personally addressed to Molotov on July 14,1944 
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entitled `On the question of Soviet-American relations'. He began his forecast with an 
audacious basic presumption: in all likelihood, after the war the United States `would be 
interested in economic and political cooperation with the Soviet Union, ' and such 
cooperation would `greatly determine the nature of post-war international relations. ' In 
support of this scenario, Gromyko adduced that the United States had `broken away from 
isolationism and will remain actively involved with the world at large'. He predicted that 
cooperation with the Soviet Union would survive in the longer run because of 'US essential 
interests in cooperation'. Presciently, he highlighted that the `industrial financial bourgeoisie 
of the United States.. 
. 
would be interested in the prevention of Germany's re-emergence as a 
serious economic competitor after the end of the war in Europe'. Gromyko concluded that 
conditions of peace in the international political system would allow America `the maximum 
utilisation of the gains and advantages already achieved and those still to be achieved before 
the war is over'. He also predicted that `the US would be sympathetic to and facilitating in 
establishing bourgeois-democratic political (as opposed to fascist-type) regimes in Western 
Europe, and first of all in Germany" 
However, Gromyko underlined the `possible difficulties' in Soviet-American relations, 
including possible disagreements over the post-war treatment of Germany: the United States 
was likely to be considerably softer on Germany (especially on reparations) than the Soviet 
Union. Gromyko also pointed out the `the general ideological hostility of the American 
ruling class toward the Soviet Union'. He also highlighted Eastern Europe (including the 
Baltic states) as a potential troublespot because of the concern amongst `American 
government and business circles regarding the prospects of social change and of establishing 
Soviet-type regimes in some of those countries'. Gromyko also pointed out that `the 
112 Mastny, V., Russia's Road to the Cold War, p. 231-2 
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American aspiration to increase its influence in the Near and Middle East (particularly in 
Iran)... would not be in the interest of the Soviet Union'. Yet, despite this fairly impressive 
inventory of potential problems Gromyko remained quite optimistic about the future, stating 
that the necessary conditions are clearly present for a continuation of cooperation between 
our two countries in the post-war period'. He also added that `to a great degree, these future 
relations would be determined by the very nature of the relationship which has already been 
shaped and is still being shaped during the war. ' 13 The key issue then became the nature of 
such post-war cooperation with the United States. There are no serious disagreements 
amongst Litvinov, Maisky and Gromyko: they all saw it largely in terms of agreatpower concert 
based upon some kind of a division of the world into spheres of influence. 114 
In his November 6,1944 speech, Stalin gave his own estimate of the alliance's prospects, 
which happened to be quite in tune with Maisky-Gromyko-Litvinov line: at the basis of the 
Alliance, he said, were not `accidental or transitory motives, but vitally important and long- 
lasting interests', above of all `preventing new aggression or a new war, if not forever, then at 
least for an extended period of time. ' "s This speech is particularly significant because it 
denotes the idea that Stalin wanted to create the conditions for coexistence between the 
Soviet Union and the Western Allies after the war. 
By April-May 1945 Soviet strategy had two aims: (1) to consolidate Soviet influence 
throughout Eastern Europe and to exclude British and American interference, and (2) to 
113 Perlmutter, A., FDR and Stalin: A Not So Grand Alliance, 1943-1945 (Columbia & London: University of 
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take `territory which if necessary could be used for `bargaining' with the West'. "' Stalin was 
not only pushing westward but also trying to hamper the Allied advance eastward. The 
Vozhd informed Harriman on April 15,1945 that a major Soviet offensive was about to 
begin, but stated that its target was Dresden rather than Berlin. A week later, after the Red 
Army had already encircled the capital, Antonov sent a message to Eisenhower in which he 
claimed additional territory as supposedly belonging to the Soviet area of operations. He 
stated the Red Army's intention to occupy the entire eastern bank of Elbe, along with the 
Vltava valley in Bohemia. "' Pechatnov asks the question of whether this line of thinking, 
espousing clearly-defined spheres of interests, examined in conjunction with the `half-world' 
thinking prevailing in Washington and London could have given rise to `a better post-war 
accommodation between the Soviet and Anglo-American `orbits', instead of the rigid 
balance of power which emerged in the early Cold War years. 118 
This possibility gives rise to a reconsideration of the orthodox/revisionist debate. The 
interaction which arose regarding the treatment of the German Question and long range 
superpowers' objectives at large, could have been geared toward the formation of a less 
conflictual international order. However, an examination of the political implications of 
American and Soviet structural interests, seem to confirm the view that conflict itself was an 
important factor in the creation of policy. The war mentality that industrialised the Soviet 
Union and expanded the American economy during the 1930s and 1940s respectively, was 
partially responsible for setting in motion the establishment of spheres of influence. 
116 Kennedy-Pipe, C., Stalin's cold war, p. 66 
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Indeed, Stalin's election speech of February 9,1946 amounted to a condemnation of the 
capitalist system. The Soviet leader argued that 
the war broke out as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces 
on the basis of present-day monopolistic capitalism... the development of world capitalism in our 
times does not proceed smoothly and evenly, but through crises and catastrophic wars. Perhaps 
catastrophic wars could be avoided if it were possible periodically to redistribute raw materials and 
markets among the respective countries in conformity with their economic weight by means of 
concerted and peaceful decisions. But this is impossible under the present capitalist conditions of 
world economic development. 119 
The `war mentality', geared towards fostering a more forceful implementation of Soviet 
interests in Germany and Europe was outlined by Nikolai Novikov, Soviet Ambassador to 
the United States. Novikov's telegram hinted at the possibility of a split in the Alliance with 
the formation of an `Anglo-Saxon' bloc hostile to the Soviet Union. 
The `hard-line' policy with regard to the Soviet Union announced by Byrnes. 
. . 
is at present the main 
obstacle on the road to cooperation of the Great Powers. It consists mainly of the fact that in the 
postwar period the United States no longer follows a policy of strengthening cooperation among the 
Big Three (or four) but rather has strived to undermine the unity of these countries. The objective 
has been to impose the will of other countries on the Soviet Union. This is precisely the tenor of the 
policy of certain countries, which is being carried out with the blessing of the United States, to 
undermine or completely abolish the principle of the veto in the Security Council of the United 
Nations. This would give the United States opportunities to form among the Great Powers narrow 
'19 Speech delivered by Joseph Stalin at a meeting of the Stalin electoral district, Moscow, February 9,1946, 
From the Pamphlet Collection, J. Stalin, Speeches Delivered at Meetings of Voters of the Stalin Electoral District, 
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groupings and blocs directed primarily against the Soviet Union, and thus to split the United Nations. 
Rejection of the veto by the Great Powers would transform the United Nations into an Anglo-Saxon 
domain in which the United States would play the leading role. 121) 
As we will see in chapter 3, the sovietisation of the Eastern zone and the breakdown of four 
power control in Germany would contribute to the formation of a Soviet-led bloc in Eastern 
Europe. In September 1947, the Soviets set up COMINFORM (Communist Information 
Bureau), an information agency composed by the Communist parties of Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia 
(but not the German SED). COMINFORM re-established information exchanges amongst 
the European Communist parties that had lapsed since the dissolution of COMINTERN in 
1943. Stalin called the conference in Szklarska Porgba (Poland) in response to divergences 
amongst the Eastern European governments on whether or not to attend the Paris 
Conference on Marshall Aid in July 1947. The intended purpose of the COMINFORM was 
to coordinate actions between Communist parties under Soviet direction. As a result, the 
COMINFORM acted as a tool of Soviet foreign policy. 
The Soviet response to the Truman Doctrine was initially cautious and some policy analysts 
suggested a possible participation of the Soviet Union in the ERP. After all, the Soviet 
Union accepted lend-lease aid from the United States during the war. However, Moscow 
quickly realised that an `open-door' policy in Eastern Europe would find them in no position 
to compete with the United States. Therefore, on July 2,1947 Molotov announced that the 
Soviet Union would not participate in further discussions over the ERP and advised the 
(Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow) (1950) 
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Eastern European countries to do likewise. Zhdanov had by then advanced his `two camps' 
theory and the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party spelled out the criteria for 
building Soviet-style socialism in Eastern Europe: a significant degree of Communist 
political and administrative control, nationalisation of industrial, transport and financial 
systems, land reform and a pro-Soviet foreign policy. 
COMINFORM's contrast with COMINTERN starkly defined the nature of the post-war 
international Communist movement. The meeting was small, with two delegates each from 
Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Italy, and France. The 
Soviet spokesmen, Andrei Zhdanov and Georgii Malenkov, presided. Key notables (Tito, 
Togliatti, Thorez, Dimitrov, Gottwald, Räkosi and all general secretaries of their parties) 
were missing. The East Germans and Albanians were also absent. Neither the Greek, 
Spanish nor the Finnish Communist Party were invited, which denotes that Moscow did not 
want to pursue a revolutionary path outside their immediate sphere of influence. 121 The 
purpose of COMINFORM was to instil loyalty to Soviet foreign policy amongst the 
member states of the newly-established Soviet bloc. 
The Tito split began Stalinisation's final phase, from the summer of 1948 to Stalin's death in 
1953. Stalin was furious at the revolutionary independence of the Yugoslav Communist 
120 Nikolai Novikov, Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Telegram, September 1946- 
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Party (KPJ). After 1945, whilst Stalin was abiding by his wartime agreement with Churchill 
for non-interference outside the `percentages' areas, the KPJ championed dictatorship of the 
proletariat against parliamentary roads, affirming international revolution and backing the 
Greek Communists. Tensions crackled at a consultation of Soviet, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian 
parties in Moscow in February 1948, when Stalin accused Tito of creating an alternative 
Communist centre. Stalin recalled Soviet advisers in March, denouncing Yugoslav deviations. 
When the KPJ defended itself, Stalin expelled Tito's party from COMINFORM. 
COMINFORM, tightened the grip of Moscow over Eastern Europe and devised policy to 
use Western European Communists to destabilise ERP deliveries. 122 
The break with Yugoslavia demonstrated that the Soviet Union could not gain lasting 
control over any country in which the revolutionary forces came to power as a result of their 
own strength. Moreover, the highest priority in Soviet thinking about revolutions abroad was 
not the survival and stabilisation of revolutionary power but rather Soviet control over the 
new revolutionary government. 123 
After COMINFORM, the Soviet bloc's international line had shifted to promoting a 
disruption of the delivery of the Marshall Plan aid by transportation unions and open 
confrontation with local governments. The French and Italian Communists stepped into line 
and returned home to lead demonstrations and strikes that led to a sharp decline in their 
popularity. 124 The rebuttal of Titoism also marked a shift in Moscow's direction of bloc 
policy. Tito was charged by the Soviets with the crime of nationalism because he would not 
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allow Stalinist agents to roam freely in Yugoslavia. All ruling and non-ruling Communist 
parties, including the Chinese Communist Party, stepped into line in condemning what 
should have been seen as relatively minor challenges to Soviet leadership on the part of 
Yugoslavia. '2s 
Moscow viewed interventionism as a mechanism to enforce specific bottom line security 
interests. According to Zubok and Pleshakov, Stalin `wanted to avoid confrontation with the 
West. He was even ready to see cooperation with the Western powers as a preferable way of 
building his influence and solving contentious international issues'. 126 Leffler argues that 
Soviet policies were merely `reactive' to US policy, particularly the Truman Doctrine and the 
Marshall Plan. 127 The Soviet Union operated cautiously and with strict regard to the norms 
of behaviour forged through the diplomatic interaction with the Western Allies. The 
evolution of Soviet ideology unfolded according to the circumstances imposed by 
superpower interaction in Germany and beyond. The Soviet Union adhered to its own 
`grand design', aimed at preventing encirclement by the West. The notion of vital areas of 
interest and the `two camps' theory endorsed by Zhdanov, entailed an underlying idea of 
coexistence in the post-war international order. The ideological machinery which informed 
Cold War diplomacy was geared towards sustaining the structural interests of the 
superpowers. In this context, the Cold War should not be seen exclusively as the unfolding 
of conflictual interaction between the superpowers but also as the informing element for the 
establishment of norms of behaviour for the post-war international order. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
American and Soviet structural interests in Germany and Europe revolved around strong 
interventionist elements. The pursuit of US long-term interests called for the creation of an 
international economic system based on the free exchange of goods and capital. Political 
intervention in the industrial heartland of Western Europe, starting with the Western zones 
in Germany, would crank up this process. At the same time, security motivations compelled 
Moscow to hold on to Germany, whether united or divided, and to a sphere of influence in 
Eastern Europe. This structural arrangement necessitated the element of coexistence in 
order to prevent the possibility of a new systemic conflagration. 
Ideology served to attain national interest goals within the boundaries of coexistence. Law 
and diplomacy had a decisive influence in restricting conflict to Rationalist parameters. The 
intense diplomatic intercourse between the superpowers created a political opening which 
did not exist during the first Cold War (1917-1933). The `grand design' policies set down by 
Moscow and Washington during the war provided with the ideological driving force in the 
treatment of the German Question. Having to manage a conflictual situation with the Soviet 
Union called for decisive action on the part of the United States. Action came about in the 
form of `containment', with the implementation of the Truman Doctrine and the ERP. 
Containment enforced the demarcation of the spheres of influence and had an obvious 
economic rationale behind it. The first experiment in containment would be in Germany, 
where a bipolar outcome was enforced through the establishment of Bizonia. In the case of 
Germany, containment manifested itself in a mixture of defensive and offensive responses 
On one hand, the United States and its Western Allies allowed Moscow to proceed with the 
implementation of its sphere of influence east of the Elbe. At the same time, the Anglo- 
133 
American bloc realised the importance of establishing Bizonia in order to safeguard vital 
interests in the industrial heartland of Germany. 
The intervention of the United States in the treatment of the German Question created a 
situation of conflict, which stemmed from the need to ideologically prop up the `grand 
design' for the post-war international order. The volatile situation in Western Europe had 
reached a climax by 1946. Italy and France were of paramount importance because of the 
size of the left-wing constituency and the politicised nature of the resistance movement in 
both countries. These developments required action on the part of the United States in order 
to secure these countries as strategic switchpoints within the `grand design' for Western 
Europe. The Italian and French Communist Parties had a significant political strength and 
the post-war cabinets in those countries included several ministers of that affiliation, a 
situation that was potentially inflammatory for the post-war international order. Former 
Resistance elements had taken a vested interest in the political process. France and Italy had 
an important geopolitical dimension. Both had imperial possessions and a substantial 
industrial base. The potential sovietisation of countries with a substantial industrial base 
could have affected US interests. Action was needed in order to prevent them from joining 
the Soviet camp: the French election of 1946 and the 1948 Italian general election were 
heavily influenced by the United States as part of their ongoing effort to contain 
communism. 
The structural aspects of conflict provided the treatment of the German Question with strict 
demarcation lines which would ultimately ensure a relatively smooth passage to a bipolar 
solution based on co-existence between the two camps. The perceptions which informed 
inter-Allied relations represented a `security dilemma' which manifested itself in two ways. 
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America feared the prospect of either a disruptive war or four-power agreement in Germany, 
as any of those options would have hindered their `grand design' project. At the same time, 
security concerns prompted the Moscow to sovietise the Eastern zone of occupation and 
work towards the establishment of Moscow-orientated regimes in Eastern Europe. 
From Moscow's perspective, Washington's encroachment on the western parts of 
Germany and Europe evoked past fears. Stalin construed the Iron Curtain's speech made 
by Churchill at Fulton, Missouri in 1946 as a `call to war' and within three weeks the 
Soviet Union rejected membership of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), announcing a five year plan designed to make the Soviet Union self- 
sufficient in the event of another war. 128 At the COMINFORM Conference of 1947 
Zhdanov stated that `the more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct becomes 
two major trends in post-war international policy, corresponding to the division of the 
political forces operating on the international arena into two major camps: the imperialist 
and anti-democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic 
camp, on the other'. 129 Zhdanov argued for the thorough communisation of Eastern 
Europe, including East Germany, relying on the mobilising skills of the Party to carry it 
out and emphasised the strategic value of Communist fifth columnists in the West. 1" The 
superpowers' respective bottom lines became the ordering principle of policy over 
Germany and inter-Allied relations in the international political system at large. 
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Neorealism provides with a sound theoretical framework for interpreting the 
structuralisation of conflict during the 1943-8 period. While classical realism uses `human 
nature' 131 in order to explain international politics Neorealism privileges a interpretation 
based on structural constraints over agents' strategies and motivations, assuming that the 
international structure is decentralised and anarchic, with states acting as sovereign political 
units. Their driving force for survival is the primary factor influencing their behaviour. The 
structure limits cooperation among states through fears of relative gains made by other 
states, and the possibility of dependence on other states. 132 Waltz defines the international 
political structure according to its ordering principles, the character of the units and the 
distribution of capabilities. Structures are defined, first, according to the principle by which a 
system is ordered. Systems are transformed if one ordering principle replaces another. 
Second, structures are defined by the specifications of functions of differentiated units. 
Hierarchic systems change if functions are differently defined and allotted. For anarchic 
systems, the criterion of systems change derived from the second part of the definitions 
drop out since the system is composed of like units. Third, structures are defined by the 
distribution of capabilities among units. 133 
A Neorealist interpretation puts a different perspective on the orthodox/revisionist debate. 
By examining the systemic conditions of superpower interaction over Germany in the 1943- 
8 period, we can arrive at the conclusion that structural interests made incumbent upon the 
superpowers to establish the conditions for the breakdown of four power control over 
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Germany. American economic interests and Soviet security concerns became the ordering 
principle of the treatment of the German Question, creating the conditions for a bipolar 
post-war international order. At the same time ideology, as the enforcing mechanism of 
these structural elements, gave the nascent international order the 'specification of functions' 
which Waltz earmarks as defining elements of the international political system. 
The political realities imposed by the vacuum of power created in Europe with the demise of 
Nazi Germany accelerated the process of polarisation. As we will see in chapter 3, the 
superpowers Viewed the unfolding of the bipolar process as the most logical way to 
implement their respective `grand designs' for the post-war international order. Avoiding 
partition would have entailed a complete rethink of long term interests precisely when the 
need of the hour called for decisive action. As I will further explore in chapter 4, the role of 
the superpowers in the process of the partition of Germany would entail the creation of a 
`pluralist plus' international order in which intervention and coexistence would dictate the 
implementation of structural interests within the spheres of influence system. 
See Waltz, K., Theory of International Relations 
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Chapter 3 
The German Question, the social construction of conflict and the origins of the Cold 
War 
3.1 Introduction 
As we have seen in chapter 2, the treatment of the German Question structural elements of 
conflict that shaped superpower relations in the direction of a bipolar post-war international 
order. From a Neorealist perspective both the United States and the Soviet Union had a 
`grand design' which would give the nascent post-war international order its ultimate 
structuring force. However, as it will be further explored in this chapter, the conflictual 
elements of the superpowers' relations regarding the German Question had a socially- 
constructed dimension given by the elements of international law and diplomacy, and the 
creation of a balance of power system. The bipolar outcome was shaped by the way the 
Allies dealt with the occupation and the diplomacy of the German Question. The divergence 
of interests which resulted in the onset of the Cold War was initially socialised as the result of 
the superpowers' interests in Germany. This socialisation of conflict was influenced by the 
strong interventionist input of the superpowers, resulting in the creation of a post-war 
international order based on coexistence. Waltz emphasises geopolitical redistribution as a 
determinant factor in the creation of a post-war international order based on competition. 
However, this notion has to be parried against the historical evidence which supports the 
idea of a socially-constructed process as pivotal in the transformation of the superpowers' 
interests and identity. Paraphrasing Wendt's argument on the social construction of power 
politics, the competitive nature of the post-war international order and the influence that the treatment of the 
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German Question had on it was zuhat the main Allies made of it. ' The social theory of international 
politics espoused by Wendt, which juxtaposes the Neorealist credo, maintains that social 
kinds, like the international political system, are ideas authored by human beings. 2 Wendt 
argues that `if self-help is not a constitutive feature of anarchy, it must emerge causally from 
processes in which anarchy plays only a permissive role'. Furthermore, he sustains the view 
that `the meanings in terms of which action is organised arise out of interaction. 'Wendt also 
states that anarchy has this meaning only in virtue of collective, insecurity-producing 
practices, but if those practices are relatively stable, they do constitute a system that may 
resist change'. ' 
The constructivist notion espoused by Wendt can be linked to the English School of 
thinking. 5 In the case of the superpowers, intervention and coexistence socialised conflict to 
the extent that the disagreements over the German Question and its ultimate bipolar 
outcome would not disrupt the formation of a post-war international order in which the 
United States and the Soviet Union would be able to enforce their structural interests. This 
process of socialisation of conflict was aided by the significant role that diplomatic and legal 
interaction had in the treatment of the German Question and the reconfiguration of the 
international political system as a whole. 
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A constructivist interpretation on the socialisation of conflict over Germany adds to the 
debate on the origins of the Cold War by espousing the idea of superpower interaction as a 
medium for the creation of a post-war international order based on the premise of non-disruptive conflict. The 
post-revisionist accounts on the origins of the Cold War espouse the idea of superpower 
interaction as the originating factor in the creation of conflict. These accounts attempt to 
strike a balance between the orthodox and revisionist camps, identifying areas of 
responsibility for the origins of the conflict on both sides. Paterson, for instance, views 
Soviet hostility and American efforts to dominate the post-war world as equally responsible 
for the Cold War. ' Gaddis maintains that `neither side can bear sole responsibility for the 
onset of the Cold War'. Gaddis highlights the constraints imposed on American 
policymakers due to the complications of domestic politics. He also criticises some 
revisionist scholars, particularly Williams, for failing to understand the role of Soviet policy 
in the origins of the Cold War. ' 
Out of the post-revisionist literature emerged a new area of inquiry that attempted to offer 
an insight into American and Soviet actions and perspectives. 8 From this standpoint, the 
Cold War was not so much the responsibility of either side, but rather the result of 
6 See Paterson, T., Soviet American confrontation: postwar reconstruction and the origins of the Cold War (Baltimore and 
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predictable tensions between two world powers that had been suspicious of one another for 
nearly a century. As Ernest May wrote in a 1984 essay 
After the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union were doomed to be 
antagonists.... There probably was never any real possibility that the post-1945 relationship could be 
anything but hostility verging on conflict... Traditions, belief systems, propinquity, and convenience 
... 
all combined to stimulate antagonism, and almost no factor operated in either country to hold it 
back. 9 
Although systemic constraints (in the form of structural interests and ideology) created the 
possibility of conflict, both superpowers were in a position to make concessions aimed at 
preventing a bipolar outcome in Germany and Europe. This adds a new dimension to the 
interpretation of the origins of the Cold War. The unfolding of conflict can be seen from the 
perspective of superpower interaction over Germany. However, conflict was socialised 
through the functioning of the legal and diplomatic framework put in place in order to deal 
with the German Question, therefore restricting its scope and avoiding a systemic 
disruption. This chapter explores how the treatment of the German Question contributed to 
the socialisation of conflict between the superpowers, paying particular attention to the zonal 
occupation and the diplomatic breakdown at the Moscow and London CFM. 
3.2 The zonal occupation and the spectrum of conflict 
The division of Germany into zones of occupation created a situation which had the 
potential to create conflict between the Allies. While the decision-making over the 
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fundamental principles guiding the occupation of Germany were to be taken at ACC level, 
the zonal commanders were able to implement policies unilaterally. The dire economic 
situation in the Anglo-American zones would compel Britain and America to launch the 
creation of Bizonia. At the same time, the economic rehabilitation of the Eastern zone 
according to a Communist criterion generated the conditions for the breakdown of inter- 
Allied relations and the push towards bipolarity. 
The British zone (which had the highest industrial and population density in Germany) could 
not feed itself and was dependent on food exports, with the aggravating factor that the 
Soviets refused to ship food from the Eastern zone and Poland. '° By 1945-6, the British 
zone had become a drain on London's resources, just when Britain was facing a grave 
financial situation at home. During 1946-7, in the midst of the British dollar crisis, Britain 
was contributing some 0100 million, mostly for supplies of food, in order to financially 
sustain its zone of occupation in Germany. The British zone had 19 million inhabitants and 
had to absorb the influx of German refugees from Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Eastern 
zone of occupation. Its industrial capacity was either stalled or destroyed. The excess food 
required could not be purchased with exports, as the inter-Allied agreement of March 28, 
1946 placed great restrictions on the level of industry. " 
In 1946, the actual industrial production of the British zone (only 10% of pre-war output) 
fell far below the level of industry standard due to shortages of food, accommodation and 
fuel. During 1946, a fifth of the meager supply of Ruhr coal went to France as reparations. 
9 Quoted from Brinkley, A., American History: A Survey. (New York: McGraw-Hill) (1986), p 799 
10 Smyser, W R, From Yalta to Berlin, (New York: St. -Martin's Press) (1999) p. 46 
11 Northedge, F. S., Descent from Powver-British Foreign Policy 1945-1973, p. 74 
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Industrial plants and machinery were being shipped to Russia in accordance with the 
Potsdam agreement (amounting to a quarter of the zonal industrial equipment not deemed 
to be necessary for Germany's peacetime economy), a practice which was continued until 
October 1946. The British zone of occupation was not making a contribution to the 
economic recovery of Western Europe. 12 
This situation compelled the British Cabinet to come up with the `Benin Plan', which 
envisaged freeing the economies of all the zones of occupation so they could send their 
surplus production to each other. In March 1946 a memorandum produced by Bevin 
summarised British aims in Germany. There were five main points: first, security from a 
revival of German aggression; second, reasonable economic well-being in Germany and 
Europe; third, a reduction of the British costs of occupation of Germany; fourth, the 
creation of a democratic and Western-minded Germany; and fifth, the restriction of Soviet 
influence as far to the east as possible. '3 
In the American zone, the food situation presented a more difficult problem because of the 
loss of the breadbasket provinces of East Germany and the increase of the West German 
population by more than 20 % through the influx of ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern 
Europe. Well into 1946, Germany had no regular mail service with other countries as 
security considerations prevented contractual communications. The US Trading with the 
Enemy Act supplemented these obstacles. The key problem was the absence of sound 
currency. The Reichmark had lost its usefulness as a medium of exchange, which made the 
12 Northedge, F. S., Descent from Power-British Foreign Policy 1945 1973, p. 75 
13 `The Future of Germany and the Ruhr', Ernest Bevin, 11 March 1946, PRO: CAB 129/9, CP (46) 156, Gen 
121/1 
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conditions ripe for a thriving black market. Two main factors of wartime price stability, 
adequate supplies and draconian controls, no longer existed. A gradual thaw of the frozen 
prices set in, with the result that prices for consumer goods during May 1945 and July 1947 
rose by 97 %. ' ` 
The situation in the Anglo-American zones prompted the United States and Britain into 
action. On 27 April 1946, Britain decided that priority should be given to funding British 
imports to Germany rather than transporting German capital equipment to the Soviet 
Union. On 4 May 1946, Britain announced that the dismantling of plants for delivery as 
reparations would be suspended until the British zone was self-sufficient. In addition, 
reparations from current production ended completely. Besides the fact that current 
production was dismally low in immediate post-war Germany, the British believed that 
`reparations from current production could only be reparations at the expense of the British 
and American taxpayers'. 's 
In May 20,1946 an OMGUS Special Report called for a new plan for the liquidation of war 
finances and the financial rehabilitation of Germany, advocating currency reform at a rate of 
10: 1 and the abolition of new debt allocated to foreign institutions on pre-war terms. 
16 The 
`Plan for the Liquidation of War Finance and the Financial Rehabilitation of Germany', 
produced by Gerhard Colm, Joseph Dodge and Raymond Goldsmith of the US State 
Department was submitted to Clay on May 20,1946. The Plan highlighted the fact that the 
14 Backer, J. H., The Decision to Divide Germany, p. 113-4 
15 ` Statement by the Control Commission for Germany (British Element) Regarding Reparations from the 
Western Zones, Dismantling, and ERP' (24 September 1948)-From Documents of Germany under occupation, p. 331 
"' Clay to the Chief of Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Echols), May 23,1946- FRUS, 1946, VoL V, 
The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe, p, 557 
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Reichmark faced repudiation by its own people and the economy was disintegrating into a 
barter economy. " 
The stop to reparations deliveries made by Clay gave impetus to the organisation of the 
Western zones. By May 1946 the Stated Department was of the view that the Soviets had to 
be warned that if Germany could not be run as a unit, then Washington would have no 
alternative but to treat western Germany `as an economic unit and integrating this unit 
closely' with the Western European economies. 18 Soon after, Clay announced that the 
United States would have no choice but to merge its zone of occupation with any zone 
where the occupying power was willing to agree with the multizonal policy he had in mind. " 
This offer was quickly accepted by Britain. 
The implementation of the rehabilitation of the Western zones gained ground amongst the 
Anglo-Americans because of the dire financial situation in their respective zones of 
occupation and the potential political ramifications of the sovietisation of the Eastern zone. 
Polarisation was encouraged through the economic reconstitution of the Eastern zone of 
occupation under the Moscow diktat. As we will see in chapter 6, Bizonia and the 
sovietisation of the Eastern zone of occupation would lead to a radical transformation in the 
post-war society of states, for the ideological split which originated in Germany would create 
a bipolar outcome in Europe and inform the Cold War international order as a whole. The 
sovietisation of the Eastern zone contributed to the social construction of conflict as it 
17 Kuklick, B., American Policy and the Division of Germany: the clash with Russia over Reparations (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press) (1972) p. 118-9 
18 Acheson to Byrnes, May 9,1946, FRUS 1946 Vol V, pp. 551-554 
11 Clay press conference, A lay 27,1946, Clay Papers, I: 221 
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would be the first testing ground of Communism in Europe outside the Soviet Union and 
trigger the process of rehabilitation in the Anglo-American zones. 
The Soviet occupation authorities worked towards the establishment of an East German 
administration from the very onset of the occupation. 2( ' The importance of the process of 
sovietisation in the Eastern zone in the bipolar outcome in Germany lies in the fact that by 
gearing the East German economic system towards Communism, the Soviet authorities 
created a geopolitical space meant to be kept free from Western influence. In September 
1945 the Soviet Military Administration established German administrations in the areas of 
transport, post and telegraphs, fuel and power, trade and supply 
, 
industrial matters, 
agriculture, financial affairs, labour and social welfare, popular education, and justice and 
health. 21 On October 22,1945 Marshall Zhukov granted the provincial and Länder 
administrations in the Russian zone the right to issue laws and decrees having legal force. 
The measure ensured that the `administration of the Provinces and of the Federal `Länder' 
[were] entitled to issue, in the legislative, judicial, and executive fields, laws and decrees 
which shall have legal force, provided that they conflict neither with the laws and orders 
issued by the Control Council, nor with the orders of the Soviet Military Administration'. 22 
In September 1945, the Soviet military administration announced a massive land reform 
which broke the vast estates that constituted the stronghold of the Prussian Junker military 
20 For accounts on the political organisation of the Eastern zone see Phillips 
, 
A. L. Soviet Pok'cy toward East 
Germany Reconsidered- The Postwar Decade (Greenwood Press. Place of Publication: Westport, CT. Publication 
Year) (1986), Krisch, H., German Politics under Soviet Occupation (Columbia University Press: New York) (1974) 
and Naimark, N., The Russians in Germany-A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, NA and London) 
21 Announcement of the Soviet Military Administration of the establishment of German Administrations in the 
Soviet Zone, September 13,1945-From Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 64-6 
146 
and political elite. In spite of the adverse effects on production, half a million German 
farmers now owned their land. The lower limits for land holdings were set by Stalin at 100 
hectares, to avoid complete incompatibility with the Western zones. 23 The aims of the land 
reform were to `create new independent farms of landless peasants, agricultural labourers, 
and small tenants', to `give land to resettlers and refugees who were deprived of their goods 
and chattels by Hitler's predatory war policy', to `create farms in the vicinity of the towns 
and under the town administrations which can supply workers, employees, and artisans with 
meat and dairy products, and to put small allotments at the disposal of workers and 
employees where they can grow vegetables'. Farmers who received land through the Land 
Reform paid a sum equivalent to the value of one year's crop. 24 Nettl points out that by 
turning labourers into owners, the Soviets instilled allegiance to the authorities. 25 
The Soviet authorities earmarked the nationalisation of industry as a main priority. The 
Soviets themselves assumed ownership of about 25% of industry in the form of Soviet stock 
companies (SAG) and nationalised much of the remainder. By mid 1946 they had ended 
private ownership of any significant industrial holdings. " At the very beginning of the 
occupation the Soviet authorities ordered all banks closed and all deposits blocked. Later, 
municipal savings banks and agricultural credit cooperatives were reopened, but only 
payments of RM 300 were allowed. All financial claims and liabilities of financial institutions 
were made void, along with the Reich's debt, which served as their main backing. The 
22 Order by Marshall Zhukov granting the Provincial and Lander Administrations in the Russian Zone the right 
to issue laws and decrees having legal force, October 22,1945-From Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 82 
23 Smyser, W R, From Yalta to Berlin, p. 34 
21 Decree on Land Reform in Saxony, September 10,1945-From Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 59- 
64. Loewenthal describes the land reform scheme as the first important step towards the separation of the 
Eastern zone from the rest of Germany. See Loewenthal, F., News from Soviet Germany, (London: 
Gollancz) (1950). p. 291 
25 Nettl, J. P., Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 1945-50, p. 87 
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banking system was replaced by five big state banks, which took over the available assets of 
the former without consideration of existing liabilities. As a result of these measures, the 
Soviet zone was drained of nearly four-fifths of its monetary assets. 27 By July 1945 private 
activity in the insurance field was eliminated and all existing companies were merged into 
five public (Land) insurance corporations. 28 
From the beginning of 1946 the Administration for Labour had been a special instrument in 
Soviet labour policy. One of its most important tasks was the provision of skilled and 
unskilled labour for transfer to the Soviet Union. The eastward movement of labour, 
compensated only by the return of sick or incapable war prisoners to Germany, culminated 
in the removal of over 100,000 Germans in May June 1947 under the code-name Ossawakim. 
Commerce was centralised through the elimination of provincial import-export organisations 
and the establishment of a Central Administration for Foreign and Inter-Zonal Trade. 29 
Both Bizonia and the sovietisation of the Eastern Zone had the immediate effect of 
socialising conflict and accomplishing a `peace of sorts'. The political and economic 
reconstitution of the Eastern zone socialised conflict by creating a demarcation of interests 
which prompted the rehabilitation of the Western zones. As we have seen in chapter 2, any 
possible interference by the Soviet Union in the economic process in the western zones was 
clearly against the American `grand design' of reconstituting Germany as the engine of a 
free-market orientated Western Europe. A debacle in the Western zones would have resulted 
in the American withdrawal from Western Europe or in a war with the Soviet Union. 
26 Smyser, W R, From Yalta to Berlin, p. 35 
27 Kuklick, B., American Policy and the Division of Germany: the clash with Russia over Reparations, p. 117-8 
28 Hardach, K., The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century (University of California Press: Berkeley, 
Los Angeles, London) (1980), p. 116 
29 Nettl, J. P., Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 1945-50, p. 134-42 
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Bizonia and the sovietisation of the Eastern zone were signs of irretrievable conflict towards 
partition. However, polarisation was also a Rationalist response to the divergence of interests 
as it established specific spheres of superpower influence. 
The situation which unfolded at zonal level created the conditions for a bipolar outcome in 
Germany and Europe. However, the re-organisation of Germany into spheres of influence 
meant that conflict unfolded within Rationalist parameters, as the rehabilitation process in 
Bizonia and the Eastern zone enforced a balancing mechanism that prompted a bipolar 
outcome. Diplomacy, the legal framework in operation at the ACC and CFM and the 
creation of a bipolar balance of power constructed conflict within restricted, non-disruptive 
parameters. The seemingly anarchical situation which arose after the war with the demise of 
Nazi Germany was contained by the `pluralist plus' construction of a post-war order in 
Germany and Europe. The intervention of the superpowers in the treatment of the German 
Question led to the construction of a bipolar order which adhered to the principles of 
coexistence that bound superpower interaction during the war and would continue to do so 
after the partition of Germany into two states. Seen from this perspective, superpower 
interaction in Germany was not responsible for constructing a `Cold War'. 30 Instead, it 
created a `peace of sorts' which was informed by the elements of legality and transformation 
as well as a restrained spectrum of conflict. 
30 The term `Cold War' was coined by George Orwell in an essay titled `You and the Atomic Bomb', published 
on October 19,1945 in the London Tribune. Orwell argued that '... We may be heading not for general 
breakdown but for an epoch as horribly stable as the slave empires of antiquity... the kind of world-view, the 
kind of beliefs, and the social structure that would probably prevail in a state which was at once unconquerable 
and in a permanent state of `Cold War' with its neighbours. From 
http: //www oruelltodaycom/orwellcoldwar. shtml The Cassell Companion to Quotations cites a speech by 
Bernard Baruch, delivered in South Carolina, April 16,1947 in which he stated, `let us not be deceived: we are 
today in the midst of a Cold War'. The American columnist Walter Lippmann gave wide circulation to the 
term. 
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3.3 The issue of economic principles and the breakdown of four-power control 
Lack of agreement on the economic principles guiding the occupation of Germany as well as 
on its post-war political and economic system became the main source of conflict between 
the Allies. The rehabilitation thinking espoused by the United States fitted into their `grand 
design' project for the post-war international order. This thinking clashed with the Soviet 
insistence on taking reparations from Germany. The taking of reparations entailed that the 
Anglo-American zones could not operate under the economic principles upheld by the 
Western occupying powers, as Soviet financial demands took priority over rehabilitation. 
At Potsdam, the issue of the economic principles that were to guide the occupation of 
Germany was a source of tension between the Allies. The final agreement emerged at the 
eleventh plenary session when the Byrnes `deal' ensured that Soviet reparations would be 
met by `removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the Soviet Union, and from 
appropriate German external assets'. Additionally, the Soviet Union was to receive from the 
Western zones 
15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the 
metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German 
peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an 
equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such 
other commodities as may be agreed upon. 31 
31 Section III 4 (a), Protocol of the Proceedings-Potsdam Conference, August 1,1945- 
http: //www. yale-edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade17. htm 
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10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy 
and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on 
reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return. 32 
In addition to the Potsdam reparations agreement, several of the `Economic Principles' of 
the Potsdam Protocol also affected the reparations issue. Paragraph 14 stipulated that 
Germany was to be treated as a single economic unit and accordingly, common policies were 
to be established with regard to concerns such as industrial production, reparations and 
foreign trade. Paragraph 15 established the basis for the dismantlement process and 
paragraph 19, stated the critical `first charge' principle. 33 
Prior to the Moscow and London CFM, the Allies had expressed their disagreements on 
economic principles at ACC level. The Coordinating Committee meetings reflected the 
divergence of views and interests of each of the Allies. When common import/export policy 
was discussed, Britain argued that a separate administration contradicted the spirit of 
Potsdam. France pressed for the formula of economic unity without central administrative 
bodies. The Soviet Union put an emphasis on reparations and on the importance of the 
zonal policies whilst the United States was concerned about the occupation costs burden on 
US taxpayers. 34 
From the very outset, France was against the establishment of central German institutions. 
On July 10,1945 the Political Department of the French Foreign Ministry produced a 
32 Section III 4 (b), Protocol of the Proceedings-Potsdam Conference, August 1,1945- 
http: //www. yale. edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade17. htm 
33 Section II B (14-15), Protocol of the Proceedings-Potsdam Conference, August 1,1945- 
http: //www. yale. edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade17. htm 
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memorandum, concluding that no consideration of economic nature ought to supersede 
political (and more specifically, security) considerations in regards to the possible 
dismemberment of Germany. The Memorandum recommended a permanent French 
presence in Germany, de facto zonal laissez-faire ('politique de zone'), de-prussianisation, a 
French presence in the Rhine and a special regime for the Ruhr. 3s 
On September 28,1945 the American, British and Soviet representatives to the ACC had 
agreed on a central German transport department under Allied control. France rejected the 
proposal, arguing that a centralised railways system would recreate the German war 
potential. The highways system would permit Germany to reorganise a paramilitary system 
of mobilisation. Furthermore, they suggested that the navigation of German rivers and 
canals should be placed under international control. 36 During the seventh ACC meeting 
General Pierre Koenig, head of the French occupation forces in Germany, deferred any 
agreements on transport on the grounds that the issue was linked to the question of the 
Ruhr and the Rhineland, to be decided at the London CFM. 37 In addition to this, France 
wanted to annex the Saar region, which was bound to cause a disruption in inter-zonal trade 
and reparations deliveries. France would agree to a German administration Department for 
zonal trade in order to encourage commerce, but not to a German-controlled administration 
agency. 38 
11 Murphy to Byrnes, May 2,1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol V, The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe, p, 
546-7 
35 Note from the Political Department to Bidault, July 10,1945-Documents Dijýlomatiques Franfais 1945, Tome II 
(1 er Julliet-31 Decembre) p. 62-9 
36 Paper submitted by the Allied Secretariat to the ACC, September 28,1945-FRUS, 1945, Vol. III, European 
Advisory commission; Austria; Germany, p. 841-2 
;7 Murphy to Byrnes, October 2,1945-FRUS, 1945, Vol III, European Advisory commission; Austria; Germany, p. 
842-5 
38 Murphy to Byrnes, April 14,1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol V, The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe, p, 
536-7 
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During the first two years of occupation the French zone achieved a trade surplus. The fact 
that the French zone was economically reconstituted faster than the other zones, explains 
the lack of willingness on the part of Paris to merge it with the other Western zones. The 
French stance socialised conflict to the extent that it provided the other Allies with an 
incentive for unilateral action. However, even a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the 
French would have not been able to restrain the enforcement of the superpowers' structural 
interests in their zones of occupation. 
The issue of economic unity was tackled at diplomatic level during the London CFM of 
September 1945 when Molotov reiterated Stalin's call for four-power control over the Ruhr, 
which the Western participants rejected. Equally, Molotov rejected the Western request for 
open access to the Soviet zone. 39 France expressed its reservations regarding a central 
German government on security grounds. The French also reinstated the view that, should a 
German central administration be constituted, the Ruhr region should be detached from its 
jurisdiction. 4" 
At the Paris CFM of July 1946, James Byrnes, US Secretary of State, hinted at a `Western 
Option', by promising the Saar region to the French and by threatening to re-organise the 
Western zones if four-power agreement could not be achieved. The Soviet Union rejected 
Byrnes proposal for a four-power treaty to keep Germany disarmed for 25 years, something 
which hints, according to Shlaim, at a Soviet refusal to acquiesce to US involvement in a 
39 Smyser, W. R., From Yalta to Berlin: the Cold War Struggle over Germany, p. 28 
"' French memorandum submitted to the London CFM September-October 1945, September 14,1945-From 
Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 66-8 
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European security structure. 41 Conversely, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, 
expressed his delight at the American proposal, stating that the treaty was `something which 
would give us peace in Europe, and allow for normal development over a sufficient period 
to eradicate the warlike spirit of Nazism in Germany'. 42 Bevin and Byrnes rejected 
Molotov's proposals for four-power control over the Ruhr. Bevin believed that Stalin would 
use its role in the Ruhr to control the economy of the British/Western zones. Bevin and 
Byrnes also proposed to unite the whole German economy in accordance with the Potsdam 
agreement. Molotov rejected it, not without emphasising support for German unity. The 
issue of reparations was also discussed, with Bevin and Byrnes arguing that the two countries 
were paying $520 million a year in order to feed the Germans because the Soviet zone 
withheld the food they produced. " Byrnes maintained that there would be no reparation 
deliveries until imports into the American zone were paid for. Meanwhile, Molotov 
confessed to Soviet removals in the Eastern zone and suggested a reduction of the 
reparations figures, subject to a fixed amount from equipment in the Ruhr. Byrnes was afraid 
that quarrels might develop if the Allies accepted this plan. 44 
Molotov stated that it would be `incorrect to adopt the line of annihilating Germany as a 
state, or of agrarianising her, with the destruction of her main industrial centres'. He also 
expressed the Soviet refusal to `federalise' Germany. Molotov stated that the Soviet Union 
41 Shlaim, A., The Partition of Germany and the origins of the Cold War, p. 123-135. See also From Yalta to Berlin: the 
Cold War Struggle over Germany, p. 68 
42 Extract from Bevin report before the House of Commons on the Paris CFM (April-July 1946), June 4,1946- 
Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 139-41 
43 Smyser, W. R., From Yalta to Berlin: the Cold War Struggle over Germany, p. 29 
44 Kuklick, B., American Policy and the Division of Germany, p. 152 
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did not intend to hinder the increase of industrial production provided the main industrial 
centres, like the Ruhr, would remain under inter-Allied supervision. 45 
Trachtenberg argues that the dispute over Iran and Turkey had influenced the American 
stance over the German Question. 46 Undoubtedly, by 1946 the spectrum of conflict was not 
limited to the treatment of the German Question. However, in order to secure a favourable 
reconfiguration of the post-war international order the superpowers needed to secure a 
foothold in Germany. Both `grand designs' ultimately hinged upon the superpowers' ability 
to enforce certain economic principles guiding the reconstitution of Germany. 
By 1946 Britain was in favour of a Western strategy, entailing the economic rehabilitation of 
Germany and an American presence in Europe. On March 15,1946, the Cabinet Committee 
summarised British interests in Europe according to the following criteria: `security from 
German aggression', `reasonable economic well-being for Germany and Europe', `restriction 
of Soviet influence as far East as possible' and `the recovery of France'. 4' The German 
Control Office was also in favour of the regeneration of German industry and a more 
independent attitude in the British zone of occupation pending a possible quadripartite 
agreement. 4$ The Cabinet paper of May 3,1946 established the policy of containment of 
Soviet influence in Germany as it hinted at the possibility of working `towards a Western 
German State or States which would be more amenable to [British] influence'. 49 
45 Extract from Molotov's statement to the Soviet press on the Paris CFM (April-July 1946)- May 27,1946- 
From Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 138-9 
46 Trachtenberg, M., Constructed Peace, p. 35. See also Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near Eart: great 
power conflict and diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton, N 
. 
J.: Princeton University Press) (1980) pp. 270- 
286,304-342 
47 GEN 121/1, March 11,1946, CAB 130/9 
48 Interdepartmental Meeting, April 3,1946, FO 945/16 
49 CP (46) 186, May 3,1946, CAB 129/9 
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In a statement before the House of Commons on October 22,1946, Bevin argued that 
Britain regarded a united effort by the four Powers `as being the most likely to produce the 
greatest stability' for Germany and that `whatever difference of opinion there might be as to 
the final settlement in Germany, the four Powers in occupation of Germany are joined by 
their determination to prevent any future German aggression'. Bevin also emphasised that 
Britain wanted to ensure that Germany would not become a `permanent distressed area in 
the centre of Europe, and that the Germans should have a proper and reasonable standard 
of living'. so 
The Paris CFM meetings culminated in a decision by the United States and Britain to devise 
the Western Option', whilst publicly proclaiming four-power unity over the German 
problem. 51 This volte face was further entrenched by Byrnes speech in Stuttgart on 
September 1946, where he stated in no ambiguous terms that the United States favoured the 
`economic unification of Germany'. If that would falter, the United States would move `to 
secure the maximum possible unification'. 52 America and Britain, while at odds with France 
on the question of central institutions and the removal of goods from their zone by way of 
reparations, " believed that the French left the door open for future agreement. 54 The 
Anglo-Americans look favourably on French claims to the Saar and engaged with Paris in 
negotiations regarding matters which extended beyond the German Question, like the 
50 Extract from a statement by Bevin concerning British policy on Germany, October 22,1946-From Documents 
on Germany under Occupation, p. 180-6 
51 Deighton, A., The Impossible Peace: Britain 
, 
the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War, p. 81 
52 Speech by US Secretary of State James Byrnes, Restatement of Policy on Germany, Stuttgart (Germany), 
September 6,1946- http"//usa. usembassy. de/etexts/ga4-460906. htm 
53 Acheson to the Secretary, June 20,1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, The British Commonwealth; Western and Central 
Europe, p, 570 
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Middle East. By August 1946, Bidault admitted that French policy on Germany had been a 
mistake, blaming it on De Gaulle and internal political reasons. Bidault hinted at a possible 
turning point after the upcoming elections. 55 However, as late as October 1946 France was 
still blocking uniform treatment of trade unions and political parties, giving the Soviet Union 
the chance to withhold approval at the ACC. 56 The French would adopt a Western- 
orientated approach from 1947 onwards, as the issues regarding the German Question were 
now considered within the context of a European system. American aid to France (agreed 
upon through the Blum-Byrnes Accord of 1946), the Marshall Plan and the establishment of 
common European institutions conducive to solving the economic crisis secured French 
bandwagoning into the Western option'. 
Meanwhile, no progress was being made at ACC level on the issue of economic principles. 
On April 1946 the Economic Directorate of the ACC discussed a paper on common import- 
export policy, which involved the question of reparations. The Soviet member argued that 
the `zonal problem' was not to be discussed until the stabilisation of the trade balance or 
until the reparations plan was completed. 57 By September 1946 the Soviet Union was 
justifying the lack of information on the dismantling of plants in its zone of occupation on 
the grounds that at the time of dismantling, the Soviet authorities did not have information 
regarding the presence of foreign interests in given enterprises. 58 
54 Murphy to the Secretary of State, July 20,1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, The British Commonwealth; Western and 
Central Europe, p, 580 
ss Caffery to the Secretary of State, August 30,1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, The British Commonwealth; Western and 
Central Europe, p, 596 
56 Murphy to the Secretary of State, October 25,1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, The British Commonwealth; Western 
and Central Europe, p, 629-30 
57 Murphy to Byrnes FRUS, 1946, Vol V, The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe, p. 538 
58 Dubrow (Charge in Moscow) to Byrnes, FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, The British Commonwealth; Western and Central 
Europe, p. 600-2 
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Clay suggested an increase on the amount of reparations to be taken from current 
production in order to stop the dismantling of plants. However, the official view of the 
American authorities was that if reparations from current production were to be increased, 
in ten years the Soviets would end up extracting more. S" American officials were aware of 
the fact that if reparations were to be taken from current production, German industry could 
run the risk of being under Soviet control, as in the case in Finland, Central Europe and the 
Balkans. 60 
At Clay's request, former US president Herbert Hoover was sent to Germany in 1946 to 
review the food situation. Hoover, in agreement with Clay, ordered larger food shipments to 
the occupation zones. However, even those proved inadequate during the bitter winter of 
1946-7, as railroads and canals froze and storage bins collapsed. The German ration sank to 
starvation levels with food riots taking place throughout the country. On February 28,1947 
Hoover delivered a report on German agriculture and food requirements, concluding that 
the United States would face `large expenditures of food to Germany for some years'. The 
Report concluded that the situation was not going to improve unless `the export industries 
of Germany can be sufficiently revived to pay for their own food'. " 
Clay warned Washington about the political fallout which could have been caused as the 
result of the food shortages. He convinced Truman to send Hoover to Germany again in 
March 1947. Hoover returned with a grim report and with a set of recommendations that 
fully supported Clay's views. On March 3,1947, he produced a third report on the necessary 
steps for the revival of German exports. Hoover outlined that export recovery was needed 
59 Caffery to Byrnes, FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe, p. 593-4 
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not only for economic purposes but also `as the first necessity of peace'. Hoover also stated 
that `the whole economy of Europe is interlinked with the German economy through the 
exchange of raw materials and manufactured goods' and that `the productivity of Europe 
cannot be restored without the restoration of Germany as a contributor to that productivity'. 
Hoover thought that the economic rehabilitation of Germany was the difference between 
the regeneration and degeneration of Europe. He also recommended halting the removals 
and destruction of plants, the industrial autonomy of Germany (in order to keep the Soviets 
away) and frowned upon a different regime for the Rhineland and the Ruhr. 62 
American thinking on Germany and Europe shifted decisively in the aftermath of the 
Moscow CFM. Marshall endorsed Hoover's proposals and supported a new and more 
61 generous US occupation doctrine, JCS 1179, which replaced JCS 1067 on July 11,1947. 
During the meetings between Clayton and British Cabinet members, Bevin and Hugh 
Dalton, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, emphasised the difficult situation of 
Britain. They also highlighted that money from the US loan were used in order to subsidise 
the German occupation. Bevin observed that the troubles in Germany stemmed from the 
unsettled level of industry and the dismantling of industrial plants. 64 During the second 
meeting Bevin asked for a more concise statement on the US attitude towards Europe and 
61 Herbert Hoover, The President's Economic Mission to Germany and Austria-Report no. 1-German 
Agriculture and Food Requirements-From the Truman Presidential Library files www. trumanlibrary. org 
62 Herbert Hoover, The President's Economic Mission to Germany and Austria-Report no. 3 
-The Necessary 
Steps for Promotion of German Exports, so as to relieve American taxpayers of the burdens of relief and for 
economic recovery of Europe-From Truman Library. From the Truman Presidential Library files- 
www. truma nlibrary. oorrg 
63 Smyser, W R, From Yalta to Berlin: the Cold War struggle over Germany., p. 50-1. 
64 Summary of the meeting between Clayton, the US Ambassador and members of the British Cabinet, June 24, 
1947. Deighton insists on the importance of the British influence in the shift of the American stance towards 
the German Question. Bevin and his officials knew that the Americans needed British leadership in Germany 
and Europe. The British were able to capitalise on the divisions in the American camp and solidified an 
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the Marshall Plan. Clayton replied that `Europe should explain why more progress has not 
thus far been made... [and that] European countries should set forth a statement. 
... 
of what 
they propose to do to help themselves'. " 
The foreign ministers met in Moscow in March-April 1947 in order to discuss the work done 
by the ACC on demilitarisation, denazification, democratisation, economic principles and 
reparations and the establishment of central administrations. The main purpose of the 
Moscow CFM was to conclude a peace treaty with Germany. However, by 1947 the 
demarcation lines had already been drawn. Bizonia was already operational and sovietisation 
was proceeding at full speed in the Eastern zone. Therefore, the main framework of action 
for the enforcement of the superpowers' structural interests was already setting the tone for 
polarisation in Germany and Europe. 
In the eve of the Moscow CFM, containment thinking prevailed amongst the US delegation. 
The impetus for the political amalgamation of the Western zones came from the military 
government, which was setting down stringent conditions for cooperation with the Soviets. 
Many of the policy-makers in charge of preparing the Moscow CFM were converting to the 
Kennan line and therefore deemed the possibility of a united Germany as undesirable. 66 
Trachtenberg argues that Marshall may have wanted to reach an agreement with the Soviets 
on the question of reparations from current production but the key point was that 
agreement should not increase the cost of financing essential exports to Germany. In the 
understanding with the US in spite of disagreements over Japan, China, Greece and dollar gap. See 
Deighton, 
A., The Impossible Peace:, p. 163 
65 Summary of Second Meeting between Clayton, the US Ambassador and members of the 
British Cabinet, 
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view of the State Department (and the British Foreign Office) as long as the German 
economy was in deficit, and as long as the Western powers had to bear the biggest share of 
this deficit, any increased production had to be sold abroad in order to pay for imports, cut 
the deficit and relieve the British and American taxpayers. Any arrangement that allowed 
goods to be sent to the Soviet zone before the trade account was balanced would mean that 
the economic burden of the western powers would be greater and Britain and the United 
States would be paying reparations for the Soviet Union. 67 Eisenberg maintains that the 
Anglo-American bloc wanted to set prohibitive conditions for Soviet cooperation and to 
proceed with bizonal arrangements. 68 The rationale against economic unity prevailing in the 
US camp seems to be in accordance with a Rationalist mindset. The demarcation of 
boundaries that the consolidation of polarisation offered was more attractive than the 
prospect of working on the possibility of quadripartite agreement. The possibility of four- 
power agreement could have been detrimental for the structural interests of the United 
States, which hinged upon the rehabilitation of Germany in order to secure a free-trade 
system of exchange in Europe. 
On February 1,1947, in preparation for the Moscow CFM, the French Government sent a 
memorandum to the Allied capitals, abandoning the idea of the separation of the Ruhr but 
putting forward a proposal to establish an international authority for the Ruhr and to 
limit 
their heavy production as well as supervise the distribution of energy resources. 
At the 
Moscow CFM Bidault justified this formula on security grounds, reparations and a balanced 
German budget. He argued that Germany should be forced to export a substantial part of 
its 
coal and steel production, which should not exceed the levelsimposed 
by the March 1946 
67 Trachtenberg, NI., Constructed Peace, p. 57-8 
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ACC Plan. Bidault also insisted on the establishment of inter-Allied agencies, the integration 
of the Saar into France and an inter-Allied regime for the Ruhr. The Anglo-Americans 
conceded on the Saar and on issues related to coal distribution. However, the 
implementation of the Marshall Plan would throw any French ambitions on German 
disarmament out of the window. 69 
During the eighth meeting of the Moscow CFM, Molotov stated that the Soviet Union 
`made no secret of the fact that it wanted reparation, or of the figure of reparation which it 
demanded, but it seemed that the Western powers were not interested'. He also stressed that 
the United States and Britain `received gold captured in the Western zone of Germany' and 
that ; they had received almost all German external assets, her commercial fleet, and valuable 
patents and inventions worth about 10 billion dollars' which constituted `reparation'. 
Molotov remarked that the French had received `reparation from current production in the 
form of coal and timber'. While Bidault seemed to acquiesce to Molotov's request, both 
Bevin and Marshall appeared to be dismissive of comments made by the Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs and refused to hear comments by the IARA representative. 70 
During the ninth meeting, Marshall reinstated the American position on the Yalta agreement 
on reparations, refusing to budge on reparation from current production on the grounds that 
it would reconstitute `German war potential'. " During the eighteenth meeting, the 
representatives tackled the treatment of Germany as an economic unit, reparations, level of 
industry and the demilitarisation of industry. Bidault stated that these issues could not be 
68 Eisenberg, C. W., Drawing the L&ze, p. 295 
69 Bitsch, M. T., Un Keve franfais. 
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discussed without settling the future of the Saar and the supply of German coal. Bevin read a 
statement outlining the British position, which basically revolved around the requirements of 
`freedom of movement in Germany for people, trade and ideas', `that the proceeds of all 
exports from current production and stocks should be devoted in the first place to defray 
the costs of German imports', `an equitable sharing.... of the financial burden already 
incurred' and the `establishment of central administrations'. Bevin also reminded the 
representatives of the Soviet conditions for economic unity, which he found unacceptable: 
the annulment of Bizonia, four power control of the Ruhr and reparations from current 
production. At the same time, Molotov reinstated the case for the Potsdam provision to 
grant the Soviet Union $10 billion in reparations. However, he underlined that the Soviet 
delegation wished for `an agreement suitable to all'. 72 
During an informal meeting, Marshall reminded the delegations that neither Potsdam nor 
the level of industry agreement of March 1946 had provided for reparations from current 
production. Molotov stated that the Soviet delegation could agree to the British proposal on 
reparations in the form of steel production of up to 10 tons per annum. However, when 
asked by Marshall, he reiterated that on top of reparations from current production the 
Soviet Union desired reparations in the form of removal of plants. Meanwhile, Bidault 
reiterated the French case for a compensatory mechanism between an increase in the level of 
industry and the question of the Saar and coal supply. 73 
71 Ninth meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, March 18,1947- FO 371/64206, p. 57 
72 Eighteenth meeting of the CFM, March 31,1947- FO 371 /64206, p p. 78-84 
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On the 215` meeting of the Moscow CFM the Allies agreed on the setting of German central 
ddministrative agencies and a German Advisory Council. The French however, made 
agreement on these matters provisional until the Allies could determine the definite borders 
of Germany and the permanent status of the Saar, the Ruhr and the Rhineland. " 
The Allies seemed to agree on the establishment of a provisional government. Molotov 
pressed for representatives of political parties, trade unions and anti-Fascist organisations to 
be included in the provisional government. Bevin commented that there was general 
agreement on the issue of the provisional government but that the issue was subject to 
agreement on economic principles. 75 On the twenty-third meeting Molotov argued that the 
Länder could not possibly be left in charge of administering issues such as state security and 
reparations. Bidault remarked that the question of reparations should be decided by the ACC 
and that France would not agree to a German state security service. 76 
On the twenty-fifth meeting Bidault reiterated the French position on a special regime for 
the Ruhr and the Rhineland in view of its `unique concentration of mining and industrial 
resources'. Bevin disagreed, arguing that such a regime would involve the dismemberment of 
Germany. " On the twenty-sixth session Marshall stressed that although the United States 
favoured quadripartite control over the whole of Germany, they did not agree on granting a 
special regime to the Ruhr. 78 
7; Proceedings of the fourth plenary session of the CFM, March 10-April 
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Trachtenberg argues a unified Germany was not a particularly attractive proposition for the 
Western power, s for if that entity was weak it would be prone to be influenced by the Soviet 
Union. If strong, it could play east against west and be a threat to peace. Trachtenberg also 
maintains that the Western powers did not seek to sabotage the Moscow CFM but they did 
not want to pay too much of a price for the success of the conference. ' 
In mid-April Marshall told Stalin that the United States wanted economic unity and not a 
centralised government which would endanger the international order. Marshall assured 
Stalin that America did not want to convert the Soviet Union to the capitalist credo. 
Washington's intention was to rehabilitate the European countries ravaged by the war. Stalin 
pressed Marshall on the issue of reparations (arguing that only $2 billion had been received 
so far) but remained `optimistic' on the possibility of four power agreement. 80 In a 
broadcast made in the aftermath of the Moscow CFM on April 24,1947 Marshall 
maintained `no reparations from current production were contemplated by the Potsdam 
agreement'. The Secretary of State stated that 
the United States has indicated that it would be willing to study the possibility of a limited amount of 
reparations from current production to compensate for plants previously scheduled to be removed 
... 
it being understood that deliveries from current production are not to increase the financial 
burden of the occupying powers or to retard the repayment to them of the advances they have made 
to keep the German economy from collapsing. The Soviet government has made no response to this 
suggestion. 81 
11 Trachtenberg, M., Constructed Peace, p. 60 
80 Eisenberg, C. W., Dralving the &'ne, p. 306 
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Eisenberg argues that once the Americans had decided not to compromise on the issue of 
reparations from current production, there was no prospect of a four power deal. The failure 
to achieve a consensus was conducive to the partition of Germany. 82 The `grand design' 
rationale prevailed in Marshall's thinking. In his report to the American people on the 
outcome of the Moscow CFM, Marshall referred to Germany as the `vital centre', to be 
rehabilitated by the ERP. In an address of November 18,1947 Marshall was unequivocal: 
`the restoration of Europe involves the restoration of Germany. Without revival of 
Germany's economy there can be no revival of Europe's economy'. 83 
The failure on the part of the Allies to achieve unity on economic principles at the Moscow 
CFM would trigger more unilateral action at zonal level. The Allies agreed on a revised plan 
for the level of industry in the Anglo-American Zones on August 29,1947 in order `to retain 
sufficient capacity in the bizonal area to approximate the level of industry prevailing in 
Germany in 1936'. The plan established that `the bizonal area must be prepared to exchange 
in foreign trade proportionately larger quantities of industrial products in return for 
necessary food and raw material imports'. It also provided that `sufficient capacity will be 
retained to produce RM 500 million, which is about 80% of pre-war production' leaving 
`35% of the present capacity to be removed as reparations as against 60% under the previous 
plan'. The Anglo-Americans estimated the capacity in the bizonal area to be about RM 1,195 
million. The revised plan established that capacity was to be retained to produce RM 916 
81 General Marshall broadcast of April 24,1947-From Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54, p. 219-227 
82 Eisenberg, C. W., Drawing the line, p. 302 
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million (119% of pre-war production), leaving 23% of present estimated capacity available 
for reparations, as compared with 33% under the old plan'. " 
The Moscow CFM was influential in consolidating the transition to a bipolar solution for the 
German Question. The lack of progress at the Moscow CFM and the simultaneous process 
of polarisation taking place in the occupation zones rendered impossible the continuation of 
the illusion of unity. Success at the Moscow CFM would have been more daunting for the 
United States and the Soviet Union than the actual failure to achieve an agreement on 
economic issues. A modicum of success would have reversed Bizonia, delayed the 
implementation of the ERP and therefore put further constrains on the rehabilitation of 
Germany and Europe according to the `grand design' rationale. At the same time, agreement 
would have left Moscow with less leeway to pursue their objectives in Eastern Europe, as a 
united Germany could have resulted in the reversal of polarisation in the Continent. This 
would have entailed a retreat from the political foothold created by the Red Army's march 
into Central Europe. 
In any case, nothing fortuitous occurred at the Moscow CFM. The diplomacy of the 
German Question followed a logical and Rationalist path. The United States ensured that 
there would be no agreement on economic principles, therefore acting on the premises 
imposed by the `grand design' thinking. For the Soviet Union, reparations became the 
political tool for the continuation of the sovietisation of the Eastern zone and the creation of 
a Moscow-orientated bloc in Eastern Europe. The breakdown at the Moscow CFM marked 
the grand entrance of the United States and the Soviet Union in the political, economic and 
84 Revised Plan for the Level of Industry in the Bizonia, August 29,1947-From Documents on Germany under 
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military affairs of the continent of Europe for the next 40 years. This influence, which began 
with their involvement in the treatment of the German Question, would have an important 
milestone in the breakdown of inter-Allied negotiations at Moscow for it would prompt the 
consolidation of polarisation and bloc-formation in Germany and Europe. At the Moscow 
CFM, the Allies were faced with the prospect of a permanent marriage over Germany. The 
dangers inherent in such a marriage were more clear and present than the possibility of 
future gains offered by economic unity. 
During the London CFM, which took place between November 25 and December 15 1947, 
the issue of German unity was again at the forefront of the discussion. During the tenth 
meeting of the London CFM on December 5,1947, the question of economic principles was 
tackled. Marshall pressed on the need to create the necessary conditions for the economic 
unity of Germany. Molotov understood that the American proposal consisted in the 
abolition of the zones of occupation in Germany and the free flow of goods before any 
central government could be established. Molotov pointed out that the Harriman Report 
indicated that a German government could be started in the Western zones. Molotov 
stressed that the US delegation was not interested in an all German government and any 
interest they were displaying at the conference `was only for the sake of formality and 
convenience'. He also pointed out that the other occupying powers had rejected his proposal 
that no government should be set up in any of the four zones. 85 
Molotov concluded that `economic unity could only be expected if the provisions of the 
Potsdam Agreement were fulfilled and the German people were permitted to participate 
in 
Occupation 1945-54, p. 239-45 
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[the] rehabilitation [of Germany]'. Molotov also stated that the German people should be 
given a say in the economic rehabilitation of Germany, whose industrial production was 35% 
of what it was in 1938.86 Marshall retorted by saying that there were no differences between 
his views and those of the Harriman Report: the United States insisted that there could be 
no German Government without economic unity. Marshall also said that the reason behind 
the lack of economic unity was the steady resistance of the Soviet representative each time. 87 
Bevin reminded Molotov that since the London CFM of 1945 Britain had expressed the 
view that Germany `should be made to pay its way, and not be a burden upon the Allies'. He 
also mentioned, in regards to reparations, that German industry should not be allowed to 
develop in a way to threaten security, as it occurred following the aftermath of World War 
One. $a 
During the eleventh meeting of London CFM Molotov proposed the establishment of 
central German Departments, the free flow of goods (linked to the dissolution of fusion 
agreements) and pressed on the question of reparations and the removal of zonal barriers. 89 
In addition, the Soviets also put forward a proposal for the quadripartite control of the Ruhr, 
financial reform, the expansion of German exports, decartelisation and the end of fusion 
agreements. The Soviet delegation still insisted on the sum of $10 billion in terms of 
reparations (to be taken from current production). They also proposed that removals from 
the Western zones should be completed by the end of 1948 and asked for the re- 
establishment of IARA. The Soviets did however agree to an upward revision to the level of 
s' Minutes of the tenth meeting of the London CFM, December 5,1947- FO 371/64646 
86 Molotov statement at the 10th meeting of the London CFM 1947- F0371/64646 pp. 3-4 and p. 6 
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industry as soon as reparations deliveries were fulfilled. The Soviets also produced a 
statement denouncing the Frankfurt set-up and Western Germany, especially the Ruhr, as a 
base for the domination of Europe. 90 
Meanwhile, Marshall, Bevin and Bidault agreed on the fact that the reconstruction of 
Germany would not take precedence over the reconstruction of the `democratic countries of 
Europe'. 91 In the final session, Molotov voiced a request by the `People's Congress' in Berlin 
for a hearing. This request was duly rejected by the other members. 92 
Marshall's statement (proposing the adjournment of the London session of the CFM), 
concluded that the ministers have been `unable to agree on what [they] mean by Germany'. 
He cited Soviet insistence on the issue of reparations, reluctance to furnish information 
about reparations removal and how these practices in the Soviet Zone `prevented Germany 
from playing its part in the recovery of Europe'. Marshall also stated that `true political and 
economic unity would require a free movement of goods, persons and ideas throughout 
Germany and the establishment of a rule of law and political freedom which the occupying 
powers themselves would respect'. 93 
The lack of agreement over the economic principles involved in a peace treaty with 
Germany is an example of how conflict was socialised through diplomatic interaction. By 
adapting to the evolving political circumstances, which resulted from superpower interaction 
in Germany, Moscow and Washington created the conditions for partition. While structural 
interests created certain norms of behaviour on the part of the superpowers, they did not 
90 Minutes of the 12th meeting of the London CFM 1947- F0371/64646 
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specifically prescribe the division of Germany. The road to polarisation in Germany and 
Europe was paved through the constant probing of each other's intentions at occupation 
and diplomatic level. The issue of economic principles had profound political implications. 
Failure to achieve agreement would signal the dismemberment of Germany according to the 
demarcation lines imposed by the zones of occupation. Quadripartite agreement at the 
Moscow and London CFM would have produced unknown effects on the stability of the 
post-war international order. Allowing the Soviet Union to have access to the Ruhr and to 
take reparations from current production from the Western zones would have created a 
situation capable of disrupting the American `grand design' for Germany and Europe. 
Making concessions on the terms of economic unity would have left the Soviet Union in a 
position of disadvantage vis-ä-vis the United States and ultimately deprive Moscow of its 
foothold in Germany, which could have meant a withdrawal from Eastern Europe and a 
reversal of its own `grand design'. 
A quadripartite solution to the German Question would have created the illusion of peace in 
Europe. This would have resulted in a potentially devastating conflict between the two 
superpowers. For the Soviet Union, the issue of reparations became the interactive element 
which would determine how its structural interests would be accomplished. Ultimately, the 
taking of reparations from the individual zones of occupation helped to establish clear 
boundaries and determine an expeditious and effective course of action. The Soviet demands 
on reparations put the question of German unity in serious doubt from the very beginning. 
Nevertheless, agreement would have prolonged and exacerbated a very tense situation that 
was taken the course of partition at zonal level. From the American perspective, an 
92 Foreign Office minutes of the 17th meeting of the London CFM 1947- FO371/64646 
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agreement on economic unity would have entailed the possibility of a Soviet foothold in the 
whole of Germany. Accordingly, lack of agreement on economic principles provided the 
United States with the perfect excuse to pursue the rehabilitation of Western Germany and 
Western Europe. For the Soviets, four-power agreement on the German Question would 
have meant the possibility of losing their security foothold not only in Germany but also in 
Central and Eastern Europe. It is generally recognised that next to the establishment of four 
zones of occupation, the setting of a zonal reparations plan was the most important step on 
the road to the division of Germany. 94 From this perspective, conflict between the 
superpowers was to a great extent restrained by the legal framework provided by the 
occupation zones. Failure to achieve agreement on economic principles provided the Allies 
with the opportunity to enforce an orderly divorce. This would allow the superpowers to 
work within clearly-demarcated boundaries and impose a balance of power system based on 
coexisting spheres of influence. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The political and economic organisation of the zones of occupation was implemented 
according to the national interest of the occupying powers. This selfish solidarism created 
the conditions for the establishment of a post-war international order socialised to a great 
extent by the treatment of the German Question. This socialisation unfolded within the 
boundaries established by superpower intervention but nevertheless, in adherence to the 
principle of coexistence. Intervention was exercised by the United States and the Soviet 
Union in order to enforce bottom line interests, but within the self-imposed Rationalist 
93Marshall statement, December 15,1947- From Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54, p. 261-3 
172 
elements of legality and diplomacy. The gradual breakdown of the practical association 
prompted the organisation of the Eastern zone according to the diktat of Moscow; and a 
growing interaction between London and Washington in order to achieve the rehabilitation 
of the Anglo-American zones. Whilst Moscow was sovietising the Eastern zone of 
occupation (as well as creating a political foothold in Central and Eastern Europe) the 
United States worked on the establishment of Bizonia and forged ahead with the creation of 
free-market economic order in Western Europe. 
The dissolution of the practical association in the aftermath of the Moscow and London 
CFMs stemmed from the organisation of the zones of occupation according to the national 
interest of the superpowers and would serve as a catalyst for the creation of the post-war 
international order. The sovietisation of Central and Eastern Europe was by no means 
complete during 1945-6. Meanwhile, the foundations of a `sphere of influence' in the 
Continent were created in the zone occupied by the Soviet Union in Germany. The 
sovietisation of one third of Germany was completed before the consolidation of the Soviet 
foothold in Central and Eastern Europe. Simultaneously, Bizonia paved the way for the 
creation of a `Western policy' for Germany, the economic rehabilitation of the Anglo- 
American zones, and the configuration of a `Western bloc' in Europe. 
While these developments created a nascent international order based on confrontation and 
mutual distrust between the superpowers, they also became a Rationalist response to the resolution 
of the German problem. While the sovietisation of the Eastern Zone and the setting of Bizonia 
contributed to the division of the continent and to the polarisation between the West and 
94 Backer, J. H., The Decision to Divide Germany: American Foreign Policy in Transition, p. 90-1 
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the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it also avoided an all out war over Germany. The 
Neorealist account on the structuralisation of conflict does not necessarily contradict the 
Wendtian perspective applied to the conflictual aspects of the treatment of the German 
Question. Conflict over the treatment of the German Question and the making of the post- 
war international order was socialised through the implementation of the superpowers' 
structural interests. However, the careful orchestration and the enforcement of these 
interests unfolded within the same parameters that sustained the wartime associative 
framework. The legal provisions endorsed by the Allies at Potsdam enabled the parties 
involved in the treatment of the German Question to enforce their interests in non- 
disruptive manner. The political and economic rehabilitation of the zones of occupation, 
well under way when the Allies met at the Moscow CFM, provided with a carefully 
constructed setting for a neat breakdown of four-power control over Germany. 
The bipolar solution to the treatment of the German Question and the establishment of the 
post-war international order socialised the conflictual elements of superpower interaction. 
The political and economic organisation of occupied Germany dealt the final blow to four- 
power agreement over Germany and paved the way for its partition into two states: West 
Germany, modeled along capitalist and liberal democratic lines and East Germany, organised 
along the political and economic lines imposed by Moscow. Two socio-economic systems 
confronted each other on the question of the political and economic organisation of 
Germany. However, this confrontation would entail the formation of two blocs that would 
gradually give meaning and order not only to the German Question but to the nascent post- 
war international order as a whole. The conflict that stemmed from the treatment of the 
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German Question had the consequence of creating a balance of power system based on 
coexisting spheres of influence. 
The interaction between the pursuit of the national interest and the respect for the 
Rationalist rules of superpower engagement escapes the interpretative framework imposed 
by classical Realism, with its view of politics in terms of the pursuit of power and self- 
interest and its lack of identification with moral aspirations. 95 The enormity of the task 
undertaken by the two emerging superpowers during World War Two and the relative 
inexperience of the United States and the Soviet Union in the management of the 
international system, coupled with the Rationalist constraints imposed by superpower 
interaction, restrained their capacity to act exclusively out of national interest concerns and 
qualified the anarchic condition of the nascent post-war international order. Superpower 
interaction unfolded within `pluralist plus' parameters. Superpower intervention over the 
German Question resulted in the enforcement of bottom line interests. However, this 
interventionist drive would be restrained by the configuration of a post-war international 
order based on coexistence. 
Waltz argues that the rules of behaviour create `sameness' in the international order, as states 
have to conform to these rules by simple involvement in the system. This in turn produces a 
tendency to balance and a socialisation in the system. 96 In addition, the social theory of 
conflict espoused by Wendt brings an added dimension to the debate on how the treatment 
of the German Question influence the breakdown of relations between the superpowers, not 
necessarily divorced from the structural perspective. In fact, in response to Wendt's 
9' Morgenthau, H., Po§ticr Among Nations-The Struggle for Power and Peace (McGraw Hill: 1993), p. 4-13 
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arguments, Suganami has argued that states and system cultures are two descriptions of the 
same thing. 97 
The socially-constructed dimension of conflict over Germany can be linked to the post- 
revisionist view on the origins of the Cold War. An examination of the socialisation of 
conflict can be useful in order to arrive at a more comprehensive explanation on the 
outcome of the German Question and the origins of the Cold War, inasmuch as it allows us 
to determine the way in which contingent elements interacted in order to help Moscow and 
Washington accomplish of their structural goals. The issue of German economic unity was 
exploited by the superpowers in order to enforce a specific outcome and create a definite 
identity in the post-war international order. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union 
could have been satisfied with keeping Germany united. A united Germany would have 
meant the possibility of superpower intervention beyond the respective areas of interest and 
the subsequent end to an international order based on coexistence. This would have also 
entailed the possibility of failing to achieve their structural interests in Germany and Europe. 
The fact that conflict evolved as a social construction can explain why the breakdown of 
four-power control over Germany did not result in disruptive conflict. Wendt treats states as 
intentional actors or `people' and see the international system as anarchic, with its structure 
defined in cultural rather than material terms. The culture of the international system can 
take at least three different forms (Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian) depending on whether 
states constitute each other as enemies, rivals, or friends. " This fits an English School 
interpretation inasmuch as the elements of legality and diplomacy tempered the blind pursuit 
97 See Forum on Social Theory, Review of International Studies (2000) 
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of the national interest by the superpowers in the enforcement of their structural interests in 
the treatment of the German Question. Conflict was socialised in such way that the ordering 
principles of the process of polarisation served to re-shape the international political system 
according to the primary institutions of intervention and coexistence. 
Wight defines diplomacy `as the system and the art of communication between powers'. 
Wight also argued that the diplomatic system is `the master-institution of international 
relations'. 99 Der Derian describes diplomatic culture as `the mediation of estrangement by 
symbolic power and social constraints. ""' He also states that `what gives definition to a 
diplomatic system. 
. 
is not the structure itself, but the conflicting relations which maintain, 
reproduce, and sometimes transform it. ' "" The restraining factor in the unfolding of 
conflict and ultimate breakdown of relations over the treatment of the German Question 
was the diplomatic and legal interaction between the superpowers "" and the construction of 
a balance of power system based on coexistence. 
The basic principle involved in a balancing of political power, as David Hume highlighted, `is 
no more than a precept of commonsense, born of experience and the instinct of self- 
preservation'. 103 Oppenheim describes it as the equilibrium between the various powers 
which form the family of nations and `essential to the very existence of any international 
98 See Wendt, A., Social Theory of International Politics 
'9 In the chapter on international society, he writes that `The institutions of international society are according 
to its nature. We may enumerate them as diplomacy, alliances, guarantees, war and neutrality'. See Wight, W., 
Power Politics (1979) p. 111 
100 Der Derian, James On Diplomacy, p 42 
101 Der Derian, James, On Diplomacy. A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell)(1987), p 106 
102 Somewhat ironically, the works on the history of diplomacy in the thirty years since the original series of 
English School works appeared, have not been written by members of the English School, but by scholars who 
do not refer to it or who have been openly critical to it. See Berridge, G., Diplomacy-Theory and Practice (London: 
Prentice Hall) (1995), Anderson, M. S., The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919 (London: Longman and 
Hamilton) (1993) Langhorne, K. and R., The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration (London: Routledge) (1995) 
103 Hume, D., Essay on the Balance of Power, lib. i. cap. 83 
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law'. In the absence of a central authority, the only sanction behind the code of rules 
established by custom or defined in treaties, known as `international law', is the capacity of 
the powers to hold each other in check. 114 To Butterfield, the growth of human insight into 
the workings of the balance of power are closely linked to the workings of diplomatic 
interaction as `an international order is not a thing bestowed upon by nature, but is a matter 
of refined thought, careful contrivance and elaborate artifice' pos 
By examining the diplomacy over the German Question, we are able to put the interpretative 
emphasis back on superpower interaction and add a different dimension on the 
orthodox /revisionist debate on the origins of the Cold War. The diplomatic and legal 
interaction that arose from the treatment of the German Question created a particular type 
of balance of power. The balance of power created through the lack of agreement on 
economic principles and the reorganisation of the occupation zones had the ultimate effect 
of managing conflict and restraining it to the strict enforcing of structural interests. As we 
will see in chapter 4, this balance of power system would have a significant impact on the 
creation of an international political system sustained through the institutions of intervention 
and coexistence. 
104 Oppenheim, L., International. Law,: a treatise, (London, 1920-21), p. 73- 
http: //gallica bnf fr/ark: /12148/bpt6k93562g 
105 Butterfield H., The Balance of Power' in Wight M. and Butterfield H., (eds. ) Diplomatic Investigations. Essays in the 
Theory of International Politics (London: Unwin) (1966), pp. 132-148 
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Chapter 4 
The German Question and the `primary institutions' of the post-war international 
order 
4.1 The English School's concept of `primary institutions' and the German Question 
The interaction between conflict, cooperation and legality in the treatment of the German 
Question assisted the formation of the `primary institutions' which sustained the post-war 
society of states. The concept of `primary institutions' constitutes a central element in the 
English School of thinking. Wight postulates that `the institutions of international society are 
according to its nature', ' which implies that these institutions will be different from one 
type of international society to another. Wight enumerates the primary institutions of the 
international society of the first half of the twentieth century, as `diplomacy, alliances, 
guarantees, war and neutrality'. 2 Bull updated and expanded the concept with his set of five 
institutions of international society, consisting of diplomacy, international law, the balance of 
power, war, and the role of great powers. 3 The malleability of the concept is exposed by 
Buzan, who states that `primary institutions' are durable and recognised practises structured 
around `shared values 
... 
held by members of international societies, and embodying a mix of 
norms, rules and principles'. Buzan also argues that `primary institutions' are neither 
permanent nor fixed and that they will typically undergo `a historical pattern of rise, 
I Wight M., Poorer Politics, p. 111 
2 Wight M., Power Politics, p. 111-2 
3 Bull H., The Anarchical Society, pp. 101-229 
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evolution and decline'. ` Mayall highlights the historical context of the development of 
primary institutions. Mayall states that some of these institutions (sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and non-intervention) have been around since the beginning of the modem states- 
system, with others (self-determination, human rights etc) having been added more recently. 
5 
The general context of inter-Allied relations was conducive to the transformation of the 
international political system and the fostering of coexistence. Pivotal to this process was the 
high level of legal and diplomatic cooperation between the superpowers which, as seen in 
chapter 1, stemmed from the wartime practical association. ' World War Two produced an 
extension of international society, as manifested in the expansion of international regimes 
and the ever-increasing role of the United Nations. 
During the war, there was an intense debate on international and European organisation. In 
1943, the State Department set up the Political Committee for the study of the future peace, 
which consisted of up to 40 members, including international relations experts as well as 
senators and House representatives. The `Committee' was subdivided into sections, 
including the Political Sub-Committee, headed by Hull and Welles, the Security Sub- 
Committee, headed by Norman Davies, the Territorial Problems Sub-Committee chaired by 
Isaiah Bowman, the International Organisation Sub-Committee, headed by Welles, the Legal 
Sub-Committee headed by Green Hackworth, and the European Federation Sub- 
I Buzan, B., From International Society to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of GlobaCuation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (2004), p. 181 
5 Mayall, J., World Politics: Progress and its Limits. (2000) p. 149-50 
6 See pp. 36-43 
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Committee, headed by Hamilton Fish Armstrong. ' During 1942-3, the State Department's 
Political Committee drafted plans for international organisation and by March 1943, a 
preliminary draft on a United Nations charter was sketched by Clark Eichelberger. The draft 
called for international organisation based on `international law and morality'. $ 
The post-war policy machinery set up by the US State Department tackled the issue of 
colonialism. By 1942, Secretary of State Cordell Hull was pressing for the setting of 
timetables to increase self-government in all dependent territories and outright independence 
for the most advanced colonies. On March 9,1943, the Far Eastern Division of the US State 
Department headed by Stanley Hornbeck produced a draft known as the `Declaration of 
National Independence', formulating what appeared to be a Pacific Charter/World Charter. 
By October 1942, the Sub-Committee on International Organisation produced a full draft on 
international trusteeship for non-self governing peoples. 10 
The Atlantic Charter declared that the signatories would `respect the right of all peoples to 
choose the form of government under which they will live'. Churchill subsequently claimed 
that this would apply only to those countries under Nazi occupation, rather than the British 
Empire. However, the Indian legislative assembly passed a resolution stating that the 
Atlantic Charter should also apply to Britain's most important colony. 
The UN Charter would include a statement on equal rights and self-determination. 
The 
process of decolonisation would gain new impetus following the aftermath of the war, 
Eichelberger, C., Organitiing for Peace. a personal history of the founding of the United Nations, p. 
199 
8 Eichelberger, C., Organitiing for Peace, p. 201-2 
9 Roger, W. L., Imperialism at bay, 1941-1945: the United States and the decolonization of the 
British Empire., p. 176-8 
10 Roger, W. L., Imperialism at by, p. 183 
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beginning with the independence of Pakistan and India from Britain in 1947 and the First 
Indochina War. 
The economic and political dislocation brought about by the war prompted the setting of 
European federation schemes. Just before the German invasion of France, the British 
Cabinet proposed the establishment of a Franco-British Union. The London Inter-Allied 
Conference of September 24,1941, established the framework for the setting of federative 
schemes, including the Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation Agreement of January 25,1941 
and the Greek-Yugoslav agreement for a Balkan Union of January 15,1942. Article 5 of the 
Anglo-Soviet Treaty of May 26,1942 provided with the framework for political and 
economic cooperation on a pan-European level. After the war, the process of integration on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain would unfold in accordance with the spheres of influence 
system. In this process, both the elements of intervention and coexistence collided in the 
formation of the post-war international order. 
The Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), established at the Potsdam Conference, also 
contributed to the resolution of important issues regarding the post-war international order. 
The Moscow CFM of December 1945 tackled issues like the establishment of an Allied Far 
Eastern Commission Council for Japan, the situation in Korea, China, Romania, Bulgaria, 
and the possibility of setting a UN commission for the control of atomic energy. 
The Far Eastern Commission (FEC) formulated policies for Japan, to be fulfilled under the 
terms of surrender. The FEC consisted of thirteen members. Decisions were taken by a 
majority vote, but the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China retained the power 
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of veto. Between July 10,1947 and December 23,1948 the FEC made thirteen policy 
decisions which fell into three categories: disarmament, democratisation and economic 
recovery. 
At the New York CFM of December 1946 the Allies drafted preliminary plans for a peace 
settlement with Austria and Germany. At the Paris and New York CFM the Allies 
completed peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Finland. The treaties 
(signed in Paris on February 10,1947) enabled the former Axis powers to reassume their 
responsibilities as sovereign states and to qualify for membership in the United Nations. 
The settlement elaborated in the peace treaties included payment of war reparations, 
commitment to minority rights and territorial adjustments, including the end of the Italian 
colonial empire in Africa and changes to the Italian-Yugoslav, Hungarian-Slovak, Romanian- 
Hungarian, Soviet-Romanian, Bulgarian-Romanian, French-Italian and Soviet-Finnish 
frontiers. 
The setting of the United Nations gave new impetus to the idea of world organisation. The 
stated aims of the United Nations were `to maintain international peace and security, to 
safeguard human rights, to provide a mechanism for international law [and] to promote 
social and economic progress. ' " 
This framework of coexistence helped to transform the international political system. 
Although these developments unfolded independently from the treatment of the German 
Question, the need to achieve an international framework of coexistence stemmed from the 
cataclysm brought upon the international political system by the Nazi revisionist challenge. 
r " See UN Charter http: //%v-, vA,. tin. org/aboutun/-charte 
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The revisionist challenge launched by Nazi Germany created an overhaul in the structure of 
international society. The superpowers' influence regarding the treatment of the German 
Question and the reconfiguration of international society gave a new dimension to the role 
of `primary institutions'. The transformative nature of the involvement of the United States 
and the Soviet Union in World War Two generated a renewed concept of behaviour in the 
international political system. The disruption to inter-state relations caused by the Nazi 
invasion of Western and Eastern Europe prompted the intervention of the United States and 
the Soviet Union in the war effort and the realignment of the international order. 
Washington sustained the war effort financially, militarily and diplomatically on a scale 
unprecedented in the history of military alliances. This intervention created a situation of 
decisive action in Germany and a permanent involvement of the United States in European 
affairs, which would entail the political emasculation of Germany and Europe and the 
creation of a Western bloc. At the same time, the Soviet intervention in the war was crucial 
in the defeat of Nazi Germany, as no other major ally engaged Germany in the same 
magnitude as the Red Army. 12 The enormity of this enterprise created a new political 
mindset amongst the Soviet leadership. The devastation caused by the Nazi invasion would 
be the main informant of Soviet policy following the aftermath of World War Two. This 
prompted Moscow's encroachment into Germany as well as Central and Eastern Europe. 
12 Overy describes the Soviet war effort as `an incomparable achievement, world-historical in a very real sense'. 
See Overy, R, Russia's War, p. 327. Russian deaths in the Great Patriotic War exceed 27 million (40% of all the 
people killed during World War Two). These included at least 7 million civilians and 3.25 million soldiers who 
died in captivity. The Soviet military effort accounts for most of the 3.25 million German military fatalities 
during the war. A further 3 million German troops were captured by the Soviets. German losses in the Eastern 
Front accounted for 10 million killed, missing, wounded or captured and the loss of equipment to 48,000 tanks, 
167,000 artillery pieces and nearly 77,000 aircraft. See Duffy, C., Red Storm on the Reich-The Soviet March on 
Germany, 1945 (Routledge: London) (1991), p. 3. See also, Merridale, C., Ivan's War the Red Army 1939-1945 
(Faber and Faber: London) (2005) 
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It is through the treatment of the German Question that both intervention and coexistence 
became the primary institutions of the Cold War international order. The German Question 
affected the diplomatic interaction of the Allies as well as the legal principles that derived 
from it, compelling the superpowers to search for an equilibrium in which the pursuit of the 
national interest would not preclude the recognition of spheres of influence. In this context, 
the typical notions attached to the concept of `primary institutions' by the English School 
scholarship cannot fully explain the main informative aspects of the Cold War. While 
diplomacy, international law and the balance of power became instruments of 
transformation, it would be the elements of intervention and coexistence what would give 
the Cold War international order its ultimate shape. 
World War Two prompted the reconstitution of international society. This reconstitution 
was based on a stronger emphasis on intervention and the coexistence of diverse ideologies 
sharing the aim of preserving the international order. It has been argued that war derives its 
legitimacy from the service it renders to the society of states. '3 When World War Two 
became global and therefore affected the international political system as a whole, it took the 
significance of an `epochal war'. 14 World War Two propelled the Allies to create a new 
international order based on a new legal framework aimed not only at quashing the Axis' 
revisionist drive but also at filling the legal and political vacuum of the interwar period. This 
created the conditions for the intervention of the United States and the Soviet Union in the 
remaking of the society of states. The bipolar reality of the post-war international order 
compelled them to achieve a balance of power based on the coexistence of ideologies. This 
13 Anderson K, and Hurrell A., Hedley Bull on international society (Basingstoke: Macmillan) (1999), p. 101 
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chapter now expands on how the treatment of the German Question contributed to create 
these `primary institutions' and the effect that they would both have in the unfolding of the 
Cold War international order. 
4.2 Intervention as a primary institution of the post-war international order 
Intervention became a primary institution of the post-war international order because of the 
decisive input that the Allies had in achieving a bipolar solution for the German Question 
and the way that this affected the formation of spheres of influence. The policy of 
unconditional surrender, agreed upon by the Allies at the Casablanca Conference in January- 
February 1943, meant that the political future of Germany would be the pivotal element in 
the shaping of the post-war international society. The occupation of a defeated nation had 
little precedent in the modern history of the international political system. This kind of 
intervention indicated the conunitment of the victors to transform Germany, and in the 
process, to a radically changed international order. '5 Although the Allies had different 
interests in regards to Germany, in order to attain them, they were compelled to maintain the 
ethical and functional cohabitation of the wartime years. A more integrated world and the 
emergence of two blocs meant the possibility of intervention like never before in 
international history. 
14 Bobbit defines an `epochal war' as `a war that challenges and ultimately changes the basic constitutional 
structure of the State, by linking strategic to constitutional innovations'. Bobbitt, P., The shield of Achilles: sear, 
peace and the course of history (London: Allen Lane) (2002), p. 907 and pp. 21-3 
15 France was occupied by Alliance forces in 1815 in order to enforce the settlement imposed by the Congress 
of Vienna. See McGuigan, R, The Allied Occupation Army In Post-Waterloo France (Napoleon Series). Also, Veve, 
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The treatment of the German Question during the 1943-8 period produced a change of 
attitude reflected in the renewed dimension of the role of ethics in the international political 
system. The experience of the Nuremberg trials enshrined in international law the view that 
intervention was justified in the case of gross violation of human rights. International law 
was institutionalised through the creation of the United Nations organisation, the expansion 
of the concept of human rights, as well as the enlargement of the legitimacy and authority of 
international organisations and regimes. " 
The Atlantic Charter of 1941 laid down the foundations for the political, military and 
economic involvement of the United States on a global scale. The Teheran Conference of 
1943 consolidated a workable rapport between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. The 
Yalta and Potsdam Conferences (1945) created the framework needed for the discussion of 
complex issues involved in the treatment of the German Question and the post-war 
international political system. The CFMs would become a useful instrument for the 
realignment of the post-war international order by acting as a forum for the discussion and 
implementation of the peace treaties with the former Axis powers. This legal and diplomatic 
machinery solidified the practical association framework during the war and contributed to 
shape the configuration of the post-war international order. The creation of the legal and 
diplomatic framework which established the post-war constitutional settlement responded to 
the need to address the German Question. It primarily responded to the need to win the war 
and ensure that the Allies would be bound together in a commonly agreed framework of 
action for the purposes of delineating the post-war international order. After the war, 
T. D., The Duke of Wellington and the British Army of Occupation in France, 1815-1818 (Westport, CT and London: 
Greenwood Press) (1992) 
16 Luard, E., Types of International Society, p. 305-8 
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international law ensured that the breakdown of the practical association would not result in 
a disruptive situation for the nascent international order. 
Intervention as a primary institution of the post-war international order entailed the 
transformation of Germany from top to bottom. This approach differed from the Versailles 
settlement of 1919, when the German Question was tackled through diplomatic and 
financial pressure and military restrictions, but without directly intervening in the 
regeneration of the German political system. The Treaty of Versailles included occupation 
clauses. The Rhineland was occupied by France and Belgium from 1923-1936 as a result of 
Germany defaulting on her reparations obligations. " However, the Allied occupation of 
Germany in the aftermath of World War Two was undertaken with the determination to 
transform the nation. 
The Allies employed a comprehensive approach to the treatment of the former Axis powers 
through the instrument of the Allied Commissions, consisting of representatives of the 
major Allied Powers. However, none of those institutions were as significant in the 
reconfiguration of the international order as the Allied Control Commission for Germany 
(ACC). The ACC was established on June 5,1945 and supplemented by the agreement of 
September 20 of the same year. 18 The Instrument of Surrender issued by the major Allies 
on May 8,1945 honoured the principle of unconditional surrender established by the Allies 
17 Articles 428-432, Treaty of Versailles, June 28,1919 
tml http"//histojy. acusd. edu/gen /text /versailles treaty /vercontents. h 
18 Cooperation by the ACC broke down as the Soviet representative withdrew on March 20,1948. The ACC 
convened again in 1971, leading to agreement on transit arrangements in Berlin and during the talks 
for 
unification of Germany in late 1989. The disbanding of the ACC was officially announced by the 
Two Plus 
Four Agreement of September 12,1990, effective as of March 15,1991. 
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in Casablanca. " The Declaration on Germany of June 5,1945, reiterated the principle of 
unconditional surrender. This meant that the main Allies, the United States, Britain, the 
Soviet Union and France (in the form of its Provisional Government) would assume 
`supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the 
German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local authority'. The 
Declaration contemplated the demilitarisation of Germany (articles 1-5,7,10,13), 
denazification and Allied control of Germany (article 12). "' 
The Allies stipulated that authority in Germany would be exercised (on the instructions from 
their Governments) by the British, American, Soviet and French Commanders-in-chief, each 
in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole. 
The ACC decisions were to be unanimous in order to ensure appropriate uniformity of 
action by the Commanders-in-Chief in their respective zones of occupation. 2' The ACC was 
supported by a Coordinating Committee and Control Staff. The Coordinating Committee 
was composed of Military, Naval, Air, Transport, Economic, Finance, Reparations, 
Deliveries and Restitutions, Internal Affairs and Communications, Legal, Prisoners of War 
and Displaced Persons and Manpower Directorates. There were four heads for each 
division, one for each occupying power. Its staff included military and civil personnel. 
The Coordinating Committee carried out the Council's decisions, communicated them to the 
appropriate German bodies and supervised the day-to-day activities of the latter. United 
19 German Instrument of Surrender, May 8,1945- 
http: //en. wikisource. org/wiki/--German Instrument of Surrender %288 May 1945%29 
20 Declaration on Germany June 5,1945- From Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 29 
21 Statement by the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and the 
Provisional Government of the French Republic on Control Machinery, June 5,1945- From Documents on 
Germany under Occupation, p. 36 
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Nations organisations, if admitted by the Control Council to operate in Germany, were to be 
subordinate to the Allied control machinery and answerable to it. 
Although this modus operandi would create the difficulties that brought about the bipolar 
outcome for Germany, the determination of the Allies to work together in matters pertaining 
to the reconstitution of the German political and social system is indicative of their 
willingness to apply intervention in the same manner as they employed it during the war. 
The ACC contributed to the transformation of Germany because the Allies were eager to 
apply the notions of intervention and coexistence. 
Intervention extended to the control of the German economy. On September, 20 1945 
Proclamation no. 2 of the ACC established that the Allies would `exercise such control as 
they deem necessary over all or any part or aspect of German finance, agriculture, 
production and mining, public utilities, industry, trade.. 
. 
and over all related or ancillary 
matters, including the direction or prohibition of the manufacture, production, construction, 
treatment, use and disposal of any building, establishments, installations, public or private 
works, plant, equipment, products, materials, stock and resources'. 22 
The Control Council agreed on a number of measures that would be pivotal for the political, 
legal and administrative organisation of post-war Germany. On November 6,1945, through 
Directive no. 16, the Allies agreed to rearm the German police after the removal of 
personnel hostile to the occupation authorities. 23 The ACC also deliberated on the transfer 
of ethnic Germans from Austria, Czechosolovakia, Hungary and Poland into the four zones 
22 Control Council Proclamation no. 2: Certain additional requirements imposed on Germany, September 20, 
1945-From Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 68-79 
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of occupation. On November 20,1945 the ACC agreed that `the entire German population 
from Poland (three and a half million persons) will be admitted to the Soviet and British 
zones of occupation in Germany' and that `the entire German population from 
Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary (3,150,000 persons) will be admitted to the American, 
French, and the Soviet zones of occupation in Germany'. 24 This kind of intervention was 
particularly important because it reversed the historical trend of German expansion into 
Eastern Europe. Historically, the presence of Volkdeutsche in the East constituted a 
significant factor in the extension of the German borders well beyond the Oder-Neisse line. 
The transfer of ethnic Germans was probably undertaken in the belief that the measure 
would have confined the future German set up to a less extended geopolitical space. The 
significance of this undertaking still lingers on, as after reunification in 1989 Germany kept 
the same borders demarcated by the four occupation powers in 1945. 
Further measures were carried out in order to prevent a militaristic resurgence of Germany. 
On May 13,1946 Order no. 4 called for the confiscation of literature and material of a Nazi 
and militarist nature. 25 On August 20,1946 Law no. 34 dissolved the German Armed 
Forces, including the `Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), Oberkommando des 
Heeres (01 I), Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM), and Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine 
(OKM), all German land, naval and air forces, with all their organisations, staffs and 
institutions, including the general staff, the officers corps, reserve corps, military schools, 
war veteran organisations, and all other military and quasi-military organisations, together 
23 Control Council Directive no. 16: Arming of the German Police, November 6,1945-From Documents on 
Germany under Occupation, p. 88-9 
24 Control Council Plans for the transfer of the German population to be moved from Austria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland into the four occupied zones of Germany, November 20,1945-From Documents on 
Germany under Occupation, p. 89-90 
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with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany'. ' 
On October 12,1946 Directive no. 40 established the policy to be followed by German 
politicians and the press. The Directive prohibited politicians and journalists from 
contributing `towards the spreading of nationalistic, pan-Germanic, militarist, fascist or anti- 
democratic ideas' and from criticising Allied decisions made at CFM and ACC level. 27 
The elements described above point out to intervention within the context of commonly 
agreed rules and institutions, a legacy of the wartime practical association framework. 
Intervention geared to the transformation of Germany was implemented within the 
framework of coexistence. This model of direct intervention would be applied in other 
locales during the Cold War. 28 Both Moscow and Washington would apply direct 
intervention in their spheres of influence in order to enforce adherence to the policy 
guidelines that sustained the superpowers' long range political and economic objectives. The 
United States would intervene in Latin America to enforce compliance with the system 
which sustained Washington's political and economic interests, as in Guatemala (1953), 
Brazil (1964) and Chile (1973). The Soviet Union would operate in a similar manner in 
Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). It would be precisely when direct intervention 
failed, as in the case of the events which unfolded in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, 
that the boundaries established by the spheres of influence system ran the risk of becoming 
25 Control Council Order no. 4: Confiscation of literature and material of Nazi and militarist nature, May 13, 
1946-From Documents on Germany under Ocaipation, p. 134-5 
26 Control Council Law no. 34: Dissolution of the Wehrmacht, August 20,1946-From Documents on Germany 
under Occupation, p. 151-2 
27 Control Council Directive no. 38: the arrest and punishment of war criminals, Nazis and militarists and the 
internment, control and surveillance of potentially dangerous Germans, October 12,1946- From Documents on 
Germany under Occupation, p. 168-79 
28 The United States would be responsible for redesigning the political framework of post-war Japan through 
the promulgation of a new constitution. The 1947 Constitution included provisions that transformed Japanese 
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blurred and prompted the risk of a systemic war. At the end of the Cold War, the concept of 
intervention would gain a new momentum. The Fukuyaman idea of the `end of history', 
which echoes the Marxian notion of `historical imperatives', was enshrined in the liberal 
credo of a `new world order'. Intervention would also be influential in the reshaping of the 
post-Cold War international order according to the Washington Consensus and direct 
military and political involvement, as in the case of the Balkans and the Persian Gulf in the 
1990s. 
The intervention of the superpowers in the treatment of the German Question was crucial in 
the formation of a balance of power in Germany and Europe. The sphere of influence 
system which emerged after the war originated as the result of the pursuit of the national 
interest on the part of Moscow and Washington. This balance of power was primarily and 
decisively shaped in Germany before it became fait accompli in the rest of Europe. 2'During 
the war, the territorial division of Europe according to spheres of influence was discussed at 
length at inter-Allied level. During the early stages of the war, the Soviets did not want to 
press the Western Allies too hard on territorial issues. During the Anglo-Soviet Treaty 
discussions in London in May 1942, the Soviets agreed to a compromise proposal for the 
withdrawal from the Baltic region. In place of a secret agreement by which the British were 
to support Soviet claims to Romanian annexations, the Soviets asked only that Britain 
recognise the special interests of the Soviet Union in Romania and Finland. With Germany 
still ravaging the Soviet Union, the war effort took priority over territorial concerns and 
society and the country's position in the international order; notably, article 9, which to this day states that the 
`Japanese people renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation'. 
29 Interestingly, the concept of spheres of influence was mentioned in the Ribbentrop-Molotov 
Treaty of 1939. 
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Stalin instructed Molotov to sign the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, which omitted all references to 
territorial boundaries. "' 
At the Teheran Conference, with the German Army already in retreat in the Eastern Front, 
Stalin reversed his position on the Baltic region. The Western powers tacitly acknowledged 
the legitimacy of Soviet territorial claims over Poland. 31 In October 1944 Churchill met 
Stalin in Moscow. Both leaders agreed that Bulgaria and Romania were to be areas largely 
under Soviet influence and that Greece would fall into the British sphere of influence. 
Britain and the Soviet Union were to equally share control in Yugoslavia and Hungary. In 
spite of Churchill's assurances to Hull that this was only applicable to war conditions, both 
statesmen understood that it represented a political division of the Balkans. 32 With both the 
Anglo-American military forces and the Red Army deep into Europe (from Normandy to 
Poland) the new political reality, enshrined in the `Percentages Agreement' and confirmed at 
the Yalta Conference, laid down the prospect of a Soviet Eastern Europe and the possibility 
of US interventionism in Western Europe. 
After the war, the Allies operated on the premise of a spheres of influence system. During 
1945-6 the situation in Central and Eastern Europe was evolving toward sovietisation. 
However, Washington refrained from making any concerted efforts to prevent the 
imposition of Communist rule in Eastern Europe. The spheres of influence system in 
Germany (demarcated by the zones of occupation) became a `peace of sorts' which informed 
inter-Allied relations in the international political system at large. The United States was 
30 Neumann, W., Making The Peace, p. 34 
31 Neumann, W., Making The Peace, p. 67-8 
32 Neumann, W., Making The Peace, p. 76 
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prepared to let Central and Eastern Europe be a part of the Soviet sphere and focused its 
efforts on reconstituting Western Europe. n 
Developments in Germany, where the Allies undertook an assiduous diplomatic and legal 
engagement, reassured all parties concerned of each other's aims and intentions in a tangible 
manner. The occupation of Germany created demarcation lines for the enforcement of the 
superpowers' national interest. A successful enforcement of those interests in Germany 
would provide the superpowers with the opportunity to expand and maintain their spheres 
of influence elsewhere in Europe. 
The balance of power created during the 1943-8 period differed from previous attempts by 
great powers to organise the international political system. The spheres of influence system 
was sustained by two superpowers which had overwhelming capabilities to marshal the 
international political system without the need to engage in delicate multipolar alliances. 
Unlike the great powers of the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century, the 
superpowers had the capacity to act unilaterally in their sphere of interests. Therefore, the 
emerging balance of power was more likely to fall apart because of internal rather than 
systemic causes. 34 The war in Europe created an opening for the permanent involvement of 
the United States in European affairs. In the space of 24 months after the end of the war, 
the United States succeeded in the task of politically emasculating Germany and in the 
creation of a non-autarkic Western European bloc. Western Germany, Western Europe, 
Britain and Japan became politically, economically and militarily integrated with the United 
13 See Lundestad, G., The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe 1943-1947, (Tromsö, Oslo, Bergen: 
Universiteitsforlaget) (1978) 
34 See Waltz, K., Theory of International Relations. 
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States during the Cold War. This placed the United States in a position of advantage in 
relation to the Soviet Union. Both the United States and its Allies in the stronghold parts of 
the world benefited from this relationship. Conversely, the Soviet Union, forced to fight a 
war of national survival against Nazi Germany, was compelled to create a defensive sphere 
of influence almost exclusively in the heartland of Europe relying on the political and 
military coercion of the relatively poor countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
The failure of the Moscow CFM of 1947 in achieving economic unity for occupied Germany 
would be the catalyst in the consolidation of a Western policy, centered around the 
economic recovery of the Anglo-American zones. This policy would have a significant 
impact on the fate of Western Europe. Any success in the economic recovery of Bizonia was 
linked to the implementation of the ERP and the supply of German mineral resources to its 
neighbours. The Soviet Union, fearing encirclement by the West, construed the failure to 
achieve an agreement on German economic unity at the Moscow CFM as an opportunity to 
consolidate its own bloc. 
The diplomatic breakdown at the Moscow CFM in 1947 enabled the Allies to pursue their 
long range objectives in Germany and Europe without constraints. Allied agreement at 
Moscow would have restored German unity. A united Germany would have enabled the 
possible emergence of a tripolar world, and the retreat of the United States and the Soviet 
Union into a less prominent position in the international political system. This would have 
signified a reversal of the `grand design' envisaged by both superpowers. The Moscow CFM 
is another example of direct intervention by the superpowers in the making of the post-war 
international order. In this context, the policy of diplomatic breakdown m as the policy of 
bloc-formation. By the time the Allies met at Moscow, the containment mindset prevailed in 
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the US delegation. The Red Army was making sure that the area under its control adopted 
the political and economic policies dictated by Moscow. More importantly, Bizonia and the 
sovietisation of the Eastern zone ensured that the German Question could not be divorced 
from developments elsewhere in Europe. By accomplishing a diplomatic breakdown, the 
United States attained its goal of expanding the free market system of exchange through 
political and economic intervention. At the same time, a divided Germany reassured the 
Soviet Union that the former foe would not be able to exert any political influence in Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
This balance of power system enjoyed a great deal of stability during the Cold War due to 
the bandwagoning of the former Western European powers into the Washington-led 
political and economic transnational structures. u The German Question also affected the 
role of the minor Western Allies, Britain and France. Faced with the loss of political and 
economic autonomy, the Western parts of Germany and Europe had little choice but to 
bandwagon into the Atlantic system of collective security imposed by the United States. 
In March 1946 a memorandum produced by Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Minister, 
summarised Britain's aims in Germany. There were five main points: first, security from a 
revival of German aggression; second, reasonable economic well-being in Germany and 
35 Bandwagoning was coined by Quincy Wright in A Study of War (1942) and popularised by Kenneth Waltz in 
Theory of International Politics (1979). In the bandwagoning process, the political system of Washington's allies 
took second place to the economic priority attached to the `grand design'. Spain was politically and 
economically isolated until 1955, when it became strategically important for the United States to foment a 
military presence on the Iberian peninsula, next to the Mediterranean Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar. Salazar's 
Portugal was the only non-democracy among the founding members of NATO in 1949, which reflected 
Portugal's role as an ally against communism during the Cold War. After liberation from Nazi Germany, 
Greece experienced an equally bitter civil war, caused by the differences that emerged between left-wing and 
right-wing resistance forces. Civil war began between the Democratic Army of Greece and right-wing 
forces 
which had the support of the Hellenic Army. During the 1950s and 1960s, Greece experienced a gradual and 
significant economic growth, aided by grants and loans by the United States through the Marshall 
Plan. After 
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Europe; third, a reduction of the British occupation costs in Germany; fourth, the creation 
of a democratic and Western-minded Germany; and fifth, the restriction of Soviet influence 
as far to the east as possible. 36 Disagreements with France and the Soviet Union over 
Germany, a dire financial situation at home and the occupation costs in Germany (which the 
British paid for with the money from the $ 3.75 billion US loan) prompted Bevin, the 
Foreign Office and the Cabinet to press Washington for the formation of a US-led bloc, a 
US permanent presence in Europe and the rehabilitation of the Western zones of 
occupation in Germany. 
French policy over Germany also contributed to the process of bandwagoning. France 
influenced the bloc-formation process by preventing the setting of central administrative 
bodies in Germany, therefore giving the other Allies leeway to pursue the organisation of 
Bizonia and the sovietisation of the Eastern zone. French policy on Germany during the 
1944-7 period rotated around their desire for a guarantee against future German aggression. 
French policy was underpinned by political as well as economic considerations. Paris wanted 
to avoid a resurgence of the German nationalism which had prompted three invasions of its 
territory since 1870. France demanded that the Ruhr be severed politically and economically 
from the rest of Germany and placed under the control of those states that could make use 
of its coal, going as far as using its power of veto in the ACC and CFM to reject any 
proposal for German unification. 37 Paris' stringent policy on Germany began to shift in 
1947, when the Soviet threat began to assume a more peremptory character and the German 
participating with United Nations forces in the Korean conflict, Turkey, another non-democracy, joined the 
NATO in 1952, becoming a bulwark against Soviet expansion into the Mediterranean. 
36 PRO: CAB 129/9, CP (46) 156, Gen 121/1, `The Future of Germany and the Ruhr', Ernest Bevin, 11 March 
1946. 
31 Smyser, W. R., From Yalta to Berlin: the Cold War Struggle over Germany, p. 48 
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problem changed in nature and urgency. 38 By 1947 the French demand on access to 
German coal was met by the Western Allies, prompting the creation of the trizonal 
arrangement and the co-opting of France into the Washington-led bloc. The French 
bandwagoning signaled the end of the rivalry which plagued the international order since the 
late nineteenth century. With France unable to muster the political leverage to influence the 
international political system and Germany having surrendered its state to the Allies, the way 
was paved for a new order of things in Europe. 
Although the process of bandwagoning meant a partial constraint on independent 
manoeuvering by London and Paris, the input of the minor occupation powers in the 
treatment of the German Question is indicative of the significance of intervention as one of 
the primary institutions of the Cold war international order. French policy on Germany 
would be crucial for the accomplishment of European integration and the Europeanisation 
of the German Question, as epitomised in the creation of the Common Market in 1957 and 
the Franco-German Treaty in 1959. The legacy of the French influence in the shaping of the 
role of Germany in the post-war international order would become evident in the wake of 
the Cold War, when the French President Francois Mitterrand pressed for further economic 
integration and the creation of a common European currency as part of the German 
reunification process. 
The 1943-1990 system had a significant effect in the consolidation of political and economic 
integration in Europe. Western Europe would become more politically and economically 
integrated than ever before in history. This integration (sponsored and assisted by 
38 Schuman, R., French Policy Towards Germany Since the War, Lecture delivered on October 29,1953 at the Royal 
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Washington) would also abolish the balance of power system within Western Europe which 
operated regularly since 1648. The 1943-8 period profoundly altered intra-European 
relations. The foreseeable demise of the British Empire led to the idea of closer economic 
links between Britain and Europe. The United States, fearful of the onset of another 
economic depression, was interested in creating the conditions for a liberal system of 
exchange. This provided Washington with the impetus to give political and economic 
sponsorship to the process of Western European integration. Fears of another encirclement 
by the West compelled Moscow to carve a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and 
marshal a simultaneous integration process with her satellites. 
With Germany deprived of any say in the realignment of the post-war international system, 
the integration process in Western Europe would assume the characteristics desired by 
Washington. A similar process would unfold beyond the Iron Curtain, with Moscow 
dictating the modality of Eastern European integration. The experience of the war and the 
possibility of military conflict between the two Europes gave meaning to the process of 
integration. The experience of the United States, with the tenfold expansion of state 
intervention in the economy since the Great Depression " was mirrored in Western 
Europe, where the Welfare States were introduced and major industries nationalised. The 
incentive for integration in Western Europe stemmed from the political sponsorship 
provided by the Marshall Plan and the relative decline of France and Britain vis-ä-vis the 
superpowers. France, Germany, Italy and the Low Countries had complex industrial 
networks and a geo-economic potential which facilitated their absorption into a common 
Institute of International Affairs (Oxford University Press), p. 7 
39 See DiLorenzo, T 
. 
J., How Capitalism Saved America-The Untold History of our Country. From the Pilgrims to the 
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economic space. Integration was facilitated by the subordination of Germany to 
supranational institutions, the creation of an Atlantic linkage (which placed the ultimate 
responsibility for the security of Western Europe in the hands of Washington) and the threat 
posed by the Soviet Union. This transformation proved to have a lasting effect. The political 
and economic integration of Western Europe in the aftermath of World War Two revolved 
on the premises that would inform the process of absorption of East Germany and the 
former Soviet bloc after 1989-90. The outcome of the German Question produced a 
situation in which preying upon regional neighbours had become irrational. Western 
European civil societies would be empowered to constrain state-action. Sub-national and 
supranational institutions and networks became an important element in this process. The 
depoliticisation of Western European nationalisms, the creation of a supranational European 
community and, to an extent never seen before, the setting of regional interdependence as 
the prime source of Western European wealth, aided the process of integration. 40 
The political and economic integration of Western Europe unfolded as the immediate result 
of the treatment of the German Question. The outcome of the German Question 
transcended the conflictual aspects of the Cold War, as it established a successful framework 
for inter-state cooperation through the transformation of Germany's position in Europe and 
the role of the former imperial powers in the post-war international order. 
The doctrine of `correlation of forces' informed Moscow's intervention in the formation of 
the balance of power. For the Soviet Union, intervention became a Rationalist tool for the 
attainment of vital interests. Intervention was applied in the sovietisation of Eastern Europe, 
40 Puchala, D., Western Europe in Jackson, R. H. and James, A., States in a Changing World A Contemporary Analyru 
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by forcing the countries beyond the Iron Countries to reject ERP aid, and in the isolation of 
Tito's Yugoslavia. The concept of `correlation of forces' (sootnoshenie sii) conveys the idea of a 
relationship or distribution of power. 4' In practical terms it entailed that if the calculation 
was favourable, then the appropriate tactical action would be that of advancing the Soviet 
cause without generating undue strategic risk. 42 The doctrine of `correlation of forces' played 
a significant part in the development of post-war Soviet strategic thought. World War Two 
had forced the Soviet Union to reassess her long-term strategic weaknesses. This 
reassessment forced the Soviet leadership to carve a sphere of influence in Germany and 
Europe, catapulting the country into superpower status and ensuring the accomplishment of 
its security goals. The Soviets worked on two different strategies simultaneously. On one 
hand they proclaimed the unity of Germany at the ACC and during the CFM negotiations. 
At the same time, they prompted the emergence of a bipolar situation in Germany by 
sovietising their zone of occupation, and impeding the rehabilitation of Germany as a single 
unit by insisting on the extraction of reparations from the Western zones. This responded to 
long-dated (and rather justified) fears of an anti-Soviet bloc which would include Germany. 
The intervention of the superpowers in the treatment of the German Question secured the 
creation of a bipolar international order. The only entity strategically capable of becoming a 
`third force' in the post-war international order (balancing against the Soviet Union and the 
United States) would have been an independent and neutral Germany. The idea of a `third 
force' was toyed with in Britain and France. However, the political and economic dislocation 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford) (1993), p. 76-7 
41 Garthoff, R., The Concept of the Balance of Power in Soviet Policy Making', World Politics, October 1951, p. 88 
42 Garthoff, R., Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press) (1953), p. 91. For the concept of 
`correlation of forces' see Hansen, J., Correlation of Forces: Four Decades of Soviet Military Development 
(Praeger 
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caused by the war and the looming conflict between the superpowers rendered impossible 
the emergence of a neutral Germany and an independent Europe. 
Germany managed to integrate the economic resources of Western Europe during the Nazi 
period. The Nazi leaders also worked towards establishing the foundations of an autarkic 
and self-sufficient socio-economic system in Europe. The reconstitution of Germany as a 
unified autonomous unit would have entailed the withdrawal of the United States from 
Western Europe after the war and the possible absorption of the Central and Eastern 
European economies on the part of the Germans. The idea of an independent Germany was 
pervasive in the Soviet leadership in the 1943-8 period. Furthermore, an independent 
Germany would have found a rapprochement with the Soviet Union easier and more 
productive, as Moscow would have probably placed fewer constraints on German 
sovereignty, provided her security requirements were met. The Stalin Note of 1952 and 
Lavrentii Beria's suggestion for the reunification of Germany in 1953 are eloquent examples 
of the ambivalent position of the Soviet Union on the German Question. 43 For the 
superpowers, intervention in Germany became the medium by which they enforced their 
national interests in the wider spectrum of the post-war international order. By doing so, 
intervention, the instrument that facilitated the successful culmination of the war, became 
one of the primary institutions of the Cold War international order. 
Publishers) (1987). Also, Lider, J., Correlation of forces: an analysis of Mamist-Leninist concepts (Gower: Aldershot) 
(1986) 
13 Soviet terms for reunification included the reestablishment of Germany as a united state within the 
boundaries established by the provisions of the Potsdam Conference, a single united German government to 
play a role in the negotiations of the peace treaty and the withdrawal of all occupation forces within one year. 
Following the date on which treaty came into effect, political parties and organisations were to have `free' 
activity. Germany was to have its own national armed forces and would be allowed to manufacture munitions 
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and democratic Germany. For an account of the Stalin Note see Steninger, R. The German Question: The Stalin 
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4.3 Coexistence as a primary institution of the post-war international order 
Coexistence would become the second most prominent institution of the Cold War 
international order. This development was brought about by the formation of a spheres of 
influence system, shaped through the intervention of the superpowers. The practical 
association formed for the purposes of the prosecution of the war against Germany, left the 
main Allies with the responsibility of creating an international order diametrically opposed to 
the ideology of the Axis and one in which Communism and Western democracy would be 
able to co-exist. 
The duration and nature of the wartime practical association, as well as the responsibility of 
realigning the international political system after the war, created a situation of coexistence 
between the superpowers. In spite of the gradual and irreversible breakdown of the practical 
association framework after the war, there was no `cognitive closure' between the Allies " as 
they were fully aware of each other's intentions and needs. The possibility of conflict was 
restrained by the same instruments on which the practical association framework rested 
during the war: international law, diplomacy and the acceptance of the spheres of influence 
system. Ideological diversity required the operation of a legal framework that would enable 
the establishment of a post-war international order based on coexistence. The nascent post- 
The Balance of Empires: United States' Rejection of German Reunification and Stalin's March Note of 1952. (Universal 
Publishers) (2003) 
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war society of states acknowledged the need to cooperate and marshal the international 
order. 
The ACC was the main diplomatic forum in the discussion of the issues regarding the 
German Question and reflected not just the divergence of interests, but also the legal and 
ethical dimension of the responsibilities that burdened the superpowers. The spirit of 
cooperation and the willingness on the part of the Allies to achieve transformation in 
Germany would extend to the management of the international political system. Achieving a 
`peace of sorts' in regards to the most crucial element in the realignment of the post-war 
international order would serve to create strict demarcation lines in Europe and therefore 
maintain a non-disruptive international order during the Cold War. 
Through the medium of the ACC, the Allies were able to debate the issues regarding the 
German Question on a continual basis. Notwithstanding the conflict of interests that arose 
out of political developments in the zones of occupation and the international political 
system at large, during the early period of the occupation (1945-6), the ACC accomplished 
the task of laying down the foundations for the social and political reorganisation of 
Germany by eliminating all the vestiges of the Nazi political system. As Germany underwent 
a process of full-blown polarisation during the 1947-8 period, the ACC passed into law a 
considerable number of measures which ensured the transformation of Germany. This was 
indicative of the spirit of cooperation between the superpowers. Measures included the 
repeal of Nazi legislation concerning hereditary farms, the termination of German insurance 
operations abroad, exchange of parcels between Berlin and the zones of occupation, a law to 
combat venereal disease, the liquidation of the Krupp steelworks, the abrogation of certain 
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provisions in the German penal law, and a law providing for interzonal exchange of printed 
material. " 
The ACC became the medium which facilitated an orderly passage into a bipolar 
arrangement for Germany before it became fully operational in Europe. The superpowers' 
diplomatic engagement in the management of the occupation contributed to generate a spirit 
of coexistence that would inform the Cold War international order. Because the Allies did 
not discuss the issue of a peace treaty with Germany until the Moscow CFM of 1947, the 
ACC took on the main diplomatic role on the German Question. The diplomatic and legal 
framework of the ACC had liberal aspects that would inform the shape of things to come 
not just in Germany but in the international order at large. It is partly due to the work done 
by the Allies at the ACC that a convivial spheres of influence system unfolded in Europe. 
The ACC represented the nucleus of an international society, for it constituted the main 
medium of inter-Allied diplomacy, negotiations and law-making in regards to Germany. It 
solidified the Rationalist legacy of the wartime period as the Allies continued to engage in 
the legal and diplomatic process in spite of their ideological diversity. This pattern would 
continue to inform the order of things in Germany and Europe, inasmuch as it would put 
restraints on unilateral action by the superpowers. The legal structure guiding the occupation 
of Germany was informed by the practical association framework established during the war. 
The ACC would have a transformative effect in the international order for it reduced 
Germany to a subordinate position and propelled a continuous show of strength between 
two emerging camps in a magnitude not seen elsewhere in the international political system. 
The Red Army established a position of dominance in the Eastern Europe countries and 
" Clay, L., Decision in Germany, p. 155-6 
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served as a catalyst for their gradual transition into a Soviet-led bloc. Conversely, in 
Germany the Allies were forced, to an extent unseen elsewhere, to engage in permanent 
diplomacy and negotiation, because of the significance of the outcome of the German 
Question in the configuration of the post-war international order. 
The Allied Control Council and its Coordinating Committee provided the inter-Allied 
occupational structure with a forum to discuss and shape policy. The ACC served as the 
main forum of inter-Allied occupation policy and gave a Rationalist framework to the 
treatment of the German Question, not only through the making of inter-Allied policy but 
also by creating a common cause facade which would enable the practical association to 
unravel within the principle of ethical cohabitation. The nature and extent of the occupation 
structure put in place by the Allies in Germany had no precedent in history. It denoted the 
Allies' willingness to work together in order to achieve a workable settlement in Germany. 
The complexity of the occupation structure is indicative of the importance of the German 
Question in the configuration of the post-war international order. The Tripartite 
Commissions in the liberated countries operated without the convivialism of the ACC. 
Unlike Germany, no other former Axis power could tip the balance of power towards any of 
the superpowers. The Allies agreed on the measures that would become influential in 
securing a permanent inter-Allied dialogue and presence in Germany. This convivialism 
resulted in a stalemate which would become a `peace of sorts'. 
Coexistence manifested itself in the creation of a bipolar solution for Germany and 
Europe. 
The failure of the Moscow and London CFMs served as catalysts for the consolidation of 
bipolar diplomacy over Germany and bloc-formation instead of a motive 
for all-out 
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confrontation. The division of Germany became a distinct possibility from the moment the 
war ended. Remarkably though, after the implementation of Bizonia and the gradual 
sovietisation of the Eastern Zone, the road to partition was paved without disruptive 
conflict. The unfolding of the Berlin Blockade shows how much the Western powers and 
the Soviet Union valued the convenience of a Rationalist unraveling of four power control in 
Germany. The probing by both sides was highly calculated and both preferred the 
embarrassment of making concessions instead of risking a full-blown conflagration. On June 
25,1948 Clay gave the order to launch a massive airlift (ultimately lasting 462 days) that flew 
supplies into the Western-held sectors of Berlin during 1948-1949. By the time the blockade 
ended on May 11,1948,278,228 flights were made and 2,326,406 tons of food and supplies 
were delivered to Berlin. Tipton points to the `legalistic distinctions' made by both the Soviet 
Union and the United States in order to prevent the situation from escalating into an all-out 
war. The United States refused to acquiesce to Clay's request for an American military 
breach into Berlin. At the same time, the Soviet Union did not challenge the passage of 
aircraft to feed the Western sector of the city or the transfer of Berlin's legislature into the 
Western sector. 46 According to Shlaim, the Soviets had minimum and maximum goals in 
imposing the blockade; the maximum aim was to halt the formation of a West German 
government while the minimum aim was to carry the division of Germany to its logical 
conclusion by liquidating the Western enclave in Berlin. Shlaim also argues that Soviet 
behaviour during the crisis was very cautious as at no point did Moscow intend to replace 
political pressure with military action. 47 The Berlin Blockade, the hottest confrontation 
+6 Tipton, F. B., A History of Modern Germany Since 1815, (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los 
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between the Allies over Germany thus far, is an example of political brinkmanship which 
allows us to conclude that while the superpowers were willing to enforce their national 
interest with regard to the German Question, they were extremely cautious in avoiding a 
systemic conflict. 
The process of polarisation occurred within the context of continued diplomatic 
engagement. The bipolar outcome reached in Germany did not stop the process of 
diplomatic engagement on the issues pertaining to the international political system at large. 
This differed significantly from the attitude taken by the Allies at Casablanca regarding the 
Nazi regime. When the conflict intensified, as during the Berlin Blockade, none of the 
superpowers called for `unconditional surrender'. This implied a principle of recognition and 
convivialism which provided legitimacy to the nascent international political system. Soviet 
ambitions of a foothold in Germany and Eastern Europe did not completely contradict the 
American objective of a liberal economic order and the creation of a sphere of influence 
responsive to the pursuit of its national interest in Germany and Western Europe. The 
creation of Bizonia and the Western bloc were not designed to prevent the Soviet Union 
from establishing an East German state or securing a foothold in Eastern Europe but rather 
to solidify the continuation of the policies that created the wartime expansion of the 
American economy. 
Superpower interaction concocted a stalemate in the epicenter and shifted the flash points to 
the periphery. As the possibility of disruptive conflict was seen as `irrational', the Cold War 
University of California Press)(1982), Gottlieb., M., The German peace settlement and the Berlin crisis, (New 
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would be mostly fought with a symbolic perspective in mind and restrained by the same 
instruments on which the practical association framework was laid down in 1943-5: law, 
diplomacy and the acceptance of the balance of power system. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The establishment of intervention and coexistence as primary institutions of the Cold War 
emerged as the result of the interaction between rationality, conflict and cooperation. These 
institutions were responsible for shaping post-war international society in a `pluralist plus' 
manner. The nature of the systemic cataclysm that descended upon Europe and Asia during 
1939-1945 resulted in the interventionist drive of the two superpowers and the subsequent 
need to co-exist in order to marshal their respective spheres of influence effectively. This 
interpretation constitutes a via media between the centrality given to intervention by the 
solidarists and its rejection by the pluralist camp. In effect, the interventionism exercised by 
the superpowers in the treatment of the German Question and the creation of the post-war 
international order constituted a `selfish solidarism' which responded to their national 
interest, but also to the need to achieve a significant modicum of co-existence. 
The English School acknowledges the input of the great powers as one of the central 
elements of equilibrium in the international political system. 48 For the superpowers, 
Germany became the test tube for the realignment of the post-war international order. The 
complexity of the issues involved in the German Question compelled them to engage in an 
intense diplomatic intercourse and created the overriding need to co-operate in order to 
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reconstitute the society of states. 4' Their overwhelmingly powerful position enabled them to 
steer the course of events after the war in an interventionist manner. The post-war 
international order would have taken a different shape if France, Germany and Britain would 
have emerged from the war in a more solid political and financial position. The United States 
and the Soviet Union, by exploiting their preponderance as great powers, gave direction to 
the German Question by organising Western unity and consolidating a Soviet bloc. 50 Their 
massive capabilities made possible the subordination of Germany and Europe to their long 
range objectives and prevented the possibility of a system-disrupting war. The formation of 
Bizonia, the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany and the creation of 
Western/Atlantic institutions came about as the result of the overwhelming power of the 
United States, which succoured the frail European powers, reorganised the Western zone of 
occupation in Germany and bound Western Europe together under common institutions. At 
the same time, the intervention of the Soviet Union in the war effort as well as the 
organisation of the Eastern zone of occupation consolidated the bipolar outcome. 
Bull argues that diplomacy can play no role where foreign policy is conceived as the 
enforcement of a claim to universal authority or as the pursuit of self-regarding interests that 
take no account of the interests of others. 51 In this context, the primary institutions of 
intervention and coexistence were influential in determining the outcome of the German 
Question and in the creation of a new constitutional arrangement for the society of states. 
The overlapping between intervention and coexistence became the characateristic feature of 
48 See Bull, The Anarchical Society. Also Wight, M., Power Politics. 
;' See Fox, W. T. R., The Super-Powers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union-their responsibility for peace, 
(Harcourt, Brace & Co.: New York) (1944) 
so Bull H., The Anarchical Society, p. 205-7 
Bull, H., The Anarchical Society, p. 170-1 
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the Cold War international order. The Cold War was informed by the principle of `selfish 
intervention', which meant the possibility of superpower involvement in specific areas of 
interests. This created a scope for coexistence and hindered the likelihood of systemic 
disruption. Intervention and coexistence would survive as `primary institutions' of the 
society of states following the aftermath of the Cold War. Intervention remains a solid 
institution of the post-Cold War international order, as seen in the case of the US-led 
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq following the aftermath of 9/11. At the same time, the 
principle of coexistence which unfolded after the collapse of the Berlin Wall seems to have a 
`Cold War' element attached to it. The United States and its European allies are willing to co- 
exist with other political systems that do not threaten their economic and political interests, 
as seen in the case of China. The assessment of the role of primary institutions from the 
perspective of the treatment of the German Question therefore gives us the chance to better 
understand how these operate according to particular historical trends. It is in this dimension 
that the English School scholarship enhances the debate on the origins of the Cold War. 
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Chapter 5 
The treatment of the German Question: the Revolutionist context 
5.1 The concept of `revolutionism' in the treatment of the German Question 
The legacy of the wartime practical association provided the framework for the 
transformation of Germany and the international order. World War Two had confronted 
different ideologies in the quest to reconfigure the international order. In this struggle, the 
Soviet Union and the Western Allies forged an associative framework based on the tolerance 
of ideological diversity. This entailed the prospect of a post-war international order which 
would have to accommodate Soviet and American aspirations and therefore be based on a 
system of co-existence. The Axis had launched a systemic war under the pretences of 
organising Europe and East Asia into a self-sufficient bloc. This idea attracted the support of 
European political parties willing to collaborate with the Nazis, as in the case of the Rey-ist 
movement in Belgium and Mussert's Holland, as well as many ordinary Europeans 
disillusioned with the drawbacks of liberal democracy during the interwar years. However, 
the Nazi New Order was at its best politically and economically vague and at its worst a 
program based on racial domination and extermination, and the economic exploitation and 
political subjugation of the occupied states. ' The very nature of the quest for the mastery of 
the international order propelled the Allies to think about world governance and 
international organisation in an unprecedented manner in the history of the society of states. 
I See Mazower, M., Dark Continent. 
- 
Europe's Twentieth Century, (London: Allen Lane) (1998) ch. 5 
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As I have outlined in chapter 1, the Rationalist framework of the Atlantic Charter and the 
Declaration of the United Nations provided with the legal instruments to carry forward 
political, economic and social reform. It also conveyed the Allies' intention to implement it 
after the war. During the war, the Allies discussed the issue of international organisation at 
length. At the Quebec Conference of August 1943, a draft four power declaration on post- 
war organisation established the legal foundations for an international organisation open to 
membership for every nation. The Quebec declaration provided that until the establishment 
of such organisation, consultation would be used to deal with all problems, including the 
surrender, disarmament and occupation of the enemy countries. 2 In Moscow, on October 
1943, the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China agreed on the establishment of 
a `general international organisation, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all 
peace-loving states... for the maintenance of international peace and security'. 3 
Great power intervention would become one of the main institutions of the post-war 
international order. At the Yalta Conference, the Allies agreed on the establishment of a 
Security Council and an international organisation for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. The San Francisco Conference of 1945 established a sophisticated system of 
organisation for the society of states. In addition to this, the CFM system provided the Allies 
with the opportunity to discuss matters pertaining to the reconfiguration of the international 
order. 
2 Neumann, W., Making The Peace, p. 55 
3 Snell, J. (Ed), The Meaning of Yalta, p. 16 
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Claude argues that international organisation may be looked upon as a process of initiating 
steps in the direction of world government. ' International organisation is the typical 
expression of liberalism in the realm of international relations, based upon the assumption of 
the harmonisation of the interests of states. 5 Although the superpowers had divergent 
interests regarding the post-war international order, the nature of the German Question 
demanded the establishment of institutions aimed at preventing a repeat of the disruption 
that unfolded in the international political system in the 1930s and 1940s. The 
institutionalisation of post-war international society was facilitated by the increasing number 
of international organisations and regimes established in the post-war period such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (1957), the World Metereological Organisation (1950), 
the International Maritime Organisation (1948), the World Health Organisation (1948) and 
the Food and Agriculture Organisation (1945). 
In addition, the experience of World War Two entailed the construction of an international 
order based on an ethical and socially-minded paradigm. 6 The Cold War international 
political system had as one of its main characteristics the entrenchment of economic 
planning. The emergence of government intervention in the economy arose as a result of the 
depression of the 1930s, war dislocation and the Soviet experience of successful economic 
planning. Polanyi argues that `the conflict between the market and the elementary 
requirements of an organised social life provided the [twentieth] century with its dynamics 
and produced the typical strains... which ultimately destroyed that society'. 7 Polanyi 
highlights the `disruptive strains' of unemployment, tension of classes, pressure on 
exchanges and imperialist rivalries as the instruments which brought about the authoritarian 
4 Claude I., Swords into Ploughshares, p. 8-11 
Claude I., Swords into Ploughrharer, p. 13 
6 Freeden, M., The New Liberalism : an ideology of social reform, (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1978), p. 39-40 
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`impasse' that put an end to laissez-faire capitalism. 8 The Great Depression had brought 
devastating consequences for the American economy. Gross national product had fallen by 
1933 to half of its 1929 level. US Businesses invested only $3 billion in 1933, compared to $ 
24 billion in 1929. Unemployment reached 25% of the American workforce in 1933. To 
aggravate matters, during the 1930s, 100,000 Americans applied for jobs in the burgeoning 
economy of the Soviet Union. ' The American policies in regards to the reorganisation of 
the international economy were imbued by the experience of the New Deal. Government 
intervention at home signified government intervention abroad. This would be reflected in 
the sponsoring of the economic reconstruction of Western Europe and in the creation of the 
financial institutions aimed at regulating multilateral trade. 
The social liberalism which had taken root in America and Britain in the 1930s and 1940s 
brought the West closer to the Communist ideals of the Soviet Union through the adoption 
of economic planning and the participation of government in the overall running of the 
economy. Britain, caught in a process precipitated by the hardships brought by the war, had 
also taken the road to a more centralised economy and the setting of a Welfare State. With 
the antecedent of the New Liberalism of Herbert Asquith and Lloyd George, Britain started 
to implement the recommendations proposed by Sir William Beveridge in his `Social 
Insurance and Allied Services Report', published in 1942. 
The treatment of the German Question brought an extra dimension to this process of 
transformation. The extent of the influence of Nazism on German society has been 
7 Polanyi, K., The Great Transformation (Beacon Press: Boston, MA) (1957), p. 249 
8 Polanyi, K., The Great Transformation, p. 209 
9 Kennedy, D., Freedom from Want-The American People in Depression and War 1929-1945 (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford and New York) (1999), p. 163-4 
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discussed at length by various historians, leading to a spectrum of opinions ranging from 
Marxist perspectives, which emphasise a strengthening of class structures within German 
society, to that of liberal historians who claim that the modernisation which took place in 
Nazi Germany, along with a change in `subjective social reality', attests to the fact that a 
revolution of class and status occurred during the 1930s and 1940s. Although there is 
evidence of social continuation throughout the regime, general historiographical consensus 
leans towards the latter of these two arguments. "' This revolution at home had profound 
implications for the international order. The revisionist drive imposed on German society by 
the Hitlerite regime had its apogee in the mobilisation of the German nation for `total war'. 
" The task which fell upon the Allies in the transformation of Germany was therefore of a 
revolutionist nature. Although the revolutionism that informed the treatment of the German 
Question adhered to the pursuit of the national interest on the part of the United States and 
the Soviet Union, the need to transform the international political system necessitated a 
revolution in the German political system. The economic `grand design' which guided US 
policy, along with the security concerns of the Soviet Union, dictated the elimination of the 
doctrine that disrupted the international order in the 1930s and 1940s. In that context, 
denazification would entail not only the punishment of the main leaders of the Nazi regime, 
but most importantly; a reorientation of German society that would facilitate the creation of 
an international order conducive to attainment of the goals set down by Moscow and 
10 See Burleigh, Michael, The Third Reich: A New History, (New York: 2000), Childers, T. and J Caplan (eds. ), Re- 
evaluating the Third Reich, (New York: 1993), Frei, N., National Socialist Rule in Germany: The Fuhrer State 1933- 
1945, (Oxford, 1993), Kershaw, I., The Hitler Myth: Image and reality in the Third Reich' in Crew, D., (ed. ) Nazism 
and German Society 1933-1945, (London) (1994), Kershaw, I., The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of 
Interpretation, (London) (2000), Lambert, P. `German Historians and Nadi ideology: The Parameters of the 
Volksgemeinschaft and the Problems of Historical Legitimation', European History Quarterly 25,1995. pp. 555-82, 
Overy, R J. `Class and Community in the Third Reich', Historical journal 22,1979, pp. 493-503 and Peukert, DJK., 
Inside Nar Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life, (London) (1987) 
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Washington. In this chapter I will look at the denazification of Germany and its influence on 
the post-war international order, paying particular attention to the work of the ACC in the 
process of political transformation, the legal precedent set by the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT) and the policies implemented at zonal level on political, educational and 
cultural reform. 
5.2 The denazification of Germany 
The Nazi period in Germany represented a cataclysm which engulfed the whole international 
political system. Nazism revolved around the concept of the Volk as a political idea which 
superseded that of the State. Hitler had peculiar ideas as to what constituted a Volk. 12 He 
understood the German Volk not as a Race, but as a medley of `racial kernels'. 13 Hitler's 
dream of a master race (Herrenvolk) dominated his geopolitical vision. The conduct of 
Germany during the war derived to a considerable extent from the Führer's racialist thought. 
Racialism was not restricted to Nazi Germany. The United States and Britain had the 
experience of an Empire based on racial exceptionalism. Both nations had fought the war 
with segregated armies. 
In his speech of February 18,1943, Joseph Goebbels, Reich's Minister for Propaganda, stated that `the world 
no longer has the choice between falling back into its old fragmentation or accepting a new order for Europe 
under Axis leadership. The only choice now is between living under Axis protection or in a Bolshevist Europe'. 
12 The background of Hitler's anti-Jewish stance is abundantly documented. In his letter to Herr Gemlich of 
September 16,1919 he states that `Rational anti-semitism, by contrast, must lead to a systematic and legal 
struggle against, and eradication of, the privileges the Jews enjoy over the other foreigners living among us 
(Alien Laws). Its final objective, however, must be the total removal of all Jews from our midst'. Point 4 of the 
Programme of the NSDAP, drafted by Hitler, and Anton Drexler on February 24,1920 stated that `only 
members of the nation may be citizens of the State. Only those of German blood, whatever be their creed, may 
be members of the nation. Accordingly, no Jew may be a member of the nation'. In his Political Testament he 
states that `It is untrue that I or anyone else in Germany wanted war in 1939. It was wanted and provoked 
solely by international statesmen either of Jewish origin or working for Jewish interests'. These documents 
were accessed at ww-w. hitler. org 
13 Lukacs, J., The Hitler of History-Hitlers Biographers on Trial, p. 123 
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Nevertheless, Nazism was informed by race to the extent of making it impossible to achieve 
political accommodation with the national communities conquered through the campaign in 
the Eastern Front or to work together with them on a legal and diplomatic framework for 
the creation of a Nazi-orientated post-war international order. The assault on the 
international order by the Nazi regime was informed by a strong racialist view. Fischer 
points out that according to Hitler, the German Volk had to reproduce itself more rapidly 
than the `lesser races'. This required the search for vital space (Lebensraum). '4 
During the 1930s Nazi Germany had marched into the demilitarised Rhineland, occupied by 
French and Belgian forces, and embarked on an irredentist crusade by invading Austria, the 
Sudetenland and the whole of Czechoslovakia, before launching a war of aggression on 
Western and Eastern Europe. In chapter 2, I have outlined the possible implications of an 
autarkic economic system in Europe and its potential danger for the United States and the 
British Empire. Although American private interests contributed to the buttressing of the 
Nazi war economy in the 1930s, the long term interests of the Allies would have been 
severely affected by the continuation of the Third Reich. In this context, denazification 
meant transforming Germany from its irredentist and challenging nature in order to ensure 
the establishment of a non-disruptive post-war society of states. 
The denazification of Germany entailed the creation of an environment conducive to 
securing the long range interests of the superpowers. These interests, while divergent from 
an economic perspective, found common ground on political aspects. Germany had to be 
subordinated politically in order to enforce the `grand design' schemes that the United States 
and the Soviet Union had in mind for the post-war international order. The superpowers 
14 Fischer, K., Storia delta Germania Natiista-Nascita e decandenza del Ter-, o Reich (Newton and Compton: Rome) 
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achieved a discontinuity with Nazism by applying interventionist elements. This process 
unfolded within the diplomatic and legal framework that sustained the wartime alliance. It 
was due to this modus operandi that the transformation of Germany through denazification 
was successfully implemented and impacted positively on the post-war international order. 
The common aim of the Allies was to eliminate the Nazi ideology in order to prevent the 
disruptive resurgence of a politically independent Germany. According to Leffler, there were 
close similarities between Soviet and US policy regarding Germany. For the United States, a 
unified Germany was only imaginable if it were to be integrated into the Western system. A 
neutralised Germany, exposed to Soviet influence, was unthinkable in 1945 because the 
reconstruction of Europe, one of America's prominent aims, depended on access to the 
German market and raw materials. Soviet policy rested on the vision that a united Germany 
could only be possible if the Soviet Union maintained a decisive influence through the issue 
of reparations, co-determination of Ruhr affairs and Communist representation in all 
institutions. '' As we will see in chapter 6, the pursuit of these interests would have a 
transformative effect on the post-war international order, as they entailed the political 
subjugation of Germany to the long range policies of the superpowers. 
For the Allies, discontinuity with Nazism ensured that Germany would be rid of the ideology 
that subverted the international order since the 1930s. The process of denazification was 
geared towards eliminating Nazism as a legitimate political movement and as a doctrine 
representing the aspirations of Germany in the society of states. 
The reformation of the German political system had been something that the Allies fully 
agreed on since the Declaration of Unconditional Surrender at Casablanca in 1943. At Yalta, 
(2001), p. 454-5 
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the Allies decided to provide safeguards against a potential military revival of German-, to 
eradicate German militarism and the Nazi general staff, to bring about the denazification of 
Germany, to punish the war criminals and to disarm and demilitarise Germany. '6 The 
provisions agreed upon at Potsdam implied great changes in German society as well as its 
political system. The number of Germans who belonged to the Nazi Party had reached 13 
million by the end of the war. Resistance to Hiderism lacked concrete support. Unlike 1918, 
when the Russians hoped for a revolution in Germany and the Entente Powers acted in 
defence of German society as they had found it, " the superpowers agreed on the need to 
bring about profound changes in Germany. The Potsdam Agreement called for `the 
complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany and the elimination or control of all 
German industry that could be used for military production', the destruction of the `National 
Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organisations' and `the eventual 
reconstruction of German political life'. '$ 
The legal framework established during the war stated the unanimous and unambiguous will 
of the Allies to reform what they perceived as the militaristic, warlike disposition of 
Germany, and its potential to disrupt the international political system. It was in the Allies' 
interest to demilitarise the character of German society and make it receptive to the kind of 
international order desired by the superpowers. The Western Allies achieved this aim by 
setting up political and economic foundations akin to liberal democracy and free market 
economics. The Soviets accomplished the objective of denazifying Germany by 
implementing socialistic measures that were directed against the big landowners and captains 
15 Leffler, M., The Struggle for Germany and the Origins of the Cold War, p. 5-6 
16 Proektor, D., The Yalta Conference and the German Problem' in Iakovlev, A. N., The Yalta Conference 1945: 
lessons of 
history (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency) (1985), p. 129 
" Davidson, B., Germany: What Now ?- Potsdam 1945-Partition 1949, p. 19-20 
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of industry who supported Hitler's rise to power and its war of aggression on the 
international order. 
The first instrument of denazification was the work done by the ACC. The ACC was 
responsible for the passage of measures that facilitated the denazification of German society. 
On September, 20 1945 the ACC abolished `all German land, naval and air forces, the SS, 
SA, SD, Gestapo... and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in 
Germany'. Furthermore, the proclamation established that `the National Socialist German 
Workers' Party (NSDAP) would be `abolished and declared to be illegal'. 19 On October 
10,1945 the ACC liquidated the `National Socialist German Labour Party, its formations, 
affiliated associations and supervised agencies, including paramilitary organisations and all 
other Nazi institutions established as instruments of party domination'. 20 ACC 
Proclamation no. 3 of October 20,1945 established the fundamental principles of judicial 
reform, stipulating equality before the law, regardless of `race, nationality or religion', that `no 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law', the 
liquidation of the extraordinary Hitler Courts and the independence of the judiciary. Law 
no. 4 provided for the reorganisation of the German judicial system. This reorganisation 
included the reintroduction of the Weimar legal system and the dismissal of judges and 
prosecutors who had taken part in the punitive practices of the Hitlerite regime. 21 On 
November 30,1945, the Allies agreed on the elimination and prohibition of military training 
18 Section II (a), Protocol of the Proceedings-Postdam Conference, August 1,1945- 
http: //www. yale. edu/lawwcb/avalon/decade/`decadel7. htm 
19 Control Council proclamation no. 2: certain additional requirements imposed on Germany, September 20, 
1945-From Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 68-79 
20 Control Council Law no. 2: providing for the termination and liquidation of the Nazi organizations, October 
10,1945-From Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 79-81 
21 Control Council Proclamation no. 3: fundamental principles of judicial reform, October 10,1945-From 
Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 81-2 
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as well as `all military educational institutions'. 22 On December 20,1945, the ACC 
established the guidelines to be applied for the punishment of people guilty of war crimes. In 
the same vein, ACC Directive no. 24 of January 12,1946 ordered the removal from office 
and from positions of responsibility of Nazis and persons hostile to Allied purposes. Persons 
were to be treated as `more than nominal participants in Party Activities' and as `hostile to 
Allied purposes' in cases when they `authorised or participated affirmatively in any Nazi 
crimes, racial persecutions or discriminations', `been avowed believers in Nazism or racial 
and militaristic creeds', or `voluntarily given substantial moral or material support or political 
assistance of any kind to the Nazi Party or Nazi officials and leaders'. 23 
ACC Directive no. 32 of June 26,1946 stated that any `member of the administrative or 
teaching staff of any educational institution who in any way whatsoever spreads or assists in 
spreading or connives at spreading militaristic, Nazi or anti-democratic doctrines will be 
dismissed from such institutions. ' ACC Directive no. 38 ordered the arrest and punishment 
of war criminals, Nazis and militarists, and the internment, control and surveillance of 
potentially dangerous Germans, with explicit reference to the Potsdam Agreement and 
supplementary ACC directives. 24 On February 25,1947 Control Council Law no. 46 
abolished the State of Prussia, a decision confirmed during the Moscow CFM of 1947. The 
Allies established the principle that the symbolism enshrined in the survival of the Prussian 
state had no place in a reconstituted Germany. The British representative in the ACC stated 
that 
22 Control Council Law no. 8: elimination and prohibition of military training, November 
30,1945-From 
Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 90-3 
23 Control Council Law no. 10: Punishment of persons guilty of war crimes, crimes against peace and against 
humanity, December 20,1945-From Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 97-107 
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The survival of the Prussian state... would provide the basis for any Irredentist claims which the 
German people may later seek to put forward, would strengthen the German militarist ambitions, 
and would encourage the revival of the authoritarian, centralised Germany. 25 
Directive no. 54 of 25 June 1947 established the basic Principles for the Democratisation of 
Education in Germany, which included `equal education opportunity for all' and free of 
charge provision of `tuition, textbooks and other necessary scholastic material... for pupils of 
compulsory school age'. This assistance was extended to pupils of other educational 
institutions, including universities. The directive also established that `compulsory full-time 
school attendance should be required for all [children] between the ages of six and at least 
fifteen'. It also set the foundations for a clear path to tertiary education, emphasising the 
need for `education for civic responsibility and a democratic way of life' and `understanding 
of and respect for other nations'. 26 
The work of the ACC was undertaken within a strong liberal framework. 2' The passing and 
enforcement of legislation outlawing Nazism from German political life would have a 
transformative effect on the post-war international order as both the Federal and 
Democratic German republics adopted similar measures in regards to the safeguard of basic 
24 Control Council Directive no. 32: Disciplinary measures against managing and administrative staffs of 
educational institutions, teaching staff, and students guilty of militaristic, nazi, or anti-democratic propaganda, 
June 26,1946-From Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 142 
25 ACC Coordinating Committee-Abolition of the State of Prussia-Memorandum of the British member, 
August 8,1946-FO 631/2454, p. 1 
26 From ACC Directive no. 54, June 25,1947- Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54, p. 233-4 
27 Kant states that `the only constitution 
... 
on which all juridical legislation of a people must be based, is the 
republican. This constitution is established, firstly, by principles of the freedom of the members of a society (as 
men); secondly, by principles of dependence of all upon a single common legislation (as subjects); and, thirdly, 
by the law of their equality (as citizens). ' See Kant, I., Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, section 2- 
http: //www. mtholyoke. edu/acad/intrel/kant/kantl. htm 
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civil liberties. 28 Moreover, the two Germanys adopted a bandwagoning position vis-ä-vis the 
superpowers rather than reconstructing themselves as revisionist forces. This position would 
entail that up until the 1970s, changes in the status quo leading up to the rapprochement 
between the two Germanys were discussed in adherence to the rules established by the 
occupying powers. 
The second instrument of denazification was the work done at zonal level by the Allies on 
educational and cultural reform and the implementation of the denazification tribunals. The 
need to accomplish a discontinuity with Nazism in Germany propelled the Allies to ensure 
that the occupied country would be rid of the ideology that subverted the international 
political system since the 1930s. 
US policy on educational and cultural reform evolved from reeducation to reorientation. 
Reorientation brought with it a new emphasis to end denazification. At the same time, the 
American occupation authorities established cultural and educational interchange networks 
and reopened the Free University of Berlin. There are a number of important measures 
which aided this process of reorientation. SWNCC 269/8, which received official acceptance 
on October 24,1946, permitted the exchange of persons between Germany and the United 
States. In February 1947 SWNCC 269/10 was issued in order to regulate the interchange of 
cultural and educational material between the two countries. In July 1947 it was modified by 
SWNCC 269/11, to allow exchange between Germans in the US Zone with other countries. 
28 The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Germany provided for the protection of the `inalienable 
rights to its citizens' (articles 6-49). The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germy included similar 
provisions (Articles 1-21) 
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29 
Re-education was undertaken with the view to prevent a recurrence of aggression rather than 
to remould the German consciousness. 30 Cultural reform was undertaken through the 
broadcasting of the American way of life in Youth Centres and the Amerika Haus network, 
also known as US Information Centres. " The Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF 
and the Information Control Division of the US Zone of occupation resorted to 
informational and educational means such as the press, radio, books, pictures, schools and 
the churches. 32 Willett opines that re-education was not as potent as the method of 
`ideological reproduction taking place as a consequence of the free market economy, and the 
unrestricted operation of American business and the mass media'. 33 
The Education Branch of the US zone was pivotal in restoring school buildings, selecting 
educators and textbooks, and removing Nazis from the teaching staff. By the end of 1945 
1,849,206 children were in school. A revival of pre-1933 youth organisations took place. As 
rapidly as faculties were screened, high schools and universities, which received US technical 
assistance, were built. 34 
On July 1945 the US occupation authorities licensed the first German newspaper, the 
Frankfurter Rundschau, with a circulation of 741,500, published three times a week by 
refugees of the Hider regime. During 1945, information libraries were created in Frankfurt, 
Munich and Berlin, supplying the German people with books and periodicals and portraying 
the American way of life. In October 1946 DANA (later renamed DENA), the news service 
29 Trent, J., Mission on the Rhine, p. 258 
30 Willett, R., The Americanitiation of Germany 1945-1949, p. 16 
31 Willett, R., The Americanisation of Germany 1945-1949, p. 17-20 
32 Clay, L., Decision in Germany (William Heinemann Ltd.: Melbourne, London, Toronto) (1950), p. 281-2 
33 Willett, R., The Americanization of Germany 1945-1949, p. 27 
34 Clay, L., Decision in Germany, p. 299 
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of the American zone, was created by the Military Government and modelled by Associated 
Press. In April 1946 a second newspaper was licensed in Frankfurt, re-establishing a 
competitive press in the US Zone for the first time. " 
The US Zone issued a denazification directive on July 7,1945 establishing that all high-level 
civil servants who joined the Nazi party before May 1,1937 were to be removed from office. 
In addition, the Handbook for the Military Government in Germany contained a list of 136 
`mandatory removal and exclusion categories'. OMGUS Law no. 8, issued on September 6, 
1945 and ACC Directive no. 24 of January 12,1946, signed by all four Allied powers, 
expanded the categories of persons subject to the denazification program. 36 
In August 1945, the US Military governor granted an amnesty from all denazification 
proceedings to persons born after January 1,1919. On November 5,1945, during the 
fourteenth meeting of the Länderrat in Sttutgart, Clay expressed satisfaction with the 
German denazification tribunals. On Christmas Day, an amnesty was granted to all those 
with incomes of less than RM 3,600 during the Nazi era and taxable property valued below 
RM 20,000.37 
The Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism was finally passed on March 
5,1946, in response to the need to expedite matters in the context of the new political 
realities of the nascent international order. The law established a distinction between major 
and minor offenders, followers and those exonerated. All persons over the age of eighteen 
were required to fill out questionnaires (Fragebogen) to determine their classification. 545 
tribunals (Spruchkammer) and appeal courts employing 22,000 people implemented these 
3s Clay, L., Decision in Germany, p. 282-4 
36 Merrit, Democracy Imposed, p. 181-2 
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directives. On July 11,1947, JCS directive 1779 took effect, marking a change in US policy 
on Germany. US policy goals thus shifted from a punitive occupation of Germany to a 
`more liberal' policy, allowing the occupied zone to create `a self-sustaining economy' and 
providing Germans with the opportunity to express greater political initiative. The 
amendment of JCS 1067 meant that denazification had to be terminated, as German 
cooperation was needed in order to implement the ERP. In October 1947 OMGUS asked 
the German Länder to amend the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and 
Militarism for the sake of accomplishing a more expeditious treatment of the subject. 38 The 
Länderrat passed a new amendment on March 25,1948. OMGUS reported 28,065 `hard- 
core' cases to be tried but the Länderrat amendments pushed the issue to the margins. 3ý 
The aims of British occupational policy in Germany were to induce `responsible 
government, federation of Germany and European partnership' and for Germany never to 
be able to launch another war of aggression. The initial aims of the military government were 
for re-education to go hand in hand with the prevention of an economic collapse and the de- 
prussianisation of Germany. 40 Marshall argues that the British approach to the occupation 
was `technical' rather than political when it came to the establishment of political life. The 
occupation authorities did not believe in democracy from the bottom upwards without 
political content. 41 
The British approach to educational reform was to seek early personal contacts with German 
teachers and to encourage exchange programmes. Like the US occupation authorities, 
37 Merrit, Democracy Imposed, p. 183 
38 Eisenberg, C. W., Drawing the leine: the American decision to divide Germany, 1944-1949, p. 373 
39 Eisenberg, C. W., Drawing the line, p. 374 
10 Turner, I. (Ed. ), Reconstruction in Post-War Germany, p. 4-6 
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Britain attempted to restrict church control over schools, to expand primary education and 
to oppose any reintroduction of school fees. Their efforts were largely unsuccessful, since 
the reactionary elements within their zones soon gained political influence in the shape of 
the newly founded Christian Democratic Union (CDU). 42 Initially, teachers were dismissed 
in the most obvious cases of Nazi affiliation. 43 A British report on `German Textbook 
Literature' describes how every effort was made to eliminate nationalism, racism, militarism, 
violence and cruelty, as well as hostility towards international world organisations 
reminiscent of attitudes prevalent in the Wilhelmine period. `` 
By the late 1946 the British authorities had used the categorisation process as a means to 
rehabilitate many of the less serious offenders. 45 The British employed a `legal' approach 
towards denazification and refused to cooperate with German anti-fascist organisations. The 
British denazification panels functioned under the advisement of German anti-Nazis. On 
October 1,1947 the British Military Government decreed that the Land governments would 
be in charge of the denazification process, including the right to `alter or revoke existing 
zonal instruction'. ' Demotions occurred until 1948-9, when many former offenders 
climbed back towards their old positions. 4' Turner argues that the greatest impact of 
41 Marshall, B., The Origins of Post-War German Politics (Groom Helm: London, New York, Sydney) (1988), p. 198- 
200 
42 Hahn, H. J., Education and Society in Germany (Berg Publishers: Oxford and Providence, NI) (1998), p. 95 
43 Samuel R., and Thomas R.,, Education and Society in Modern Germany (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul) 
(1949), p. 175 
4' Davis, K. S., The Problem of Textbooks ; in Hearnden (ed. ), The British in Germany, p. 115 
45 Turner, I., Dena cation in the British Zone in Turner, I. (ed), Reconstruction in Post-War Germany-British Occupation 
Policy and the Western Zones, 1945-55 (Berg Publishers Limited: Oxford and Providence, RI) (1989), p. 239 
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54, p. 247-50 
47 Ebsworth, R., Restoring Democracy in Germany-The British Contribution (Stevens and sons Ltd: London) (1960), p. 
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denazification in the British zone was amongst the political elites, with the civil service being 
less affected and the industrial elite barely touched. 48 
In the French zone, the military commanders gave the people responsible for the different 
aspects of the occupation a large degree of autonomy. The Director of Education, Raymond 
Schmittlein, a Germanist by profession, defined the goals of the occupation as to `free the 
German youth of the yoke of discipline which kills his judgement, the Wagnerian nightmares 
that poison its imagination... to make her understand that nationalism was imposed on her 
artificially... [and] to show her that the philosophy of the `Superman'... can only lead to 
catastrophe'. 49 
The French employed the American concept of re-education, which was geared to bring 
about a change in the political and institutional mindset. '" Textbooks published in the 
French zone downplayed the Prussian influence on the history of Germany, stressing instead 
the ties that bound Germany with the rest of Europe, especially France. They also depicted 
Prussia as a reactionary power that thwarted the effects of the Enlightenment and the 
French Revolution. 51 Denazification was stringent in the teaching profession, with less than 
50% of elementary and secondary teachers being retained. Notably though, a much less 
48 Turner, I., Dena cation in the British Zone in Turner, I. (ed), Reconstruction in Post-War Germany-British Occupation 
Policy and the Western Zones, 1945-55 (Berg Publishers Limited: Oxford and Providence, RI) (1989), p. 266 
49 Ruge-Schatz, A., Le Revers de la medaille-Contradictions et limites de l'apport culturel du government militarire francais en 
Allemagne in Vaillant, J. (ed. ), La Dena Ication par les Vainqueurs-L. a Politique Culturelle des Occupants en Allemagne 
1945-1949, p. 107 
so Ruge-Schatz, A., Le Revers de la medaille-Contradictions et limiter de 1'apport culturel du government militarire franfais en 
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51 For a close examination of the aspects involving re-education in the Western zones see Torriani, R., Nazis 
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severe process was implemented in the field of industry. 52 
Although the educational and cultural reform faced resistance from local circles, education 
policy in the French zone was very comprehensive. The occupation authorities had the aims 
of reforming the teaching profession, publishing new textbooks and reforming the 
secondary and higher education systems. 53 The occupation authorities created nine teaching 
schools in Rhineland-Pfalz and Baden-Württemberg, which in 1947 provided 500 teachers to 
the education system. 5' Educational reform began in primary schools, which reopened in 
September 1945. Sixteen teacher-training colleges patterned after the French ecoles normales 
were founded. All textbooks published after 1933 were banned. By 1947, the French zone 
published more textbooks per child than the British and American zones. 55 Secondary 
education was reformed in June 1946. Reform included the unification of schools, the 
mixing of boys and girls and more choice in regards to the curriculum. 56 French culture and 
history were taught in French as were teacher-training courses. German culture was de- 
emphasised and American textbooks were kept out of the French Zone. '' The Abitur 
(secondary education leaving certificate), modelled on the French baccalaureat, introduced a 
clearly defined path from secondary to higher education. 58 As for the university system, the 
French introduced curriculum reform and reopened the universities of Tübingen and 
Freiburg. Libraries were provided with 1,340,650 `syllabaires' and books for primary 
52 Willis, F. R., France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1963, p. 42-3 
53 Ruge-Schatz, A., Le Revers de la medaille-Contradictions et limites de l'apport culturel dugovernment militarire franfais en 
Allemagne in Vaillant, J. (ed. ), La Denacation par les Vainqueurs-La Politique Culturelle des Occupants en Allemagne 
1945-1949, p. 108 
54 Guth, S., Les Forces Francaises en Allemagne-La Citadelle Utopique, p. 29-30 
55 Was, F. R., France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1963, p. 44-5 
56 Ruge-Schatz, A., Le Revers de la medaille-Contradictions et limiter de I'apport culturel du government militarire francais en 
Allemagne in Vaillant, J. (ed. ), La Dena i zcation par les Vainqueurs-La Politique Culturelle des Occupants en Allemagne 
1945-1949, p. 109 
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education, 574,820 German classics, translations of French and English books, 868,280 
dictionaries and manuals in French, 630,000 French literary texts and 240,000 history books. 
59 
Secondary education was reformed in June 1946. Reform included the unification of schools, 
the mixing of boys and girls and more choice in regards to the curriculum. 60 French culture 
and history were taught in French as were teacher-training courses. German culture was de- 
emphasised and American textbooks were kept out of the French Zone. 6' 
Cultural policy was actively pursued and served as a transformative element within the 
occupational structure as well as to mitigate the psychological impact of economic 
exploitation. 62 The absence of coordination between the military administration in Baden- 
Baden and at Land and Kreis level created the conditions for several cultural initiatives in the 
zone. Cultural activity was revitalised through theatre and cinema, with performances by 
French actors in Baden. The old University of Mainz was reopened. The Ecole 
d'Administration in Spire, the Institute of Translators in Gemersheim and a number of 
pedagogic academies were set up in order to root the French influence. G3 The Institute of 
European History at Mainz was established and eight popular universities (Volksuniversität 
58 Guth, S., Les Forces Francaires en Allemagne-La Citadelle Utopique, p. 31-2 
59 Guth, S., Les Forces Fran faises en Allemagne-La Citadelle Utopique, p. 32-3 
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Allemagne in Vaillant, J. (ed. ), La Denazification par les Vainqueurs-La Politique Culturelle des Occupants en Allemagne 
1945-1949, p. 109 
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populaire in \'aillant, J. (ed. ), La Dena cation par les Vainqueurs-La Politique Culturelle des Occupants en Allemagne 
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were opened, offering evening instruction and college degrees. " 
France revitalised the press and on September 8,1945 Südkurier, the first approved 
newspaper was published. The press introduced the subject of denazification and grouped 
all anti-Nazi organisations (Antifa groups) like Das Neue Deutschland. 65 There was a 
revitalisation of pre-Hitler youth movements such as Bund der Katholischen Jugend, Evangelische 
Jugend and 
Naturfreunde. 66 There was an assiduous Franco-German cultural collaboration at 
the level of youth organisations like the Peuple et Culture movement, the Centre d'Echanges 
Internationaux and Service Jeunesse et Education Populaire. 67 French teachers (Lecteurs d'education 
populaire) taught in the popular schools (Volkshochschulen), portraying France's social and 
cultural values. 68 
In the French zone, the denazification process entailed not just the removal of the Nazis 
from civil service but also administrative reform. "A General Directorate of justice under 
Charles Furby was put in charge of judicial reform. Separate courts were created in each 
Land as well as a High Court in Rastatt. 70 German Denazification Committees were set up 
by the French First Army and the military government and a purge of those holding office 
was well under way in October 1945. " By 1946 each Land in the French zone had 
developed its own denazification system, with Württemberg having the most developed of 
6+ Willis, F. R., France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1963, p. 4-5 
65 Ferber, G., Vicissitudes ou les debuts de la passe ä Constance en 1945-1946 in Vaillant, J. (ed. ), La DenaIcation par 
les Vainqueurs-La Po/itique Culturelle des Occupants en Allemagne 1945-1949, p. 78-9 
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them all. Nevertheless, denazification was not given a high priority by the occupation 
authorities as it was seen to have little political utility. As France's main interest in the 
occupation of Germany was of an economic nature, any approach to denazification that 
conflicted with that aim had little chance of being adopted. 72 
In the Eastern zone, educational and cultural reform was intended to foster peaceful co- 
operation among nations. The September 1,1946 the law of democratisation of German 
schools introduced twelve years of compulsory education as well as state control of the 
school system. Teaching courses were imbued with an emphasis on Marxist indoctrination 
and political `progressiveness', while the selection of candidates was almost entirely in the 
hands of the SED. 73 The emphasis on cultural reform hinged upon the establishment of a 
`popular front', accommodating people not necessarily associated with the SED, and the 
entrenchment of the anti-fascist struggle for the democratic renewal of Germany. Cultural 
and educational policy revolved around this notion, particularly under the chairmanship of 
Johannes R. Becher, a KPD Moscow exile during the war, and president of the Cultural 
Association for the Democratic Renewal of Germany from July 1945. ' The antifascist 
education in the Eastern zone sought to unify the German nation in political terms and to 
create a cultural base akin to the socialist ideals. At the heart of these concepts was the 
uniform schooling of citizens in the Einheitschule, so as to erase the notion of class and 
70 Willis, F. R., The French in Germany 1945-9, p. 153-4 
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confessional and gender divisions. Blessing argues that the antifascist education practiced in 
schools did not replicate the state ideology dictated by Moscow for controlling its satellites. 
The educational reformers consciously fostered the German nature of the reforms. '' The 
Soviets integrated the school system with the socialist method of production. Seventh grade 
students had to work in factories one day a week. Those who refused or opposed 
Communism were not allowed to go to high school and had to undertake apprenticeships 
instead. 'G The Soviet authorities integrated the school system with the socialist method of 
production. Seventh grade students had to work in factories one day a week. Those who 
refused or opposed Communism were not allowed to go to high school and had to 
undertake apprenticeships instead. " 
In the Eastern zone, denazification brought about the complete overhaul of the socio- 
economic system, with the purge of the social and economic elites from their pre-1945 
positions. While this was probably done in the hope of generating popular support amongst 
the rest of the population, the purges forced an exodus of East Germans into the Western 
zones. Communists or Social Democrats took up prominent positions in the civil service, 
local government, the education system and the judiciary. '$ On May 25,1946 the Soviet 
Commanders nationalised the entire `property of the Nazi Party and its affiliated bodies and 
the works and enterprises of war criminals, leaders, and active protagonists of the Nazi Party 
and the Nazi state, as well as the works and enterprises which have actively served the crime 
Perspectives on Division and Unity in East and West (German Monitor no. 50, Editions Rodopi B. V., Amsterdam 
and Atlanta, GA) (1994) 
75 Blessing, B., The Antifascist classroom-Dena cation in Soviet-occupied Germany, 1945-1949 (Palgrave Macmillan: 
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of war'. 79 Denazification tribunals were largely staffed and under the control of reliable SPD 
and KPD members. This extended to the appointment of Burgermeister, police chiefs and 
senior officials, all in charge of purging their departments. so 
Order no. 201 of 16 August 1947 established the guidelines for the execution of ACC 
Directives no. 24 and 38 on denazification. Order no. 201 executed the confiscation of 
`landed property of the Junkers, fascists, and war criminals' as well as credit and banking 
institutes, and private enterprises formerly belonging to active fascists and militarists. The 
Order also provided that `former members of the Nazi party who have not themselves 
committed crimes against peace and against the security of other peoples or crimes against 
the German people [were] to be granted not only the right to vote, but also the right to stand 
for election'. The Order established that German administrative bodies and Denazification 
Commissions were to take the `necessary measures for the acceleration of the execution and 
completion of denazification in the Soviet zone of occupation'. $' 
The implementation of cultural and educational reform varied in each of the occupation 
zones. However, the Allies had a common purpose: to transform Germany by achieving a 
discontinuity with Nazism. According to Doyle, Liberalism revolves around the idea of 
`juridical equality and fundamental human rights'. 82 The process of cultural and educational 
reform as well as the implementation of denazification at zonal level had drawbacks on both 
sides of the Elbe. In order to accomplish their structural interests, the Western Allies were 
78 Pritchard, G., The Making of the GDR 1945-53, p. 86 
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quick to expedite the process of cultural and educational rehabilitation, and reinstate the 
captains of industry who had helped the rise of Hider. In the Eastern zone, the Soviet 
authorities implemented their cultural and educational reforms in order to bring about the 
sovietisation of the political system. The Liberal aspects attached to the elements of 
transformation in Germany would create a reorientation of the mindset of ordinary 
Germans. However, Peterson argues that the major change was psychological and 
indigenous. Germany was in large part denazified by Hider because Nazism was based on 
success and Hider failed. Germans might have been more dissuaded from fascism and 
communism than persuaded to democracy, 83 as seen in the flight of the German soldiers 
and ordinary Germans towards the zones occupied by the Western armies upon the end of 
the war. Moreover, the imposition of Communist rule in the Eastern zone brought with it 
the brutality of the Red Army towards civilians, particularly women, during the early stages 
of the occupation. 
The most transformative outcome of the treatment of the German Question was the 
reconciliation between German aspirations in the international political system (particularly 
in the case of West Germany) and the structural interests of the superpowers. Since the 
unification of German polity within the framework of the nation-state, the great European 
powers (particularly Britain and France) perceived Germany as a threat. As a latecomer to 
the imperial race and unified as a single state many centuries later than England and France, 
Germany was perceived as a challenger to the international order since the late nineteenth 
century. By the turn of the twentieth century Germany had become a mighty economic 
power, with the size of its economy surpassing that of France and achieving parity with that 
82 Doyle, Ways of war and peace 
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of Britain. Overseas investments grew exponentially. In 1914, the pursuit of Weltpolitik had 
caused a major disruption of the international order. The Nazi period magnified the 
potential threat of Germany. In 1945, Richter stated that the `way of purification' should he 
ahead in a European community of freedom, equality, and brotherhood which could inspire 
84 control nations. `` The surrender of the German state to the Allies in the aftermath of 
World War Two would produce a reorientation of the German political character towards 
Europeanisation. Undoubtedly, the work done by the Allies on denazification (understood as 
the reconstitution of the German political character) would be the main factor in this 
reorientation. The Allies succeeded in eradicating Nazism as a viable political alternative for 
Germany. Muhten mentions that by the time of the 1952 elections, the nationwide 
conventions of the CDU, the SPD, the German Federation of Trade Unions as well as 
assemblies of university students, physicians, booksellers and book publishers representing 
millions of Germans assailed Nazism and pledged never to let it grow again. 85 
The third instrument in the denazification of Germany was the implementation of the 
International Military Tribunals (IMT). At Nuremberg, war crimes perpetrators and the main 
leaders of the Third Reich were tried by judges representing the four occupation powers. 
The unprecedented nature of the crimes committed by Nazi Germany, the dislocation and 
devastation caused by the war and the level of superpower interventionism, prompted the 
trial of the ideology that disrupted the international order. Nuremberg had the antecedent of 
the Leipzig trials after the end of World War One, when the Germans tried the Kaiser and 
other former soldiers and generals. Wilhelm II was charged on moral and political grounds, 
83 Peterson, E. N., The American Occupation of Germany, p. 341-2 
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not on crimes against humanity. Moreover, the victors of the Great War did not seek to 
extradite the Kaiser. 86 
The London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, drafted by Robert H. Jackson, 
Robert Falco, and Iona Nikitchenko, was instituted on August 8,1945. The Charter set 
down the laws and procedures by which the Nuremberg trials were to be conducted. The 
Charter established that only crimes committed by the European Axis could be tried. Three 
categories of crimes were defined: war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against 
humanity. The Charter also stated that the official's position was not a valid defense against 
war crime charges. Between October 18,1945, and October 1,1946, the IMT tried twenty- 
two `major' war criminals on charges of conspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity. 8' The IMT defined crimes against humanity as `murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation... or persecutions on political, racial, or religious 
grounds'. 88 Twelve of those convicted were sentenced to death, amongst them Hans Frank, 
Hermann Göring, Alfred Rosenberg, and Julius Streicher, masterminders and executioners 
of the policies which stemmed from the ideology in trial. 
Under the aegis of the IMT, American military tribunals conducted 12 further trials of high- 
ranking German officials at Nuremberg, referred to collectively as the Subsequent 
Nuremberg Proceedings. Gestapo and SS members, as well as German industrialists, were 
tried for their roles in implementing the Nuremberg Laws, `Aryanisation', mass shootings of 
Jews in concentration camps, shootings by Einsatzgruppen (mobile killing units), 
deportations, forced labor, sale of Zyklon B, and medical experiments. 
86 Woetzel, R., The Nuremberg Trials in Internationlal Law (with aPostlude on the Eichmann case) (Stevens & Sons Ltd) 
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Nuremberg introduced a liberal concept of international law; namely, the principle that 
professional soldiers cannot escape punishment for waging aggressive wars and permitting 
crimes against humanity with the claim they were dutifully carrying out orders issued by their 
superiors. Nuremberg is an example of effective international law being implemented and, 
adding a clear interventionist dimension, of sovereignty and territoriality being by-passed as 
responsibility was devolved down to the individual. 89 Persico argues that the legacy of 
Nuremberg, although contradictory, documented beyond question the atrocities committed 
by the Nazi regime and contributed to the establishment of a democratic system in 
Germany, as the German population became fully aware of the worst aspects of Nazism. 90 
Although Nuremberg could not root out all the elements involved with the Nazi regime, it 
contributed to the denazification of German society. The Nuremberg trials also provided the 
German people with a clean slate and solidified the process of discontinuity with Nazism. 
The Nuremberg trials were an eloquent example of the interventionist approach of the 
superpowers. Nuremberg would have a lasting transformative effect on the Cold War 
international order as it created an important interventionist precedent for situations 
involving the disruption of the international order and gross violation of human rights, as in 
the case of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s and the trial of dictatorial leaders 
in South America. ý' 
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5.3 Conclusion 
The political transformation of Germany undertaken by the Allies established a clear 
discontinuity with Nazism. This discontinuity was meant to prevent the resurgence of 
Germany as a challenger to the international political system through the creation of post- 
war political institutions (in both the Western and Eastern zones) orientated towards the 
creation of an international order based on co-existence. This discontinuity was not, for 
practical purposes, conducive to the elimination of all vestiges of Nazism. The process of 
denazification is seen from a variety of standpoints and its main criticism is that the 
eradication of former Nazis from public life did not go far enough. 92 Fitzgibbon argues that 
denazification as punishment was not an unqualified success. As Clay himself acknowledged, 
too many `little' Nazis were punished while too many `big' Nazis were let loose. 93 
Denazification as moral reformation also had a mixed legacy. Denazification did not 
eradicate all the elements that participated in the Nazi regime or the economic networks that 
supported Nazi Germany, particularly in the Western zones. The Adenauer government 
included prominent Nazi members like Dr. Hans Maria Globke, which drafted the 
Nuremberg Laws of 1935, Dr. Günther Bergmann, which oversaw the plunder of Serbia 
during the war and Rudolf Senteck, responsible for `aryanising' Germany during the war. 94 
Astonishingly, Kurt-George Kiesinger, future Chancellor of West Germany, entered the 
radio propaganda division at the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the 1930s and 
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directed a world-wide radio propaganda apparatus, coordinating his department's work with 
that of Propaganda Minister Dr Joseph Goebbels. 
According to Liberal theory, peace can be perpetuated by establishing legitimate /democratic 
domestic orders throughout the world. 95 The process of denazification, although tainted 
by political bickering and expedited due to the evolving realities of the nascent international 
order, had the ultimate effect of ridding German society of the ideology that had caused the 
disruption of the international political system in the 1930s and 1940s. Denazification 
succeeded in getting rid of Nazism as a political alternative for Germany. Through this 
process the superpowers ensured the compliance of the two Germanys to the international 
political system established by the Allies. 
The process of denazification would be influenced by the creation of the German `economic 
miracle' and the Europeanisation of the two Germanys. 9' This rehabilitative policy can be 
interpreted using a Schumpeterian interpretation. Liberal commercial pacifism maintains that 
when citizens become rational and materialistic they `eschew psychological militarism and 
chauvinism'. 9' This is particularly true in the case of the rehabilitation of the Western zones; 
a phenomenon that would bring about the reconciliation between social welfare and sound 
economics through the rise of the Social Market paradigm in West Germany and the 
integration of Western Europe. 98 
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The process of West European integration would give the transformation of Germany a 
distinct Liberal element. The development of a European sense of community in which 
Germany would also participate was the presupposition for cultural reconstruction. 99 The 
integrationist impetus brought about by the superpowers can be explained using a 
functionalist approach, linked to the liberal ideas of Kant and going back to President 
Wilson's `Fourteen Points'. 1 "' According to functionalism, `material interdependence' 
unfolds within the assumption that states will not sabotage a process of integration taking 
place within the framework of human freedom. "" This is particularly true of the process of 
integration in Western Europe, undertaken through the intervention of the United States in 
the German Question and the process of bandwagoning that went with it. 
The increased level of international organisation envisaged by the Allies during the making 
of the post-war international order entailed a more interventionist approach to inter-state 
relations and the erosion of sovereignty in the society of states. 102 The overwhelming 
political and military power which the United States and the Soviet Union mustered during 
the war would enable them to use military intervention as and when needed and most 
importantly, to influence the political and economic process in their respective spheres of 
influence. 
99 Richter, W., Re-educating Germany, p. 127-8 
100 Speech delivered by US President Woodrow Wilson to a joint session of the United States Congress on 
January 8,1918. 
-http: //usinfo. state. gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/51. htm 
101 Mitrany, D., The Progress of International Government (New Haven: Yale University Press) (1933), p. 101 
102 The need for international organisation was discussed at length during the war. In 1940, the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace published The New World Order, a pamphlet which contained a select list of 
references on regional and world federation, together with some special plans for world order after the war. In 
1942, the Institute of Pacific Relations published Post War Worlds by P. E. Corbett, which outlined that `world 
government [as an] ultimate aim' and for the law of nations to `take precedence over national law'. Also, see 
Orson Welles, The Federation of Man, Coudenhove's Pan Europa, Streit, C., Union Now (Jonathan Cape: London) 
(1939), Emery Reves The Anatomy of Peace (1945), Wilkie, W., One World (1943), Culbertson, E., Total Peace and 
Orwell, G, Toward European Unity Partisan Review July-August 1947. 
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The occupation powers (both at zonal and ACC level) had a significant input in changing the 
German character. 103 Denazification and demilitarisation helped to remove Germany as a 
threat to the international order. The Europeanisation of the German Question (through 
economic integration on both sides of the Elbe) and the tutelage of the occupation powers 
provided the opportunity for this Revolutionist overhaul. The Allies rehabilitated and 
reconstituted the political and institutional culture of Germany. As far as Germany's position 
in the international political system is concerned, by 1947-8 the United States, as the leader 
of the Western bloc, was committed to the reconstruction of German power in Western 
Europe under the ethos of the Vest. In the words of AJP Taylor, the occupying powers 
managed to `discover the true problem which Germany presented to Europe-not how to 
resist German strength, but how to promote in Germany a sensible balanced way of life'. 104 
Roseman highlights an important difference between the 1918 and 1945 settlements, 
signaling that the `hegemonic myths' of the post-1945 era were more constructive than those 
of the interwar period. The diluted denazification that allowed the old elites to remain in 
power involved an acceptance of the post-war settlement. 1"5 
103 The Allies were also responsible for forcing the Germans to deal with the Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming 
to terms with the past). Theodor Adorno's dealt with the question in a lecture entitled Was bedeutet die 
Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit? (`What is meant by the working through the past? '), a subject related to his 
thinking of `after Auschwitz' in his later work. This work is often seen as consisting in part of a variably implicit 
and explicit critique of the work of Martin Heidegger, whose formal ties to the Nazi party are well known. 
Heidegger, attempted to provide a historical conception of Germania as a philosophical thought of German 
origin and destiny (later he would speak of `the West'). Alexander Garcia Düttman's Das Gedächtnis des Denkens: 
Versuch über Heidegger und Adorno (The Memory of Thought: an Essay on Heidegger and Adorno, translated by 
Nicholas Walker) attempts to treat the philosophical value of these seemingly opposed and certainly 
incompatible terms ('Auschwitz' and `Germania') in the philosophy of both writers. 
104 Taylor, AJP., The Course of German History (London: Methuen & Co: 1978), p. 263 
105 Roseman, M., Defeat and Stability: 1918,1945 and 1989 in Germany in Levy, C. and Roseman, M. (eds), Three 
Postwar Eras in Comparison-Western Europe 1918-1945-1989 (Palgrave: Basingstoke and New York) (2002), p. 272 
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Doyle posits that liberalism `is not inherently `peace-loving'; nor it is consistently restrained 
or peaceful in intent. "" Furthermore, Doyle points out the failings of liberal policy in their 
diplomatic relations with non-liberal powerful states, which he attributes to the fact that they 
are caught in an `international state of war'. "" As we have seen in chapter 2, the process of 
transformation in Germany was informed by the Realist elements that underpinned 
superpower relations as well as the legal/Rationalist framework of reference. 
As seen from the standpoint of Liberal theory, interventionism would facilitate the 
conditions for the end to the balance of power in Western Europe, a development which 
linked economic integration with the end of the warring feuds between the main European 
powers. Interventionism meant the Europeanisation of Germany and the gradual erosion of 
disruptive nationalism as an informative element of the European political system. Although 
the nation-state still remains the most immediate reality of the international political system, 
intervention created a legacy which would radically transform Germany and Europe. 
Distinct features of that intervention, like free market economics and the Atlantic military 
alliance under the banner of NATO, remain intact. Although the experience of integration 
in Eastern Europe under the aegis of the Moscow would unfold under the threat of Soviet 
intervention, it would facilitate the process of industrialisation and economic cooperation 
which served as a stepping stone towards the absorption of the former Communist countries 
into the European Union in 2004-7. The Eastern bloc lacked the liberal elements typical of 
Western European societies. However, the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe 
contributed in a significant way to the formation of a balance of power system based on co- 
106 Doyle, M., Kant, Liberal Legades and Foreign Affairs in in Brown, A1. (with Lynn Jones, S. and Miller, S. ) (ed. ) 
Debating the democratic peace (Cambridge, I\L : MIT Press) (1996), p. 4 
107 Doyle, M., Kant, Liberal Legacier and Foreign Affairs, p. 31 
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existence, which unfolded peacefully until its demise in 1989-90. Whilst the balance of power 
achieved during the long nineteenth century was based around the ideology of conservatism, 
the system of coexistence achieved during the early years of the Cold War allowed for the 
toleration of ideological diversity and the peaceful unfolding of the superpowers' national 
interest. 
The Allies attempted to transform Germany through the primary institutions of intervention 
and coexistence. In spite of the conflictual nature of superpower relations regarding the 
treatment of the German Question, the development of these primary institutions, discussed 
at length in chapter 4, is compatible with the notion of Liberal peace espoused by Kant. As 
we will see in chapter 6, the Liberal aspects involved in the treatment of the German 
Question would have a significant effect on the transformation of the society of states. The 
Allies had as their main priority the transformation of Germany. They undertook the work 
of denazification in order to prevent a militaristic re-emergence of the former foe and 
therefore secure a smooth and peaceful transition to the post-war international order. In 
addition, the willingness of the Allies to cooperate on international organisation denotes 
their determination to establish a post-war international order based on toleration and 
diversity. 
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Chapter 6 
The German Question and the transformation of international society 
6.1 The English School's concept of `international society' and the German Question 
The treatment of the German Question during the 1943-8 period was the most relevant 
factor in the transformation of international society. The English School endorses an overall 
pluralist view of international society. Bull maintains that a society of states comes into being 
`when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a 
society... to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and 
share in the working of common institutions'. ' James posits that international society is `a 
body of rules which define `proper behaviour' for its members and a channel of diplomatic 
communication between them'. 2 Bellamy adds to the debate by stating that the English 
School addresses the question of what represents `international society' via the debate 
between pluralists and solidarists, and by mapping the interaction of the three main 
traditions of international relations theory outlined by Wight: realism and revolutionism, 
with rationalism as the middle way between the two. 3 
The pluralist conception of international society leans towards the realist side of rationalism, 
with its emphasis on positive law, state sovereignty and the preservation of the political and 
cultural differences between members. According to Mayall `states, like individuals, can and 
do have differing interests and values, and consequently. 
. . 
international society is limited to 
Bull, H., The Anarchical Society, p. 13 
2 James, A., `International Society'-British Journal of International Studies (July 1978), p. 91-106 
3 Bellamy, A., Conclusion: Whither international society? In Bellamy, A. International Society and its Critics, p. 283-4 
247 
the creation of a framework that will allow them to coexist in relative harmony'. 4 
Conversely, solidarists root their thinking in the view that `humanity is one, and that the task 
of diplomacy is to translate this latent or immanent solidarity of interests and values into 
reality. ' ' The theoretical implication of the solidarist view is an elementary universalism 
which `underpins the society of states and contributes to the survival of international order. ' 
6 
The political emasculation of Germany and Europe, ideological polarisation and the 
expansion and institutionalisation of international society undertaken by the Allies, 
transformed the international order in a `pluralist plus' manner. The treatment of the 
German Question created an evolution in the shape of the society of states. This evolution 
was created by the interaction between conflict and cooperation. The transformation of 
international society was also influenced by the elements of intervention and coexistence, 
hence generating a middle way between pluralism and solidarism. The ideological divide 
remained a permanent obstacle to a fully-fledged solidarist society of states. However, the 
enormity of the task involved in winning the war and laying the foundations of an 
international political system less susceptible to disruption and challenges by revisionist 
powers entailed an interventionist approach on the part of the superpowers. At the same 
time, the notion of transformation in Germany and the post-war international society is 
linked to the Revolutionist elements described in chapter 5. 
I will now expand on the elements that brought the transformation in Germany and the 
international political system at large by tackling the political emasculation of Germany 
4 Mayall, J., [Forld Politics: Progress and its Limits, (Cambridge, Polity) (2000), p. 14 
5 Mayal1, J., World Politics: Progress and its limits, (Cambridge, Polity) (2000), p. 14 
6 Linklater, A., The Transformation of Political Community, (Cambridge, Polity Press) (1998), p. 24 
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undertaken by the Allies during the 1943-8 period, the nature of the ideological divide that 
informed the Cold-War international order and the expansion and institutionalisation of 
international society. 
6.2 The political emasculation of Germany 
The political emasculation of Germany, established by the Allies by the declaration of 
unconditional surrender issued at the Casablanca Conference in 1943, would become the 
main transformative element of international society. The surrender of the German state to 
the Allies would be the triggering element in the creation of an ideologically-driven spheres 
of influence system. The political enfeeblement of Germany created an end to the political 
and economic autonomy of Europe and produced an expansion in the scope of international 
society. The loss of political autonomy of the Western part of Germany facilitated its 
integration into a free-market orientated Western European bloc which would facilitate the 
continuation of the American economic expansion of the war years. US policy over 
Germany revolved around the premise of the rehabilitation of the German economy within 
the context of a free system of exchange which could serve as a tool for stability in the post- 
war international order. The threat of the Soviet Union, fear of another economic depression 
and the very nature of the American political and economic system compelled the Truman 
administration to put the policy of rehabilitation into practice with the implementation of 
Bizonia and the Marshall Plan. 
At the same time, the Soviet Union was interested in the political emasculation of Germany, 
principally because of security concerns. Its abundance of natural resources and manpower 
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made economic recovery almost exclusively dependant on indigenous efforts, provided 
Moscow did not have to fight another protracted war. In this context, constraining the 
revival of an independent Germany entailed sovietising the Eastern zone of occupation and 
pressing for reparations from the Western zones, developments which forced Washington 
and London to undertake the implementation of Bizonia. Moscow would also contribute to 
the emasculation of Germany by facilitating the transfer of German territory beyond the 
Oder-Neisse to Poland, the expulsion of 6 million ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe 
and the consolidation of an Eastern European bloc via COMINFORM. 
The political emasculation of Germany was undertaken in the context of the pursuit of the 
national interest on the part of the superpowers. Polarisation had an inherent `pluralist plus' 
principle: intervention was confined to achieving the common aim of preventing the re- 
emergence of a German regime capable of threatening long-term US economic objectives 
and Soviet security interests. This process of emasculation through intervention waters down the 
notion of sovereignty as one of the central institutions of international society. The political 
emasculation of Germany had the immediate consequence of depriving Europe of its 
political and economic autonomy. Germany's geographical and historical position had been a 
driving force in the European political system at least since the middle of the nineteenth 
century. The disruption caused by the failure of the Hitlerite quest for the domination of the 
continent resulted in a breakdown of the traditional relations between Germany and her 
European partners. The European system based on economic autarkic principles and 
imperial expansion which had operated in Europe in the 1930s would be scrapped and 
replaced by two coexisting geopolitical blocs, one marshaled by the United States and the 
other one by the Soviet Union. The surrender of the German state to the Allies meant that 
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Europe, deprived from its traditional economic ties with the richest country in the continent, 
would also surrender to the diktat of Washington and Moscow. This created a situation 
unprecedented in the history of the international political system. For the first time since the 
formation of the society of states, Europe would lose its political autonomy to an extra- 
European power. The political enfeeblement of Germany created another unprecedented 
development in the form of the end to the internal balance of power that had operated in 
Western Europe since the Peace of Westphalia. This political emasculation would also create 
the conditions for co-existence between the superpowers. The elimination of a possible 
tripolar international order ensured the non-disruptive passage into the formation of two 
blocs, originating in the split that unfolded in Germany and ultimately encompassed the 
whole of Europe. 
6.3 The German Question and the ideological divide of the post-war international 
society 
No other factor in the course of inter-Allied relations contributed more to the setting of two 
spheres of influence in Europe along ideological lines than the treatment of the German 
Question. The originating factor of an ideologically-split post-war international society was 
the polarisation of Germany via the gradual sovietisation of the Eastern zone 
during the 
1945-6 period and the setting of the Anglo-American zone of occupation 
(Bizonia). This 
process was decisive in generating the subsequent diplomatic breakdown at the 
Moscow 
Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) of 1947. When the Allies met at the Moscow CFM to 
discuss the peace treaty with Germany, they failed to reach an agreement on the economic 
unity of the vanquished nation. Indeed, the vital questions of economic unity and 
the 
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extracting of reparations, crucial elements in the accomplishment of a four-power solution 
had already been decided through the occupation process. 
The ideological divide created in Germany had profound implications for the configuration 
of the post-war international order. The main rationale behind Soviet post-war policy was to 
prevent the emergence of a resurgent Germany and encirclement by the `%'est. As such, the 
Soviet military authorities and Moscow-trained cadres began to sovietise the Eastern zone of 
right after the beginning of the occupation through the nationalisation of industry, land 
reform and the merging of the Socialist and Communist parties. The Soviets kept taking 
reparations from the Western zones, at a time when the German economy operated under 
restrictions in its level of industry. This situation effectively meant that while the economy of 
the Soviet zone of occupation was recovering, the Western zones were descending into 
economic chaos, creating the possibility of a Communist takeover west of the Elbe. 
Political life was reconstituted in the Eastern zone before anywhere else in occupied 
Germany. The KPD (the German Communist Party) and the FDGB (the Free German 
Trade Union) were given permission to start functioning as early as May 1945. Walter 
Ulbricht and the Soviet military administrators made sure that German personnel directors 
at all levels were KPD members who had lived and served in the Soviet Union during the 
war. On July 14,1945, Ulbricht and Marshall Georgii Zhukov, the head of the Soviet 
Military Government, set up eleven central organisations to manage the governance of the 
Soviet zone and potentially serve as the basis for an all-German administration. ' In early 
1946 Stalin called Ulbricht to Moscow and instructed him to form a unity party before May 
Day. Meanwhile, Vasili Sokolovsky, the new Soviet occupation commander, pushed the SPD 
Smyser, W R, From Yalta to Berlin, p. 33 
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(Socialist Party of Germany) toward a union with the KPD (Communist Party of Germany) 
by means of deportations, arrests, imprisonment or death. The merger was created on April 
21-22,1946 with KPD members taking full and direct control of the Socialist Unity Party 
(SED). 8 At the beginning of 1947 the occupation authorities constituted the Administration 
of Internal Affairs. By the end of the year they announced the formation of a `People's 
Police', with the view to establish the `democratic means of crushing secret reactionary 
elements'. 9 By 1948 the SED dominated the political He of the Soviet zone to an extent 
out of proportion to its size and strength. Members of the SED occupied the greatest 
majority of positions in the central administration, and the most important posts in the 
provincial government structures. "' 
The occupation authorities were keen to create a socio-economic system in the Eastern zone 
which would operate under the premises of the Communist credo. The Soviet military 
authorities in charge of the occupation acted with remarkable speed in order to achieve the 
economic rehabilitation of the Eastern zone. On January 15,1947 the Central Secretariat of 
the Socialist Unity Party announced the decision of the occupation authorities to curtail 
rationing, the termination of industrial dismantling and the transformation of two hundred 
industries originally earmarked for dismantling into Soviet Joint Stock Companies 
(SoWjet- 
Aktiengesellschaften), with 74 of those returning to German Land governments. Other 
measures included the reduction of quotas for reparations in kind and 
for more raw 
materials and tools to be put at the disposal of farmers, artisans and small tradesmen. 
The 
Soviet authorities wanted the production level in the Eastern zone to 
be 2-3 times higher 
8 Smyser, W R, From Yalta to Berlin, p. 36-7 
9 Nettl, J. P., Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 1945-50, p. 125-7 
10 Neal, J. P., Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 1945-50, p. 105-6 
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than that envisaged by the ACC Plan of March 1946. " Sokolovsky also gave the SED a 
greater role in the administration of the Soviet zone by devolving some of the authority held 
by the Soviets. On June 4,1947, he ordered the establishment of the German Economic 
Council (DWK) under SED control as the civilian administration for the Soviet zone. 
Ulbricht used the DWK to complete SED control over the civilian administration of the 
Soviet zone and intended to use the DWK to replace the Soviet authorities and to establish a 
separate East German civilian administration. 12 By 1948, the share of private industry had 
shrunk to 39% of the total industrial production and the state-owned trading organisation 
established by the newly-appointed German Economic Commission rapidly gained control 
of trading activities. The land reform of the early post-war period gave way to the beginning 
of collectivisation and the central command of the economy, established with the Two Year 
Plan 1949-50.13 
The Soviet input in the polarisation process has a distinct revolutionist trait. By sovietising 
the Eastern zone, the Soviets created the basis for the political rehabilitation of the German 
territory under their command. Moreover, by linking sovietisation in Germany to the 
creation of a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, the Soviets ensured the configuration of 
a permanent foothold in Germany and the integration of the Eastern zone into the nascent 
Communist bloc. This would significantly contribute to the creation of a bipolar situation in 
the international political system in which Germany would lack the capabilities or the 
inclination to seek the destruction of the society of states. 
" Communique issued by the SED, January 11,1947- Documents on Germany under Occupation 
1945-54, p. 202-3 
1z Smyser, W R, From Yalta to Berlin: the Cold War struggle over Germany, p. 37 
13 Berghahn, V R., Modern Germany: society, economy and politics in the twentieth century, p. 
196-7 
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The merging of the American and British zones of occupation, implemented on January 1, 
1947, represented another important milestone in the path towards the partition of Germany 
and Europe. The evolution toward Bizonia stemmed from the `grand design' scheme of a 
free-market international economic system, as envisaged by influential elements in the 
American establishment. This `grand design' involved the reconstitution of Germany as the 
engine of a liberal economic system in Europe, capable of absorbing American capital and 
goods and preventing a return to an autarkic economic system in Europe. 14 Although the 
ACC kept operating and passing legislation affecting the whole of occupied Germany, 
Bizonia effectively put an end to the possibility of four power control and economic unity 
under a central government and set the tone for the division of Europe into two 
ideologically-orientated blocs. 
The diplomatic stalemate of the Moscow CFM of 1947 precipitated the partition of 
Germany. A revised plan for level of industry in Bizonia became operational on August 29, 
1947. The revised plan provided for the retention of an industrial capacity approximate to 
`the level of industry prevailing in Germany in 1936'. The plan established that the bizonal 
area had to be prepared `to exchange [... ] proportionately larger quantities of industrial 
products in return for necessary food and raw material imports'. 15 The setting of Bizonia 
brought the French into a trizonal agreement for the Western zones. The Coal Conference 
at Washington in August 1947 had recommended the transfer of coal production to German 
14 The influence of the Council on Foreign Relations in the post-war thinking of the State Department, 
particularly in regards to the rehabilitation of Germany, is well documented. The `grand design' consisted in the 
creation of an international system which would provide an `elbow room' for the development of the US 
g economy along free-market lines. See Shoup, L and 'Minter, W., Imperial Brain Trust-The Council on Forein 
Relations and the United States Foreign Policy (Author Choice Press: New York, Lincoln, NE and Shanghai) (1977), 
Smith, N., American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (Berkeley, CA and London 
University of California Press) (2003) 
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hands and supply to Western Europe. On August 22-27,1947 British, American and French 
Governments representatives met in London to discuss matters relating to the level of 
industry in Bizonia and the management and control of the Ruhr mines and German 
economic resources, establishing a bipartite coal control group and the formation of a 
German coal management board on November 19,1947. " 
In a politically orientated move, in January 1948 Clay and Robertson summoned the German 
Minister Presidents and leaders of Bizonal Economic Council and recommended the 
doubling of the size of the Economic Council, the creation of a second chamber (made up 
of representatives of the Länder), a new Executive Committee under a single Chair, the 
formation of a High Court, the development of a central bank and the fiscal reorganisation 
of Bizonia.. " The Bizonal Economic Council set up a Department of the Bizonal 
Economic Administrations to deal with matters including the `problems of finance and 
subsidies connected with the coal industry as may concern the Economic Council', `labour 
matters in the coal industry which are the concern of the Economic Council' and `local 
allocations within the Bizonal area'. A German Coal Management (Deutsche Bergbau Leitung) 
was set up in Essen and became responsible for the direction of production and distribution 
of coal. '8 
On February 9,1948 the Bizonal Economic Administration was reconstituted, consisting of 
an Economic Council, a Länderrat; an Executive Conunittee and certain additional agencies. 
15 Revised Plan for the Level of Industry in the Bizonia, August 29,1947-Documents on Germany under 
Occupation 
1945-54, p. 239-45 
16 Communique on discussions between representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and 
France 
in London, August 28,1947-Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54, p. 238-9 
17 Eisenberg, C. W., Drawing the line: the American decision to divide Germany, 1944-1949, p. 366 
18 From the Anglo-American Announcement of the establishment of the Bipartite Coal Control Group and the 
German Coal Management Board-Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54, p. 259-60 
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The Economic Council had the powers to adopt and enact ordinances on the administration 
of railways, maritime ports and coastal shipping, inland water transport, inter-Land inland 
waterways, intellectual property, communications and postal services, customs and the 
management of Bizonal Civil Service. The Länderrat, composed of two representatives from 
each Land, was put in charge of passing legislation on matters within the competence of the 
Economic Council other than in respect of taxation or the appropriation of funds. The 
Executive Committee would be in charge of the administration of their respective functions, 
including the issue of implementing regulations under existing and future Bizonal legislation. 
19 Also on February 9,1948 a German High Court for the Combined Economic Area 
(Obergericht für das vereinigte Wlirtschaftsgebiel) was established in Cologne. "' The final decisive 
act towards partition was provided by the currency reform introduced in the Western zones 
on 20 June 1948 with the Deutsche Mark replacing the Reichsmark at one tenth of the value 
of the currency circulating in the Western Zones at the time, a move replicated by the Soviet 
Union in the Eastern zone. 21 
The failure of the Allies to agree on common guidelines for a united Germany at the 
Moscow and London CFM in 1947 prompted Washington to proceed with their plans to 
rehabilitate the Western zones and create a political foothold via the Marshall Plan and the 
consolidation of a Western European political and military bloc. In a simultaneous approach, 
the Soviet Union consolidated its own bloc by sovietising the Eastern zone and solidifying 
the rapprochement of the Eastern European countries to Moscow. 
19 British Military Government Ordinance no. 126, February 9,1948-Documents on Germany under 
Occupation 1945- 
54, p. 268-75 
20 British Military Government Ordinance no. 127, February 9,1948- Documents on Germany under 
Occupation 
1945-54, p. 275-79 
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However, the clash of ideologies did not prevent the emergence of an international order 
capable of accommodating the two blocs. The United States and its Allies found it 
impossible to isolate the Soviet bloc from the post-war international order because of the 
increased level of institutionalisation of the international society, the management of the 
spheres of influence system and their ongoing interest over the German Question. The 
polarisation of the post-war international society created during the occupation of Germany 
was achieved through an unprecedented level of great power interventionism, which was 
tempered by the existence of an international political system based on the tolerance for the 
diversity of interests. The common interests of the superpowers in the management of their 
respective spheres of influence entailed that both the Soviet Union and the Western bloc 
shared the civihsational requirements necessary for co-existence. 
Interventionism, informed by the ideological pursuit of the national interest, unfolded within 
the framework of coexistence. The superpowers proceeded to apply this modus operandi in 
their zones of occupation in Germany and ultimately in their spheres of influence. The 
interaction of conflict, cooperation and legality in the evolution towards German partition 
provided the superpowers with an example that would inform their actions during the next 
40 years: ideologically-driven competition would not lead to a situation of hot conflict. The confrontation 
over Germany informed ideological competition in the post-war international order. The 
Cold War seldom, if ever, got hot enough to disrupt an international order beneficial to the 
superpowers. 
21 British Military Government Law no. 61, June 20,1948- Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54, p. 
292- 
4 
22 Gong argues that the concept of standard of `civilisation' remains an integral part of international society. 
He 
defines this standard as the state in which a `civilised' constituent of international society guarantees 
basic 
rights, exists as an organised political bureaucracy, has some self-defence capacity and adheres to general 
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6.4 The institutionalisation of the post-war international society 
Another important transformation brought about by the treatment of the German Question 
during the 1943-8 period was the increasing institutionalisation of international society. The 
revisionist challenge launched by Nazi Germany necessitated a kind of interventionism on 
the part of the superpowers which was aimed at preventing a new, and potentially 
catastrophic, destruction of the society of states. 
The legal constitution of the post-war international society had its origins in the Allied 
interest of preventing a repeat of the disruption caused by the Hitlerite assault on the 
international order. Because of the diversity of interests among the Allies, the wartime 
practical association framework required a strong legal and institutional framework in order 
to operate successfully. The Lend-Lease articles, the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations 
Declaration of 1942, the declaration of unconditional surrender made at the Casablanca 
Conference in 1943 and the intense summit diplomacy in which the Allies engaged upon, 
would have a significant impact in the institutionalisation of the post-war international order. 
The intense diplomatic intercourse and the law-making process that originated from the 
treatment of the German Question created the conditions for the institutionalisation of the 
post-war international society. This institutionalisation had its corollary in the establishment 
of the United Nations organisation and its subsidiary institutions, the economic institutions 
set up in Bretton Woods conference and the extension of international regimes after the war. 
It is however the formation of the spheres of influence system what gave the 
institutionalisation of post-war international society its ultimate shape. The spheres of 
principles of international law and the international system. See Gong, G., The 
Standard of `Civilitiation' in 
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influence imposed through the superpowers' role in the treatment of the German Question 
set up the boundaries for intervention and restricted the possibility of disruptive conflict. 
This balance of power, already envisaged in the `percentages agreement' between Churchill 
and Stalin in 1944, was primarily and decisively shaped in Germany before it became fait 
accompli in the rest of Europe. Whilst during 1945-6 the political situation in Central and 
Eastern Europe was evolving toward an increasing Soviet influence (especially in Romania 
and Bulgaria), the situation was less clear in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, where the 
non-Communist leadership had hoped for more resolute support by the Western Allies. It 
appears however, that the United States was prepared to let Central and Eastern Europe into 
the Soviet sphere and focus its efforts on reconstituting Western Europe, choosing to 
replace their `one world' vision with a `half world' option. 23 In that context, the 
rehabilitation of Western Germany and Western Europe would benefit the United States 
because of the degree of development of the Western European economies and industrial 
networks. The economic crisis of 1946, the breakdown of four power control at ACC level 
and the possibility of a single reconstituted Germany tipping toward Moscow prompted 
Byrnes' invitation to the other occupation powers to merge their zones of occupation with 
the American zone in September 1946. The intervention of the superpowers created a split 
in Germany which arrested and reversed a situation of `latent tripolarity'. 
24 The setting of an 
independent Germany was clearly against the `grand design' objectives of the superpowers. 
An independent Germany would have made the attainment of a free market reorganisation 
of the world economy on the American model more difficult, if not impossible. 
The Nazi 
regime had aimed for the creation of a pan-European autarkic bloc since the 1930s. During 
International Society, (Clarendon Press: Oxford) (1984), p. 14-5 
23 See Lundestad, G., The American Non-Polly Towards Eastern Europe 1943-1947, (Tromsö, Oslo, Bergen: 
Universiteitsforlaget) (1978) 
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the war, there was a great deal of industrial and transport integration between Germany, the 
Low Countries and France. An independent Germany would have been more prone to 
establish an autarkic bloc in Europe, therefore excluding the goods and capital that the 
United States needed to export in order to avoid another economic depression. Moreover, 
the establishment of a reconstituted single German political unit would have created 
enormous apprehension in Moscow, for the Soviet Union would have seen its security 
compromised by a potential revival of nationalism in Germany. 
The `pluralist plus' elements in the institutionalisation of the post-war international society 
are manifested in the way both superpowers adhered to a strict recognition of the spheres of 
influence in Europe. The Western powers refrained from intervening during the East 
German crisis (1953), and the uprisings in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). The 
Soviet Union did little to profit from the politically volatile situation in the United States in 
the 1960s and Italy and Germany in the 1970s. 25 The superpowers seldom intervened 
outside of their respective spheres of influence. 26 Intervention on the part of the United 
States and the Soviet Union helped to establish a post-war international society based on 
institutionalised co-existence. This institutionalisation process had its apogee with the signing 
of the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which legalised the division of Germany and Europe into 
spheres of influence. 27 
24 See McAllister, J., No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954, (Cornell University Press) (2002) 
25 The Italian Communist Party (PCI) distanced itself from the Red Brigades movement in the 1970s. See 
Alexander, Y. and Pluchinsky, D. A., Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organi1ationr. (London: 
Routledge) (1992) 
26 In the case of the Cuban Missiles Crisis and the Middle East, typical examples of intervention beyond the 
spheres of influence boundaries, diplomatic engagement succeeded in avoiding an irretrievable breakdown of 
the Cold War international order. 
27 The Helsinki Accords set up the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE in order to 
promote East-West co-operation. The Helsinki Final Act held the post-World War Two European border 
arrangements to be permanent, and the signers agreed to respect the human rights and civic freedoms of their 
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For the duration of the Cold War, the German Question would remain a structuring factor 
in the institutionalisation of the society of states. The Allies had a decisive say in the 
origination, unfolding and unraveling of the German Question. The German Question 
would take the centre stage of Cold War diplomacy. The ongoing concerns of the 
superpowers over Germany prompted the continuation of an assiduous diplomatic 
intercourse. The Final Act of the London Conference on October 3,1954 endorsed the 
frontiers of Germany as provisional, pending a comprehensive peace settlement with a 
future all German government. Reunification was further discussed at the Geneva 
Conferences in 1955 and 1959 as well as the Paris Summit in 1960, the Vienna Conference 
between Khruschev and Kennedy in 1961, the Nassau Agreement of 1962 and the Partial 
Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The same Rationalist approach employed by the Allies in achieving 
a bipolar solution during the 1943-8 was utilised in order to pave the way for detente in the 
1970s. Furthermore, the reunification of Germany in 1990 unraveled the Cold War 
international order within the same legal and diplomatic framework that brought about the 
two states settlement in the wake of World War Two. The Treaty of Paris (1990) officially 
ended the Cold War with an arms reduction and a conflict prevention treaty, as well as the 
reduction of stationed military forces in designated geographical zones in Central and 
Western Europe and on the flanks of the Soviet Union. The Charter issued by this congress 
undertook to `build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of 
government)) in Europe'. 28 These legal provisions were supplemented by the Treaty on the 
citizens, as well as to undertake various forms of international co-operation. Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki, August 1,1975- www. hri. org/docs/Helsinki75. htm1 
28 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris 19-21,1990- 
wwwl. umn. edu/humanrts/peace/docs/chartei: paris. htn-l 
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Final Settlement with Respect to Germany signed in Moscow on September 12,1990, which 
legalised the reunification of Germany. 29 
The spheres of influence system was conducive to a `pluralist plus' situation, as polarisation 
in Germany and Europe provided the superpowers with a framework of cooperation in the 
aim of securing a `peace of sorts' but left considerable scope for the inner dynamics in the 
respective spheres of influence. The `peace of sorts' achieved through the spheres of 
influence system required considerable diplomatic efforts as well as a sound legal framework, 
because of the extent of the responsibilities and accumulation of power amassed by the 
superpowers during the war and the extension of the franchise in international society. It 
was in no small part due to the institutionalisation of the international order that the Cold 
War settlement remained undisrupted until its very demise. 
6.5 The German Question and the expansion of international society 
The treatment of the German Question created an expansion of the constituency of the 
society of states. This process originated with the intervention of the United States and the 
Soviet Union in the political emasculation of Germany and Europe as well as the gradual 
absorption of former colonies into their spheres of economic influence. 
In the aftermath of World War One, the victorious European powers had kept their political 
autonomy intact. Their imperial possessions (if not their economic influence) had even 
increased in number, due to the demise of the German, Austrian and Ottoman Empires. 
Conversely, superpower intervention during World War Two meant that Washington would 
29 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Moscow, 
September 12.1990-usa. usembassy de/etexts/2plusfour8994e htm 
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have a foothold in Western Europe, Eastern Asia, as well as an unchecked influence in Latin 
America and the decolonised parts of the world. In addition to this, the Soviet Union would 
have a significant impact in the process of the expansion of the society of states and in the 
achievement of a more general equilibrium of power. 30 Indeed, the German invasion of the 
Soviet Union in June 1941 and the subsequent advance of the Red Army into the West 
during the Great Patriotic War created a permanent presence of the Soviet Union in Central 
and Eastern Europe, depriving the countries occupied by the advancing armies of any 
possibility of political autonomy. Whereas the European imperial powers extended and 
preserved their power in the nineteenth century with regards to a delicate balance of power, 
the United States and the Soviet Union had carte blanche to extend their interests in 
Germany and Europe due to their overwhelming military and economy power. Economic 
and political interests made it incumbent upon them that Europe as a whole and Germany in 
particular would have a politically subordinated role. 
The extensive nature of World War Two gave the society of states a truly global dimension. 
The revisionist challenge initiated by Germany necessitated the contribution of a large 
constituency in the war effort. 31 World War Two unfolded in vast chunks of the Eurasian 
landmass and the Asia-Pacific region. New technologies like the radar as well as atomic and 
ballistic weapons created an interconnection between the different fronts and brought to the 
30 Bull, H., The ReeoltAgainst the West in Bull, H. and Watson, ýk., The Expansion of international Society, (Clarendon 
Press: Oxford) (1984), p. 224-7 
31 The Declaration of the United Nations of January 1,1942. The Declaration signatories included the United 
States, the United Kingdom and the Dominions, the Soviet Union and China which subscribed to the aims of 
the Atlantic Charter and pledged to `employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of 
the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war' and to `co-operate with the 
Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies'. The 
declaration was open to `other nations... rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for 
victory over Hitlerism'. Declaration by the United Nations- January 1,1942- 
http: //Wwwcivicwebscom/cwvlib/constitutions/un/e 
united nations declaration 1942. htm 
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fold political realities that had seemed distant thus far. The eruption of resistance 
movements in Europe and Asia made certain the possibility of decolonisation and 
geopolitical redress. This new political reality was acknowledged by the superpowers. Both 
the United States and the Soviet Union would benefit enormously from the extension of the 
franchise in the society of states. The decentralisation of authority in the international order, 
prompted by the German and Japanese invasion of Europe and Asia, coupled with the 
enormity and vastness of the war effort, created the chance for the two superpowers to 
expand their political objectives beyond Europe. 
The post-war international society retained strong `pluralist plus' aspects, as it was informed 
by the impositions of the spheres of influence system and the co-existence of ideologies. But 
the massive power accumulated by the United States and the Soviet Union during the war 
and the vacuum of power originated by the demise of Germany and Europe created the 
scope for more intervention in the international political system and the curtailment of 
sovereignty as one of the central institutions of the international order. The occupation and 
transformation of Germany would create a precedent that was later applied to the 
decolonised areas of the world. While the two blocs co-existed, the superpowers felt free to 
marshal their own spheres of influence and impart their own concept of order and justice 
within them. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The transformational aspects of the treatment of the German Question stemmed from the 
need to prevent the resurgence of Germany as a challenging power and the decline 
in the 
political autonomy of the European powers, expanding international society from 
its Euro- 
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centric core and giving it a truly global dimension. This process was facilitated by the 
increased institutionalisation of the international order. 
The transformation of the society of states would unfold within the parameters imposed by 
the interests of the superpowers. These interests gave rise to the need to intervene in the 
outcome of the German Question and create spheres of influence which would enable the 
two superpowers to coexist. Jackson states the `normative' nature of intervention during the 
Cold War. 32 This normative intervention had its most important precedent in the treatment 
of the German Question during the 1943-8. Jackson argues that the pluralist construction of 
world politics and international society entails `multiple political authorities based on the 
values of equal sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention of member states' and 
can arrangement in which the domestic affairs of states are their own affairs'. 33 In the case of 
the inter-Allied intercourse over Germany, the need to intervene in order to recreate the 
post-war international order according to long range political and economic objectives was 
not juxtaposed with the normative requirement to configure a society of states capable of 
cohabitating in spite of their diversity of ideologies. This `pluralist plus' configuration was 
decisive in the transformation of international society. Intervention would entail the 
transformation of Western Europe by ending the internal balance of power. In the case of 
Eastern Europe, adherence to the bloc institutions created by Communist diktat gave rise to 
the creation of an economic and political sphere which rehabilitated a region ravaged 
by the 
war. Co-existence would determine the parameters of the transformation as well as create 
the basis for continued dialogue. It is partly because of the tacit acknowledgement of an 
32 Jackson, R., The Global Covenant-Human Conduct in a World of States, pp. 254-5 
33 Jackson, R., The Global Covenant-Human Conduct in a World of States, pp. 178-9 
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international order composed by two camps that the Cold War unfolded in a non-disruptive 
manner from beginning to end. 
From a solidarist perspective, Vincent argues that in the case of the Soviet bloc non- 
intervention took second place to shared interests and goals. 34 However, the principle of 
non-intervention did apply to relations between the socialist and capitalist blocs. This seems 
to back up a `pluralist plus' interpretation: both in the case of the German Question and the 
overall realignment of international society after the war intervention served as a tool to 
demarcate the parameters of the institutionalisation of the international order. This `selfish 
interventionist' approach enabled the Allies to operate within their spheres of influence 
without seeking an overhaul of the international order. By doing so, they achieved the 
double aim of respecting the diversity of interests and ideologies in the international order 
and managing the Cold War international political system without systemic disruption. 
A typical anarchic and pluralist condition had shaped the international political system after 
1919. The Versailles settlement imposed the segregation of the Soviet Union, the American 
retreat from the international arena and the failure to achieve an effective institutionalisation 
of the international order. This can be seen in the relative weakness of the League of 
Nations and the fiasco of the Genoa Conference of 1922, which had as its original intention 
to bring back to the fold the `pariah states' of Europe: the Soviet Union and Germany. 
Moreover, the Versailles system retained its Euro-centric nature, which precluded the 
expansion of international society. Conversely, since 1943 the Allies transformed 
international society using solidarist elements. While the superpowers retained an overall 
34 Vincent R. J. 
, 
Non-Intervention and the International Order, p. 187 
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pluralist approach to their association over the German Question and the management of 
the nascent international political system, the extent and scope of the responsibilities which 
burdened America and the Soviet Union were significantly larger than those imposed upon 
the European powers until the outbreak of World War Two. The Allied treatment of the 
German Question during the 1943-8 period resulted in the setting of institutions, regimes 
and diplomatic and legal structures that would regulate the management of the international 
political system after the war. This `pluralist plus' making of the post-war international 
society would kickstart another important break in the history of the society of states. The 
surrender of the German state to the Allies would entail the reconstitution of international 
society according to an eroded view on sovereignty and the beginning of an interventionist 
era. Washington and Moscow would influence the political and economic process within 
their spheres of influence according to a `selfish solidarist' criterion. Furthermore, the 
surrender of the German state would create a precedent which would be used in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Kosovo and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. The defeat of Germany in 
the battlefield would enable the superpowers to reshape the foundations of the German 
state(s). In a similar manner, the military intervention on the part of NATO forces in the 
Balkans in the 1990s and Iraq and Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 would give rise to 
the creation of new state structures and the imposition of democracy and the free market by 
great powers such as the United States and the European Union. 
The revolutionist aspects of the treatment of the German Question overlapped with the 
legal dimension in which the Allies operated. The superpowers undertook the process of 
transformation in order to enforced long range interests. The transformation of Germany 
and Europe would have a long lasting effect. While the political subordination of the 
continent ended in 1989-90, the transformative aspects that shaped the outcome of the 
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German Question continue to inform the European political order. The creation of a single 
economic sphere dates back to the intervention of the United States in the ending of the 
internal balance of power system in Western Europe. However, Europe continues to be 
bound by the financial, political and military institutions established through the treatment of 
the German Question during 1943-8. The legacy of great power intervention remains one of 
the key elements informing the process of integration in the European continent as the 
expansion into the East unfolds within the parameters enforced by the supranational 
institutions based in Brussels and Strasbourg and the sway of the biggest economic bloc in 
the world. 
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CONCLUSION 
The German Question, the English School and the origins of the Cold War 
This study undertakes to explain the origins of the Cold War from the perspective of the 
inter-Allied treatment of the German Question. It endorses the view that the conflictual, 
legalistic and transformative aspects of inter-Allied interaction regarding Germany were the 
most significant factor in the making of the post-war international order. Linking the English 
School's theoretical tenets to the understanding of the treatment of the German Question 
allows us to re-appraise the role of international relations theory in the assessment of the 
polarisation process that unfolded in the international political system in the aftermath of 
World War Two. This study endeavours to practically apply the concepts espoused by the 
English School to the theoretical evaluation of a system-defining historical issue like the 
treatment of the German Question between 1943 and 1948. To summarise my findings, I 
will undertake to make some conclusions on the centrality of the German Question in the 
making of the post-war international order and the relevance of English School thinking in 
explaining system defining issues in the history of the international political system. 
The divergence of interests between the superpowers ultimately brought about the 
polarisation of Germany and Europe. However, conflict overlapped with the entrenchment 
of a diplomatic and legal framework capable of sustaining a non-disruptive international 
order in which the superpowers would be able to pursue their national interest within clearly 
defined spheres of influence. These developments facilitated the transformation of the 
society of states. Dealing with the German Question entailed the undertaking of a significant 
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transformation of the country and subsequently, of the society of states as a whole. As seen 
in chapters 5 and 6, the denazification process that unfolded in Germany through the inter- 
Allied occupation had a revolutionist effect in the defeated nation and created several 
transformations in the society of states. During the 1943-8 period, ideological rivalries, 
which loomed as the result of dealing with Germany on and off the battlefield, were 
reflected in the configuration of post-war international society. In effect, the concern with 
ideology became the ideology of the post-war society of states. ' Furthermore, the disruptive 
nature of the Hitlerite quest for domination in Europe would create an extension and an 
institutionalisation of international society unparalleled in the history of the international 
political system. Pointing to an internationalisation of the system, Luard maintains that 
ideological loyalties (which transcend national boundaries) become as important in 
determining action as national loyalties, as states are more affected by developments 
elsewhere. Z As the states-system expanded outside its European core, the extent over which 
a general balance of power was to be maintained, increased correspondingly. 3 The treatment 
of the German Question between the Casablanca Conference of 1943 and the breakdown of 
four power control in 1948 was the most significant factor in the creation and evolution of 
the post-war international order. 
The literature available on the German Question has so far attempted to explain isolated 
aspects of the subject. By using a more comprehensive approach, this study has shown that 
in the interaction of the superpowers in the treatment of the German Question, elements of 
1 Luard, E., Types of international Society, p. 69 
2 Luard, E., Types of international Society, p. 103-4 
Wight, M., The Balance of Power and International Order in James, A. (ed), The Bases of International Order-Essays in 
Honour of CA W Manning, (Oxford University Press: London and New York) (1973), p. 100-8 
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conflict, legality and cooperation overlapped and shaped the position of Germany in the 
post-war international order. This work also contributes to determine the extent of the 
influence of the treatment of the German Question on the origins of the Cold War and the 
making post-war international order. Like the treatment of the German Question, the 
realignment of the post-war international order unfolded within the boundaries imposed by 
two superpowers labouring under highly calculated political moves, which although 
responding to the national interest, were restrained in their scope of action. The Allies set 
the path for the reconciliation of Germany's legitimate claims in the international political 
system and the elimination of the possibility of a post-war German challenge to the 
international order. The German Question was the most important issue in the reordering of world politics 
because of the extent to which all other situational factors were linked to its outcome. There would have 
been no successful outcome for the superpowers elsewhere in Europe (as far as their `grand 
design' interests were concerned) without a viable solution for the German problem. The 
treatment of the German Question created a modus operandi for superpower interaction 
which would be successfully transferred to the management of the Cold War international 
order. 
This study attempts to bring about a more comprehensive interpretation of the significance 
of the German Question in the making of the post-war international order. A more 
comprehensive and systemic understanding of the factors involved in the outcome of the 
German Question and its influence on the Cold War international could be facilitated by 
including areas which have been underworked by the Cold War scholarship. Any attempt to 
4 For the evolution of the Cold War in Germany see Mitchell, 0., The Cold War in Germany-Overview, Origins and 
Intelligence Wars (University Press of American: Lanham, MD) (2005) and Burchett, W., Cold 16'är in Germany 
(World Unity Publications: Melbourne) (1950) 
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better understand the pivotal character of the German Question in the making of the Cold 
War international order would have to incorporate more extensive accounts of the 
contribution of West and East German leaders to the bipolar outcome. Establishing the 
extent of the indigenous input in events leading up to partition would also enhance our 
understanding of the role of the German leadership on both sides of the Elbe in the 
unfolding of the German Question during the Cold War. The study of the role of Germany in 
the making of the Cold War international order could benefit from more systemic accounts, 
particularly in relation to the transformation that it brought to the international political 
system. Because of the holistic nature of its trilateral approach, and the relative importance 
of the debate on the pluralist and solidarist elements of international society, the English 
School could add more to the analysis of the German Question and the origins of the Cold 
War, by tackling the different aspects of the historiography available. 'The historiography on 
the German Question during this period is vast. The archival resources on the issues 
pertaining to it are voluminous. Therefore, the study of the subject could benefit from more 
narrative, non-Rankean accounts of the history of the treatment of the German Question 
and its implications of the post-war international order. A more systemic comprehension of 
what we know, focusing on conflictual, legal and revolutionist perspectives, would enable us to 
better understand the significance of Germany in the origins of the Cold War. 
Superpower interaction in the treatment of the German Question produced a peculiar 
restructuring of the international political system. The study of this realignment has 
profound implications for the pluralist-solidarist debate. Dealing with Germany on and off 
5 Roberts mentions my paper entitled `The German Question and the International Order (1943-8)'- 
www. leeds. ac. uk/polls/englishschool/-lewkowiczo5 doc as a practical application of English School concepts to 
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the battlefield prompted the involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in the 
remaking of the international order according to the principle of intervention. Bull warns 
that the solidarist conception of international society was not only `premature' but 
potentially detrimental to the international order of the society of states. ' Seen from this 
standpoint, we can arrive at the conclusion that the influence of the German Question on 
the making of the post-war international order resides in the `pluralist plus' elements with 
which it was bequeathed: intervention within legally-determined boundaries and the pursuit 
of the national interest within the spheres of influence imposed by the need to co-exist. The 
`pluralist-plus' ethic concocted by the superpowers through the treatment of the German 
Question became a system that restricted intervention to the inner dynamics of the spheres 
of influence and expanded the idea of co-existence. As such, it differed from the narrow, 
ultra-realist concept of pluralism and the over-ambitious concept of solidarism. Watson 
states that hegemonial practice entails the pursuit of the national interest, prudence 
(minimising risks to the state itself and also to the international society in which it operates) 
and moral responsibility. ' The modus operandi employed by the superpowers in the 
treatment of the German Question entailed the creation of a convivialist ethic within the 
context of legality and the possibility of transforming the society of states. 
Employing a more systemic approach in the study of the most significant issue in the making 
of the post-war international order has the effect of debunking ideologically constructed 
theories on the origins of the Cold War. By focusing on the systemic nature of the 
actual historical episodes. See Roberts, G., History and IR, Review of International Studies, Volume 32 Number 
4 October 2006, p. 709 
6 Bull, H., `The Grotian Concept of International Society' in Wight, M. and Butterfield H. (eds. ), Diplomatic 
Investigations, p. 68-73 
7 Watson, A., lecture notes for the CSD Encounter at the University of Westminster, June 5,2002 
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superpowers' structural interests, the nature of the legal and diplomatic framework and the 
transformative effect brought about by World War Two, it is possible to put together an 
interpretation that looks at the German problem and its influence of the Cold War from the 
perspective of the different elements attached to superpower interaction. 
The practical association framework, set in motion with the entry of the United States and 
the Soviet Union in the conflagration, enabled the Allies to implement cooperative policy 
not only to deal with the German Question but also to create a more progressive 
international order. As seen in chapter 4, the Rationalist streak involved in dealing with 
Germany during the war determined the evolution of the institutions of intervention and co- 
existence as pillars of the Cold War international order. It is by looking at these 
developments that the mainstream theories on the origins of the Cold War seem narrow in 
scope. The orthodox view appears to (almost blatantly) endorse `Soviet expansionism' as the 
main contributing factor in the creation of polarisation. Revisionism is also narrow-minded, 
for it also imputes an ideological response to the creation of conflict. By focusing on the 
conflictual character of the Cold War, the orthodox and revisionist views fail to address the 
nature of the post-war international order in a systemic way and neglect the consensual 
elements involved in its creation. Quite rightly, Leffler points to a lack of overall ynthesis in the 
`new' scholarship of the origins of the Cold War, emphasising that the full story will demand 
`to transcend the parts and concentrate on the whole'. $ 
Using a system-defining episode in the history of the international political system can also 
help us to refine core English School theoretical concepts. The trilateral tradition of 
8 Leffler, M., Bringing it Together. 
- 
The Parts and the Whole in Westad, O. A. (ed), Reviewing the Cold Id--an Approaches, 
Interpretations, Theory (Frank Cass: London and Portland, OR) (2000), p. 58 
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international relations theory outlined by Martin Wight hinges upon the psychological roots 
of human association. Let us take the example of a married couple. The couple, upon 
entering into the institution of marriage, swear to abide by the rules, principles and values 
which will sustain the basic functions of the relationship. They may undertake to be 
monogamous, to have mutual respect for one another, to share in the housekeeping duties 
and to contribute to the household expenditure. These undertakings represent the 
Rationalist aspects of the relationship. The rules and principles agreed upon by the couple, if 
honoured, may create the conditions to enhance and revolutionise the relationship. The 
couple might decide to have children, to spend romantic weekends together or buy a 
retirement home in the Caribbean. However, this couple may also have opposite views on 
politics, a different approach to expenditure and alternative ways of expressing their love for 
one another. These clashing views and attitudes represent the Realist aspects of the 
relationship. The association in which this couple enters into may be sustained for life or 
indeed end at some point. However, for the duration of the association there will be 
elements that will preserve, challenge as well as transform its context, thus providing it with 
its particular shape and meaning. 
Drawing an analogy between individuals and states, one may argue that in any constituted 
political order there are rules by which citizens abide. There are also group and individual 
interests, which create a competitive atmosphere between societal actors. At the same time, 
members of that political entity may feel a fundamental (and potentially transformative) 
sense of belonging. At international level, states may for instance share membership of 
international and supranational organisations. They may also be fierce about the protection 
of their national interest whilst pursuing it within the established boundaries. The dynamics 
between the member states of the European Union are an eloquent example of the 
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interaction between conflict, legality and transformation. A member-state like Poland may 
have a more affectionate view of her relationship with the United States than, for example, 
France and Germany. At the same time, a country like Poland may help to transform the 
notion of Europeanness with the mass migration of its people to the western part of the 
continent. In any case, these elements of conflict and cooperation unfold within the legal 
and diplomatic commitment that derives from this member-state's association within the 
supranational unit. The continual overlap of the three traditions provides the international 
political system with a sense of order. The treatment of the German Question between 
1943-8 is an example of how the three lines of interpretation collide, overlap and supplement 
each other. 
The treatment of the German Question determined to a significant extent the roadmap to 
the post-war international order and helped to shape the diplomacy and institutions that 
would inform superpower interaction during the Cold War. The German problem provided 
the superpowers with the opportunity to delineate their national interest priorities in the 
post-war scenario. The German Question would signpost the evolution of the Cold War. 
Conflictual issues, diplomatic and legal arrangements as well as the possibility of 
transformation in the international political system would be negotiated by the superpowers 
through the treatment of the German problem. The Cold War international order would end 
in the same way it began: through the orderly resolution of the German Question. The 
reunification of Germany and the European continent in 1989-90 would have similar 
characteristics to the process of partition: conflict and cooperation co-habited, framed within 
a well-established legal and diplomatic system. It is within that context that the superpowers 
created and unraveled the Cold War. 
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